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ABSTRACT 
Market risk exposures have grown considerably in financial firms during the last few years in 
the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC). With an increase in the growth and size of this market, 
it has become increasingly important to understand economic consequences behind these 
exposures. Extant literature lacks adequate research in this area and studies globally and in 
emerging types markets such as the GCC countries are scarce. This thesis is a rigorous 
empirical investigation of the interaction of three aspects of market risk disclosures 
determinants and consequences of GCC listed financial firms: corporate governance, 
investment efficiency and the implied cost of capital. Using a unique hand-collected dataset 
from 2007 to 2011, I developed mandatory and discretionary market risk disclosures indices 
based on the form (qualitative and quantitative) and number of market risk exposures (e.g. 
interest rate risk, foreign currency risk and equity risk) disclosed in annual reports by GCC 
financial firms. Then, based on this index, I generate discretion (disaggregation) in 
mandatory market risk disclosures (extent and quality) variable proxies.   
First, incorporating elements of agency theory, legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory, and 
resource-based dependency, I investigate the impact of a separate risk committee on the 
extent and quality of market risk disclosures. In particular, I test whether the extent and 
quality of market risk disclosures correspond to the existence of a separate risk committee, 
the risk committee characteristics and tests whether the role of a risk committee in affecting 
market risk disclosures varies with different stages in the firm life cycle. I find that firms with 
a separate risk committee are associated with greater extent and higher quality market risk 
disclosures. Furthermore, I find that risk committee qualifications and size have a significant 
positive impact on the market risk disclosures. Additional analysis shows that a risk 
committee plays a more crucial role in improving the market risk disclosures of mature firms 
than that of young firms.    
Second, I investigate the association between discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures 
and investment efficiency. I find both under- and over-investment are significantly negatively 
associated with discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures. Further, firms that follow 
both voluntary disclosure and discretion in mandatory risk disclosure enjoy better investment 
efficiency. Results are consistent with the theory that discretion in disclosures provides 
managers with alternative channels to provide more firm specific information, which reduces 
both adverse selection and moral hazard problems and thus improves investment efficiency.  
Third, I investigate the association between disaggregation in mandatory risk disclosures, 
auditor conservatism and the implied cost of equity capital. Disaggregation of disclosures 
specifically for market risk exposures of financial firms are informative and reveal more 
private risk information components. I find that the implied cost of equity capital is 
significantly negatively associated with discretionary disaggregation in mandatory market 
risk disclosures. Furthermore, the interaction between auditor conservatism and firms' 
disaggregation provides greater reduction to the implied cost of equity capital. These findings 
are robust when subjected to a series of sensitivity tests. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THREE ESSAYS ON MARKET RISK DISCLOSURES: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, INVESTMENT EFFICIENCY AND IMPLIED COST OF EQUITY 
CAPITAL 
 
Chapter 1 discusses the objectives, motivation, results and the contribution of the 
thesis. The thesis encompasses three interlinked essays (“objectives”) relating to the 
determinants and consequences of market risk disclosures evidence from Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries. The first essay investigates the determinants of market risk 
disclosures, and the existence of a risk committee. The second essay examines the impact of 
discretion in market risk disclosures, and voluntary disclosure on the financial firms’ 
investment efficiency. The third essay tests the association between disaggregation in market 
risk disclosures, auditor conservative and the implied cost of capital. Further, Chapter 1 will 
discuss the assumptions, and limitations, of this study.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The extensive trading of derivative financial instruments since the 1990s has been 
considered the main source of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Specifically, large 
derivative losses of financial institutions during Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) 
failure demonstrate the misuse of the derivative financial instruments by firms for both 
hedging and speculating purposes. However, market regulators have attributed the causes of 
these financial incidents to insufficient of financial instrument disclosures. Jorion (2002b) 
claims these crises possibly could have been avoided if derivative disclosures had been more 
timely and effective. Hence, in response to the crisis, securities’ regulators and authorities, 
and accounting standards setters have undertaken several reforms to enhance the risk-
management philosophy and improve the financial risk reporting.  
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Furthermore, the adoption of IFRS and Basel, a voluntary regulatory standard on bank 
requirements (Basel II- Pillar 3), are collectively expected to have a profound impact on the 
reporting of financial firms. In particular, the adoption of financial derivatives and market 
risk exposures standards (e.g., IFRS 7: Financial Instruments: Disclosures, IAS 32: 
Financial Instruments: Presentation, and IAS 39: Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement: Basel II: Pillar 3) have the potential to increase risk disclosures and 
transparency related to derivative and market risk exposures. The purported benefit by 
standard and regulatory setters is to improve comparability and transparency in financial 
reporting, thereby leading to more efficient contracting between various capital market 
participants, a lower cost of capital and reduce investment inefficiency (Armstrong et al. 
2010; Chen et al. 2013; Li 2010b) 
Prior research examined market risk disclosures (e.g., Ahmed et al. 2004; Barton and 
Bodnar 1994; Jorion 1990; Perignon and Smith 2010a; Rajgopal 1999; Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam 2000  Schrand 1997; Thornton and Welker 2004; Tufano 1996) and relied on 
agency theory and information asymmetry to explain disclosure patterns. By reducing ex-ante 
uncertainty through full disclosure, a firm will be able to reduce its cost of capital and 
improve investment efficiency (e.g., Campbell et al. 2014; Chen et al. 2013; Cheng et al. 
2013; Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2003; Solomon et al. 2000). Prior research has supported 
the theoretical justification for greater disclosure; however, these studies show firms are 
reluctant to provide full disclosure. For example, firms may not disclose specific disclosure 
items (Chalmers and Godfrey 2004; Verrecchia 2001b), may not disclose to avoid spill-over 
effects (Chen et al. 2013) or may not disclose due to a lack of an adequate and structured risk 
management system (Bich Tao and Hutchinson 2013). Empirical evidence (e.g., Eng and 
Mak 2003; Frankel et al. 1995; Taylor et al. 2008; Wan-Hussin 2009), have also indicated 
that various determinants may influence firms’ to provide more extensive disclosure on 
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specific issues. For example, Eng and Mak (2003), Armstrong et al. (2010), Beyer et al. 
(2010) Beekes and Brown (2006) have suggested a firm’s corporate governance structure is 
an important determinant of firm’s disclosure and transparency. Financial instruments and 
market risk exposures noticeably are considered a central issue of a firm’s financing structure 
which in turn influences capital of the firm’s management policy (Beattie et al. 2006). 
Therefore, the disclosure of market risk is highly related to a firm’s capital management 
policy (Beatty and Weber 2003).  
Clarity of communication in relation to financial market risk exposures is important as 
these market risk exposures can be complex and even specialised investors may not have a 
complete understanding of the processes and valuation inputs involved in the measurement of 
these instruments. For example, Hodder et al. (2001a) suggest that, if market risk information 
is disclosed in aggregated form, this will obscure essential information about the risk 
elements; investors will not be able to discount the market risk exposures for each 
component. Furthermore, aggregated risk disclosures cause individual investors to react 
differently compared to the situation if risk information is disaggregated (Hodder et al. 
2001a). This view also is supported by IFRS 7 [Parag. 40(a)] which requires firms’ to not 
disclose market risk information on an aggregated basis if, in doing so, it obscures important 
differences between individual transactions or associated risks. Failure to understand the 
nature of market risk exposures could potentially lead to a negative economic outcome for the 
firm (Dobler 2008). More specifically, in countries such as the GCC, where media reporting 
is lacking, regulatory enforcement mechanisms are lacking, and with stocks that are not 
consistently followed by analysts, firms tend to have inadequate risk management systems.   
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981 to strengthen the 
economic cooperation and development of six countries comprising Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia (K.S.A) and the United Arab of Emeritus (U.A.E). The GCC countries’ 
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income is largely reliant on oil and gas exports (Balli et al. 2011)). The oil crises of the 1970s 
and early 1980s led the GCC countries to adopt different strategies by investing oil and gas 
revenue in industries which can build a competitive advantage such as in petro-chemistry, 
banking, financial services, airline, real estate and telecommunications (Fasano and Iqbal 
2003). These strategies have created a reciprocal and trustworthy partnership with the U.S. 
and European counties which has attracted capital from investors of these regions and the rest 
of the world. A number of reforms that have assisted the GCC counties to create favourable 
macroeconomic conditions leading to improved capital inflows (Balli et al. 2011). These 
reforms are reflected by fiscal discipline, low interest rates (on average between 3%to 4% in 
some cases), minimum translation of costs and uncertainty about capital repatriation, and new 
laws and governance to protect property rights, reduce corruption and ease ownership 
restrictions, and mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).  
Researchers suggest these reforms are considered an important strategy of moving 
away from oil dependency. For example, Balli et al. (2011, 436) states that these types of 
reforms 
“can be seen as a smart move as they are moving away from oil dependency to create 
industry and service-based economies capable of rivaling other economies in the 
international markets. The combined outcomes of this overall dynamic are that the GCC 
markets have become more and more important over the years for investors seeking higher 
returns and workers seeking better opportunities and for countries seeking investment 
projects.”  
 
The GCC countries also have pledged and attained stages in achieving the 
international liberalization. For example, in May 2014, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar 
both were upgraded to emerging market status by index compiler Global Equity (MSCI) 
(GulfBusiness, 2014).1 Prior evidence confirms the high capital inflow to the GCC. 
Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2007) find international investors include the GCC region in 
                                                          
1<http://gulfbusiness.com/2014/06/experts-call-for-better-regulation-of-gcc-stocks-post-arabtec-
saga/#.U_2qiPmSx8F> 
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their investment portfolio due to risk diversification. Mina (2007) finds that the utilization of 
oil revenue in GCC leads to higher foreign direct investment (FDI).  
Recently, the resignation of Arabtec’s CEO, who had unexpectedly purchased a large 
stake in the firm, had fuelled rumours of management turmoil, leading the share price to 
halve in less than a month, erasing some US 3.9 billion of market value and shares in stock 
markets fell to 6.7 percent (Businessweek, 2014).2 Arabtec has declined to answer important 
questions about its business strategy and its relationship to major shareholders. Shakeel 
Sarwar, the head of major fund manager Securities & Investment Co. in Bahrain, states that 
“These types of things do not happen in developed markets, where regulators play an active 
role in ensuring transparency” (GulfBusiness, 2014). The former incident (among others) 
provides evidence of the pressure and desire for capital markets in the GCC to promote 
further transparency and quality reporting development. 
  Indeed, financial institutions of GCC countries were exposed to a range of financial 
risks including interest-rate, foreign exchange, credit, liquidity and equity risks. Investment in 
foreign exchange and circulation has become an essential element in the portfolio of 
institutional investors. The Economics (2008)3, the daily newspaper of Saudi Arabia, reported 
in 2008 that the daily foreign currency trades in the GCC were equivalent to three trillion 
dollars of U.S. currency, more than 20 times the average daily trading volume on the New 
York Stock Exchange. Moreover, a report in the Al-Watan newspaper in Kuwait documented 
that investment in stocks accounted for 40% of total investments for insurance companies in 
the GCC in 2013.4 Investment in the GCC stock market is very risky as this market has a 
historical record of very high volatility. For example, during 2005, the stock price in the 
Saudi stock market rose by 98%; in the Kuwait Stock Exchange, the stock price increased by 
87%; in Qatar’s stock market, the stock price rose by 68%; the stock price rose in Oman by 
                                                          
2 <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-06-24/why-did-the-dubai-stock-market-crash> 
3 For details, please visit <http://www.aleqt.com/2008/02/20/article_129493.html>. 
4 See <http://alwatan.kuwait.tt/articledetails.aspx?Id=368227> in Arabic. 
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31%; and in the Bahrain Stock Exchange, the stock price jumped by 24%. In addition, the 
assets of hedging funds management in GCC markets have been growing from 135 U.S. 
dollars to 2024 billion US dollars in 2009. However, these funds in the GCC revealed 
inadequacy of risk management specifically during the financial crisis.  
Currently, substantial resources are devoted to the disclosure of information within 
the annual report and other types of media without any clear indication of matching benefits 
to both the users, preparers and other producers of these annual reports (Stocken and 
Verrecchia 2004). Researchers are interested in advancing an understanding of the 
determinants and consequences between the extent and quality of disclosures, cost of capital, 
corporate governance, investment efficiency. Thus, this thesis will shed the light on the 
determinants and consequences of market risk disclosures in the Gulf Cooperation Countries 
(GCC).  
2. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
Studies that use U.S. stock price and return data suggest that market risk disclosures are 
useful and informative (e.g., Ahmed et al. 2004; Barton and Bodnar 1994; Jorion 1990; 
Perignon and Smith 2010a; Rajgopal 1999; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 2000 ; Schrand 
1997; Thornton and Welker 2004; Tufano 1996). The extent and quality of market risk 
disclosures may impact investors in several ways. For example, Lim and Tan (2007,p.366) 
suggest that “investors perceive the earnings of firms with substantial market risk exposure to 
be less persistent, and adjust the future abnormal earnings for the higher risk exposure. Thus, 
this results in a lower expected rate of return”. Previous studies also investigate different 
determinants and consequences of market risk disclosures from non-U.S. economics (e.g., 
Amran et al. 2008; Hassan 2009; Othman and Ameer 2009). This thesis provides further 
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information on the determinants of market risk disclosures. In doing so, this thesis addresses 
the following three objectives using evidence obtained from the GCC firms.  
 Objective 1: Market risk disclosures, corporate’s life cycle and board risk committee 
(RC): Evidence from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
 
 Objective 2: Discretion in market risk disclosures and investment efficiency: 
Evidence from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
 
 Objective 3: Disaggregation in market risk disclosures, auditor conservative and the 
implied cost of capital: Evidence from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
 
3. SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND SIGNIFICANCE CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
This section discusses the summary of results and discussion, and the significant contribution 
for each objective separately.  
3.1 Objective 1: Market risk disclosures, corporate’s life cycle and board risk committee  
 
The purpose of the essay that investigates objective 1 is to examine the impact of risk 
committee (hereafter RC) concentration and specialization, and the stages of a firm’s life 
cycle in affecting market risk disclosures in the Gulf Cooperation Council region. In 
particular, I test whether the existence of a RC has an impact on the extent and quality of 
market risk disclosures. I also examine the relevance and significance of RC characteristics in 
explaining the extent of market risk disclosures. Furthermore, I study whether the role of the 
RC in affecting market risk disclosures varies with different stages in a firm’s life cycle.   
3.1.1 Summary of results 
 
The findings suggest that a stand-alone RC significantly improves the extent and 
quality of market risk disclosures. In particular, I find the association between RC and extent 
and quality of market risk disclosures are positive and statistically significant (p<.01). 
Moreover, when RC characteristics are taken into account, I find that RC qualifications and 
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size significantly (at p<.01) improve the extent of market risk disclosures. However, I fail to 
find any significant impact of the RC independence on the extent of market risk disclosures. 
In addition, results show that the RC plays a dominant role in enhancing market risk 
disclosures of mature stage firms as compared to that of younger stage firms. The latter result 
is consistent when using different life cycle measures. I use instrumental-variable (IV) 
techniques together with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation to mitigate endogeneity 
concerns. The IV results indicate that endogeneity cannot account for the positive 
relationship between the RC and extent of market risk disclosures.  
3.1.2 Significance 
 
The first objective of this study (“objective 1”) contributes to the governance and 
disclosure literature in some important ways. First, it extends the corporate governance 
literature by providing evidence that a separate RC has a significant impact on improving the 
extent and quality of market risk disclosures. While prior research (e.g., Mangena and Pike 
2005) document that the board audit committee (AC thereafter) characteristics have a positive 
impact in improving the disclosure process and monitoring effectiveness of the firm, prior 
research has not explicitly examined whether the RC can improve market risk disclosures. 
This study explicitly examines this association and thus sheds light on an aspect of reporting 
which is growing in importance in the GFC. Second, given the recent emphasis of regulatory 
bodies on strengthening risk management and risk reporting systems of financial firms and 
the overwhelming trend of firms to form a separate RC, an empirical study on the association 
between the formation of RCs and market risk disclosures is worthwhile and timely. This 
study responds to this call by investigating this association, suggesting that a separate RC can 
enhance shareholders’ interests through effective oversight of risk management and risk 
reporting. Third, I extend prior studies that document a positive association between firm size 
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and extent of risk disclosure. My results show that an RC plays a more significant role in 
enhancing market risk disclosures of mature-stage firms than that of young-stage firms. Thus, 
firm life cycle stages have important bearing on market risk disclosures. Finally, despite the 
pivotal role of disclosure in enhancing firms’ value and shareholders’ relationship, there has 
been comparatively little research on this issue from a developing country perspective. 
Hence, I draw on a sample of firms from the GCC, an economically and politically important 
region. This study provides an important opportunity to investigate the role of a separate RC 
in enhancing the extent and quality of risk disclosures in the presence of significant 
ownership concentration, the findings of which can be extrapolated to other developing 
countries. 
 
3.2 Objective 2: Discretion in market risk disclosures and investment efficiency 
 
In this essay that investigates “objective 2”, the effect of discretion in mandatory risk 
disclosures on investment efficiency5 of financial firms belonging to six emerging markets in 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region is examined. Specifically, I examine whether 
discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures reduces agency related issues stemming from 
under- and over-investment. I also investigate whether the presence of both voluntary 
disclosure and discretion in mandatory risk disclosures improves firms’ investment 
efficiency.   
3.2.1 Summary of results 
 
Using a sample of financial sector firms over the 2007- 2011 period, I provide 
evidence in support of the assertion that discretion in mandatory risk disclosures reduces both 
under-and over investment. Specifically, the negative and significant coefficients between 
                                                          
5 Investment efficiency refers to the propensity of a firm to undertake all the projects with only positive NPV. 
For this study, I define investment efficiency as the reduction of both under-investment and over-investment. 
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disclosure proxies and the investment efficiency (over- and under-investment) are consistent 
with the hypothesis that discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures improves the flow 
and precision of information, which may reduce information asymmetry and moral hazard 
problems. Furthermore, I find that the presence of both discretion in mandatory risk 
disclosures and voluntary earning disclosure (as proxied by earning growth) significantly 
improves firms’ investment efficiency by reducing both over- and under-investment. These 
results are robust to alternative specification of investment efficiency, market risk disclosures 
and endogeneity.    
3.2.2 Significance 
 
This study makes several important contributions. First, this study extends the disclosure 
literature by examining the impact of discretion in mandatory risk disclosure on investment 
efficiency. While prior literature investigates the association between financial reporting 
quality and investment efficiency (e.g.,  Biddle and Hilary 2006; Chen and Chen 2012; 
Cheng et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2011a; Biddle et al. 2009), to the best of my knowledge, there 
has been negligible research investigating the relation between discretion in mandatory risk 
disclosures and investment efficiency. I show that discretion in mandatory risk disclosures 
provides investors with credible information which reduces uncertainty and improves 
managerial decision-making. Second, results confirm the view that existence of both 
mandatory and voluntary disclosures is crucial for firms’ disclosure strategy (Einhorn 2005). 
Specifically, I document that presence of both discretion in mandatory risk disclosure and 
voluntary earnings disclosure has important implications for financial risk disclosure levels 
and investment decision-making. Third, while earlier studies (e.g.,  Biddle and Hilary 2006; 
Chen et al. 2011c) provide empirical evidence of investment efficiency in developed markets 
(e.g. U.S.) and in Asian emerging markets (e.g. China), there is far less research that focuses 
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on emerging markets from the GCC. Mandatory disclosure is more stringent in mature 
enforcement regimes (Einhorn 2005; Ostberg 2006), which in turn reduces opportunities for 
managers to provide disclosure. In this context, this essay investigates discretion in 
mandatory market risk disclosures of financial institutions of six GCC countries characterized 
by low levels of disclosure, weak enforcement regimes6, and lower investor protection (Al-
Yahyaee et al. 2011).7 Furthermore, although investment efficiency of non-financial firms has 
been investigated in prior studies, there is a lack of empirical evidence on the investment 
efficiency of financial firms. Indeed, firms belonging to the financial sector are generally 
more prone to issues relating to risk disclosure as these firms are subject to greater regulatory 
constraints (e.g., Central Bank regulation, Basel, and IFRS). Prior research on the financial 
industry and market risk reporting show that financial firms disclose more risk related 
information compared to that of other industries (e.g., Hirtle 2007; Nier and Baumann 2006; 
Perignon and Smith 2010a). Linsley and Shrives (2006) note that financial firms are highly 
risk oriented institutions and hence they suggest that risk disclosure of financial firms should 
be understood separately from that of firms belonging to other sectors. In this study, a sample 
of financial firms has been selected to investigate the association between discretion in 
mandatory risk disclosure and investment efficiency. 
3.3 Objective 3: Disaggregation in Market Risk Disclosures, Auditor Conservative and 
the Implied Cost of Capital 
In this study that investigates “objective 3”, the effect of discretionary disaggregation 
in mandatory market risk disclosures (disaggregation thereafter), auditor conservatism and 
the implied cost of equity (ICOE thereafter) on GCC financial firms is examined. First, I 
                                                          
6 For instance, weak and strength enforcement index developed by World-Bank shows a moderate score index 
for GCC, from 2007 to 2011, with a mean score of 4 (Oman; Bahrain; Kuwait, Qatar; U.A.E), minimum of 3 
and maximum of 5 in K.S.A. 
7 Furthermore, investor protection index extracted from World-Bank, from 2007 to 2011, illustrates that (on 
average) K.S.A scores the highest investor protection index of 6.48, while the U.A.E scores the lowest investor 
protection index of 4.3). 
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examine whether the disaggregation disclosure provides investors with more private risk 
information and, in doing so, whether this reduces the ICOE. Second, I investigate the role of 
auditor conservatism on the relation between discretionary disaggregation in mandatory risk 
disclosures and the ICOE. I hypothesize that the decomposition of mandatory market risk 
disclosures into their components reduces the ICOE through the provision of more 
information regarding a firm’s risk exposures and its capacity to deal with those risks. 
3.3.1 Summary of results 
 
I provide evidence to support the assertion that disaggregation reduces the ICOE. 
Disaggregation specifically in mandatory market risk disclosures significantly reduces the 
ICOE after controlling for firm-specific and country-specific governance factors. I find that 
disaggregation reduces the ICOE by between 12 basis and 22 basis points. I also find that the 
interaction between firms’ disaggregation and auditor conservatism has a significant impact 
in reducing a firm’s ICOE. These results are consistent after dividing the sample into two 
groups comprising conservative auditors and non-conservative auditors in line with the study 
by Tong and Sapra (2009).8 Results are robust to alternative econometric specifications (e.g., 
two-stage equations and serial-correlation dependence tests) and different measures of the 
ICOE, disclosure disaggregation and auditor conservatism.  
3.3.2 Significance 
 
This paper contributes to the work of Chen et al. (2011b) in several ways. First, my 
sample is derived from frontier-type markets that are characterized by a high level of 
dominance by government, family and ruling family on listed firms activities and governance 
structure. Second, my study proposes that disaggregation of risk disclosures is influential in 
                                                          
8 Tong and Sapra (2009) suggest that pooling samples that combine firms with aggressive auditors and those 
with conservative auditors may provide a false result. Hence, partitioning the sample size into two sub-samples 
may provide greater statistical power of the test. 
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reducing information asymmetry. Third, I investigate the interaction between disaggregation 
and existence of a conservative auditor, and its impact on the ICOE. Fourth, as an extension 
of prior studies that have investigated the disaggregation in mandatory earnings, special 
items, expenses and segment reporting (e.g., Botosan and Stanford 2005; Herrmann and 
Thomas 2000; Riedl and Srinivasan 2010; Venter et al. 2013), this study investigates the 
consequences of the disaggregation of mandatory market risk disclosures on the ICOE. Fifth, 
the financial sector is one of the few sectors in the GCC that is allowed by government to 
achieve full competition (Hertog 2012). Prior studies on the financial industry and market 
risk reporting shows that financial firms disclose relatively more comprehensive risk 
information than other industries (Nier and Baumann 2006; Perignon and Smith 2010a). 
There are less studies on the cost of equity capital in financial firms (e.g., El Ghoul et al. 
(2011)9; therefore, I draw the sample from GCC financial firms. 
Finally, in the GCC, most stocks rarely receive analyst coverage and few analyst 
recommendations which reduces firm-specific earnings’ forecasts (Bley and Saad 2012; Al-
Ajmi and Kim 2012).10 This creates a poor information environment which, in turn, leads to 
higher uncertainty regarding firm-specific information. Since most of the GCC-listed firms 
are not followed by analysts, the ICOE based on analyst coverage is much less extensive for 
the GCC countries. I provide a new approach for the ICOE, using a firm-specific realized 
earnings model by adopting the simultaneous portfolio measure of (Easton and Sommers 
2007). Recently, Larocque (2013) corroborated the Easton and Sommers (2007) model, 
                                                          
9 El Ghoul et al. (2011) investigate the disclosure of social responsibility and the cost of equity capital from 
mixed industries where financial firms dominated the sample. 
10 For example, Bley and Saad (2012) investigated the pricing of idiosyncratic risk and expected returns in the 
six frontier GCC countries using the asset pricing model. However, the asset pricing model provided none of the 
firms’ factors for the required stock return (Easley and O'hara 2004). Fama and French (1993) suggest that 
factors other than market risk may affect the required return. In addition, Lang et al. (2004) found only 2094 
earnings’ analyst forecast observations for multi-industrial firms from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate 
System (IBES) for 27 countries which had less investor protection spanning the period 1993–1996. Likewise, as 
my sample covers only six countries and one industry, I obtain a much smaller amount of earnings’ analyst 
forecasts (about 100 firm-year observations) from IBES and TAIB Research for my sample of financial firms 
from 2007–2011. 
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finding that correcting for predictable optimism in analyst forecast models lowers the 
abnormal growth of the ICOE models, but does not affect ex-post realized returns.11 In 
addition, I use a portfolio-specific measure which leads to exploiting the industrial-neutral 
commonalities (Barth et al. 2013).12  
4. ASSUMPTION AND LIMITATIONS 
 
This thesis has certain limitations and assumptions. This study focuses only on market 
risk disclosures of financial firms. Sophisticated market risk information such as “Value-at-
Risk (VaR)” is rarely disclosed by non-financial firms. However, there are other industries 
such as mining and utilities which might be subject to market risk disclosures that are not 
included in this thesis. Furthermore, there are number of large banking, financial, insurance 
and investment firms that are involved in market risk exposures in the GCC that are not listed 
on the GCC stock markets such as “International Gulf Bank” in Bahrain. These entities utilise 
and variably disclose market risk disclosures within annual reports. As these firms are not 
listed on the GCC stock markets, and hence do not have to report under the GCC listed rules 
and regulation, these firms are excluded from the study.  
Further, this thesis is confined to a five year period encompassing the 2007, 2008, 
2009, 2010, and 2011 financial years. It is assumed that this period is sufficient to adequately 
test the three objectives. Specifically, the adoption of IFRS 7: Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures is mandatory in all GCC countries from 2007.   
                                                          
11 Larocque (2013) estimates the realized return in Easton and Sommers (2007) model supplements for returns’ 
news and earnings’ news. This is also supported by Mohanram and Gode (2013) who indicate that removing 
predictable analyst errors leads to stronger association between the implied cost of capital, adjusted forecasts 
and realized return.  
12 For comparative purposes and so I can also take advantage of the varying benefits of each model, I use three 
models of ICOE based on firm-specific models: rt-oj is the implied cost of equity based on Ohlson and Juetnner-
Nauroth (2005); rt-peg is the implied cost of equity based on Easton (2004); and rt-peg-RW is the implied cost of 
equity capital based on Easton (2004) with random walk forecasts using Bradshaw et al. (2012) model.  
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Empirical analysis may not include all the corporate governance and country specific 
items that influence market risk disclosures. In addition, the market risk disclosures index 
may not include all items and exposures. . In addition, endogeneity may potentially be a 
problem. This thesis attempts to deal with this issue through: (1) the inclusion of a diverse set 
of independent and control variables; (2) analysis of data on a year by year; country by 
country basis; (3) uses a dynamic regression models (lag variables on independent and 
control variables); (4) use of Heckman’s (1978) Second Least Squared (2SLS) method and 
followed by post-estimations tests to robust the validity of the instrument variables (IV); and 
(5) use of alternative measures for each main model dependent and independent variables.  
The study relies solely on annual reports to derive the market risk disclosures index 
and corporate governance items. Potentially a company may disclose information related to 
market risk disclosures in media releases, internal reports, Basel requirement reports, analyst 
reports or the website that has not been incorporated within the annual reports. Moreover, a 
firm may not disclose complete information related to the corporate governance within the 
annual reports. Additional information may be largely contained with stand-alone corporate 
governance policy and procedure documents on firms’ website. Further, additional 
information related to cost of capital (e.g., earning forecast) might be contained within 
analyst reports and media releases rather than the annual reports. However, a comparison of 
market risk disclosures and corporate governance disclosures contained within the annual 
reports and that contained within separate reports located in the firm’s websites revealed that 
there were no material differences in the disclosed information. 
Items of information that comprise the market risk disclosures index are constructed 
based on the informativeness of disclosures and are considered applicable to all listed firms. 
The issue of applicability of disclosure to all sample firms has been largely overcome by 
focussing on those companies that are related to the financial industry especially following 
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the adoption of IFRS 7 in 2007. In my index construction, I rely on a Value-at-Risk 
(thereafter VaR) Index and Sensitivity Analysis (Sen thereafter) Index as IFRS 7 requires 
disclosure of market risk under VaR and/or Sen analyses and/or on a Tabular (maturity-gap) 
basis. The VaR index is used in many surveys and studies (Hirtle 2007; Perignon and Smith 
2010a; BCBS 2001, 2002, 2003). However, these studis and surverys have been conducted 
for banks, and conducted in U.S. Furthermore, previous studies have neglected the Sen 
format as an altenrative format that firms are required to disclose as part of their overall 
market risk disclosures. No prior studies have applied the Sen index. In additon, no studies 
have incorporated both the Sen and Var index in a single study. I incorporate both indices for 
the first time. In fact, this is the first study that incorporated both the VaR index and Sen 
Index in one study. However, I do not include Tabular or maturity-gap format in the index as 
Tab (thereafter) format tabulates market risk sensitivities based on assets and liabilities 
(Hodder and Mcanally 2001b). Using the Tab format, investors should be able to determine 
the cash flows derived from the firms' financial instruments. Thus tabular format is 
represented in different ways and styles depending on firms. There is no standard format for 
Tabular format based on IFRS 7 (even based on Basel II Pillar 3 and FRR .48). Prior 
literature that evaluates market risk disclosures include a dummy variable if firms disclose 
information via a Tabular format or investigate the tabular format using one market risk 
exposure method (Ahmed et al. 2004).  
The aforementioned assumptions and limitations are common issues encountered with 
past disclosures studies and do not detract from the study’s quality. Overall, this study 
represents a comprehensive analysis of the factors and consequences of market risk 
disclosures.   
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5. OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
 
The thesis comprises seven chapters. Chapter 1 outlines the research questions “objectives”, 
motivation, significant contributions, summary of results, assumptions and limitations and 
thesis structure.  
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the GCC political, economic environment and capital 
markets, market risk disclosures: conceptual and institutional background, research theories, 
literature review and ends with chapter conclusion. 
Chapter 3 discusses the data sources for this thesis “all objectives” includes discussions on 
the descriptions of sample selection procedure. 
Chapter 4 presents the first objective “Risk committee, corporate life cycle and market risk 
disclosures: evidenced from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This paper has been accepted 
for publication in Corporate Governance: An International Review (CGIR), [ABDC: A and 
ISI: 12/91 Business Finance]. Below the detail of resume license agreement with CGIR: 
Licensee: Ahmed Al-Hadi  
License Date: Jul 2, 2015  
License Number: 3660660327703  
Type Of Use: Dissertation/Thesis  
 
 Al-Hadi, A., Hasan, M. M., & Habib, A. (2015). Risk Committee, Firm Life Cycle, and 
Market Risk Disclosures. Corporate Governance: An International Review. Forthcoming 
 
Chapter 5 presents the second objective “Discretion in mandatory risk disclosures and 
investment efficiency: evidenced from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This paper is 
presented in Curtin University PhD curriculum in October 2014, and obtained the third place 
as the best paper award. All comments are addressed in this thesis. 
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Chapter 6 presents the third objective “Disaggregation, audit conservative and the implied 
cost of capital: evidenced from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This paper is presented in 
the 5th Financial Markets and Corporate Governance Conference, QUT Brisbane 22-24 April 
2014. The conference editor, co-editor and discussants’ comments are addressed in this 
thesis. And eventfully the objective is published in Multinational Journal of Financial 
Management (MJFM), co-authored with my supervisors and (ex-supervisor M. Hossain). 
[ABDC: B]. Below the detail of resume license agreement with MJFM: 
Licensee: Ahmed Al-Hadi  
License Date: Jul 3, 2015  
License Number: 3661340019469  
Type Of Use: reuse in a thesis/dissertation 
Al-Hadi, A., Taylor, G., & Hossain, M. (2015). Disaggregation, auditor conservatism and 
implied cost of equity capital: An international evidence from the GCC. Journal of 
Multinational Financial Management, 29, 66-98. 
 
 
Chapter 7 provides a summary of major findings from the empirical analysis in the three 
objectives. Conclusions are drawn from these findings followed by discussion of policy 
implication and contributions of the thesis. In addition, chapter 7 provides scope of future 
research in the GCC. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE GCC ENVIRONMENT, MARKET RISK: CONCEPTUAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of Chapter 2 is to review the political, economic environment and capital 
markets development of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Furthermore, the 
accounting, reporting, regulation and auditing profession of GCC countries, and  in particular, 
the regulatory requirements in relation to qualitative and quantitative market risk disclosures 
requirements, are discussed in this chapter. Finally, prior studies on market risk disclosures, 
corporate governance structure, investment efficiency, and cost of equity capital are also 
reviewed in this chapter.    
2. GCC: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND CAPITAL 
MARKETS 
 
Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia (K.S.A) and the United Arab of 
Emeritus (U.A.E) are in aggregate referred to as Gulf Cooperation Council GCC counties. 
Collectively, the GCC countries contain 45% and 23% of the world's oil and gas reserves 
respectively (Al-Shammari et al. 2008; Espinoza et al. 2011). The GCC countries collectively 
are one of the fast growing regions in the global economy, while the stock exchange markets 
represent emerging but equally rapidly growing markets (Al-Janabi et al. 2010). The GCC 
countries achieved solid economic growth evidenced by increasing gross domestic production 
(GDP) per capital from USD 11000 in 2002 to US$ 249031.7 in 2011 (see World Bank data 
website).  
The stock market capitalization for the six GCC countries increased from USD 120 
billion in 2002 to USD 67000 billion in 2011 and volume of shares traded also increased 
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multiple times during the same period. Further, the number of companies listed on the GCC 
stock markets increased from 399 firms in 2000 to 702 companies in 2011 (Bley and Saad 
2011). Moreover, the GCC sovereign wealth fund (SWFs) is estimated to be over USD 1 
trillion in size with the market capitalization of equity markets exceeding USD 1 trillion 
(Espinoza et al. 2011).13 Bley and Saad (2011) documented that five of six countries 
(excluding KSA) represent more than one-third of S&P frontier broad market index. 
The GCC financial markets differ from developed and many emerging markets in that 
the GCC is very sensitive to regional political crises (Al-Janabi et al. 2010). For example, 
Malliaris and Urrutia (1995) record significant price reactions during the Persian (Arab) Gulf 
War I. Experiences in financial and political crises over the last three decades (oil crisis, 
September 11 and gulf war I & II) 14 have helped the GCC countries to develop different 
strategies, such as investing locally in competitive sectors so as to avoid an outflow of funds. 
Hence, governments have invested extensively in banking, financial services and other fully-
state-owned companies (Balli et al. 2011; Hertog 2012)15. These activities have developed the 
GCC capital markets and attracted institutional and foreign investors to hold investments in 
that region (Al-Janabi et al. 2010)16. Financial markets in the GCC countries are largely 
dominated by the commercial banks (local and branches of foreign banks) and real-estate 
(Al-Shammari et al. 2008; Espinoza et al. 2011). Public listed firms encompass firms 
belonging to the banking, investment, insurance, industrial and services sectors (Al-Janabi et 
                                                          
13 Further, share prices were initially offered at a bargain and returns are fairly significant (Bley and Saad 2011). 
In 2004, foreign portfolio holders have reported returns of US$ 150 to US $170 billion from GCC markets (Bely 
& Chen, 2006). 
14 Balli et al. (2011) detail the financial and political crisis and its impacts in the Middle East from 1970 up to 
2003 
15 This commenced from the early 1990s when each individual country attempted to diversify its economy, 
privatize public sector firms and improve the legal and financial institutional infrastructure and also by pegging 
their currencies to the US dollar (Espinoza et al. 2011). 
16 For instance, early privatization of state enterprises beginning in 1995 (government owns major stack of 
shares) and the lifting of investment restrictions in the 1990s had attracted foreign investment. That led risk-
averse investors to be more secure in their investments particularly since GCC governments are major 
shareholders of most of larger companies (Balli et al. 2011) 
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al. 2010). Only finance and telecom sectors are allowed by the GCC governments to engage 
in free competition (Hertog 2012). Banks in the GCC countries are well capitalized and are 
stable across the GCC countries as a consequence of prudential regulation and supervision 
(Espinoza et al. 2011).  
Equity ownership structure in the GCC listed companies are controlled (owned) by a 
variable percentage of indigenous population (Al-Janabi et al. 2010). Ownership is typically 
categorized into government and its agencies (e.g. ministry of defence pension fund), 
dominant merchant families, royal families and institutional investors (Al-Shammari et al. 
2008)). Until recently, entry into the GCC equity markets was permissible only to GCC firms 
(Al-Janabi et al. 2010; Balli et al. 2011). Kuwait and the KSA do not allow any direct foreign 
investment ownership of stocks to be traded in their stock exchanges. Oman is the only 
country that lifted the barrier of 100% ownership of stock and other remaining countries 
permit foreign ownership of stock with variable equity limits (Bley and Saad 2011).Overall, 
market capitalization of GCC firms is still relatively small and characterized by infrequent 
trading of securities with low trading volume compared to that in developed countries or 
well-established emerging markets (Al-Janabi et al. 2010).  
Despite significant efforts to build informative accounting information systems by 
government and accounting professional bodies, the accounting profession in the GCC region 
is still in its infancy (Al-Shammari et al. 2008). Adoption of International Accounting 
Standards (IAS)/International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is mandatory for all 
stock listed companies in Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain. Further, IAS/IFRS adoption is only 
mandatory for banks, finance and investment companies in Qatar, K.S.A and the UAE.  
The financial reporting framework of GCC countries is based on company-law and 
royal decree (Al-Shammari et al. 2008). Only Oman, Kuwait and UAE have significant 
 22 
 
surveillance programs that investigate companies’ compliance with financial reporting 
requirements (Al-Shammari et al. 2008). Further, Kuwait and Oman are the only two 
countries in the GCC that have undertaken action against firms for breach of reporting 
requirements.17 Studying the legal system, accounting, and auditing and capital market 
regulation of the GCC countries assists in understanding the motivation of firms to disclose 
financial risk information, level of disclosures and transparency by firms in each of the GCC 
member countries. The following section discusses laws, accounting regulation, corporate 
governance and the financial sector for each GCC member country:  
2.1 Sultanate of Oman: Muscat Security Market (MSM) was established in 1988, and then 
the government established the Capital Market Authority (CMA) in 1998 to promote and 
monitor the licenses and trading issue of securities18. In 2002, the CMA released and 
mandated a code of corporate governance for listed firms. The Central Bank of Oman (CBO) 
was formed by a Royal Decree No.3-1974 to supervise all types of banks in Oman and 
related financial disclosures (Hussain et al. 2002). CBO requires banks to have audited 
annual financial statements from independent auditors and must be prepared under IAS/IFRS 
(Hussain et al., 2002)19. 
2.2 Qatar: The accounting and auditing are regulated under company law and commercial 
code, except for the banking sector which regulated by Qatar Central Bank (QCB)20. 
                                                          
17  Two reported cases in Kuwait for 1) auditor gave unqualified audit report, but the company violated IAS and 
2) shareholders complaint, which resolve BOD, management and auditor. Four cases in Oman, 1) 2 for auditors 
failed to notify firms’ IAS violations and 2) security regulator found 1 firm did not comply  with IAS and 
second found firm’s management provided misleading and incomplete disclosure (Al-Shammari et al. 2008) 
18 During 1997 to 1998, the capital market exhibited a tremendous drop in market value leading to collapse of 
many firms such as National Rice Mills SAOG and Oman National Investment Company SAOG. Despite the 
reasons to this sharp drop of capital market, government of Oman began to undertake further steps to avoid 
these crises in future. 
19 Hussain et al. (2002) provide a details survey of accounting and auditing regulation and standards practices in 
all GCC countries. 
20 QCB is responsible to promote sound banking and financial statement (Hussain et al. 2002). QCB mandates 
IAS for all banks (local and foreign) that operate in Qatar by Circular No. 53-1995, excluding IAS 24 - Related 
Parties Disclosures (Al-Qahtani 2005). In 1996 QCB released Circular No. 33-1996 to require all banks to 
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Although Qatar is not a member of IFAC and until recently IAS/IFRS was not mandatory for 
non-financial firms, the use of big 4 accounting firms increased the adherence and adoption 
of IAS/IFRS in many listed firms (Al-Qahtani 2005) 21. In 2005, Qatar Financial Market 
Authority (QFMA) established as an independent supervisory agency to govern the capital 
market trading activities.22 QFMA introduced code of corporate governance in 2009, which is 
driven from OCED  based on “comply or explain” (Sharar 2011).23 
2.3 Kingdom of Bahrain: Bahrain is a member of the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC). Accounting reporting requirements commenced in 1973- Law No. 23 
by establishing Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA)24. In 1992 IAS and ISA were adopted for 
all banks and listed firms by BMA. Furthermore, the Bahrain Stock Exchange (BSE) was 
established in 198725.  The government of Bahrain established a new official market trade 
referred to as the Bahrain Stock Exchange (BSB)26. In 2011, CBS issued a “comply or 
explain” the code of corporate governance for listed firms based on nine principles. 
 2.4 Kuwait: Kuwait is also a member of IFAC. The Ministry of Commercial and Industry 
(MCI) and Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) issue rules for listed companies. Although, Kuwait 
is considered one of largest stock market in the GCC, Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
and Arab World, the stock market until recently (Feb 2012) was regulated without Capital 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
appoint two independent auditors, term of five year and annual audited financial statements (Hussain et al. 
2002). 
21 Companies Law No.5-2002 contains some incomplete accounting requirement for companies such as 
depreciation and percentage deduction of companies' gross earnings by BOD. Other article N. 119 requires the 
BOD to prepare the annual audited financial statement and notes. Accounting figures must be compared to past 
year without any presentation or disclosures formats (Al-Qahtani 2005). 
22  Royal Decree No. 33-2005 and amended by No.14-2007. 
23 (Sharar 2011) for comprehensive QFMA'S code, he compares the QFMA's code of corporate governance with 
OECD principles. 
24 Replaced by Royal Decree 64-2006- to Central Bank of Bahrain CBB) 
25 Royal Decree No. 4-1987Shortly is replaced by Bahrain Bourse (BHB) by the Law No. 60-2010. The first 
attempt to establish local or to adopt international accounting standards was commenced in 1983, by the 
Ministry of Trade and Agricultural, when it called for conference inviting international and local accounting 
firms and offices for the purpose to create a committee to establish a local accounting standard.  
26 Many companies became public in Al-Jowhara Market “unofficial market trade” soon after the crash of Souk 
Al-Manakh-the Kuwaiti “unofficial market trade”. 
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Market Authority CMA (Al Mutairi and Hasan 2010)27. In 1990, Ministerial Resolution 
mandated IAS\ IFRS for all listed firms. Then, Company Law No.15 in 2010 and CMA 
25/3013 released twelve provisions on corporate governance for the listed firms effective 
from 2016.  
2.5 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (K.S.A): The K.S.A is the only country in the GCC region 
where the accounting profession is regulated by a professional accounting body. The Saudi 
Organization for Certified Public Accounting (SOCPA) was founded in 1992 through three 
stages28. Furthermore, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was established in 1952 
to regulate and supervise (local and international) banks that had banking operations in the 
KSA29. Banking Control Law requires banks and any related financial firms to disclose based 
on IAS/IFRS and encourages all banks that operate in Saudi Arabia to comply with those 
disclosure requirements. Then in 1994, disclosure became mandatory.  The Saudi Stock 
Exchange (TADAWUL) is regulated via the CMA30. In 2006, the CMA issued the code of 
corporate governance effective from 2009.31  
2.6 United Arab Emirates (U.A.E): The central bank of UAE was established by Union 
Law No. 2-1973 referred to as the Currency Board32. In 1999, Circular No. 20-1999 requires 
all banks, financial, investments companies that operate in the UAE to adopt IAS. This was 
                                                          
27 The first Law to regulate the accounting and auditing practices in Kuwait back to 1962 by Law No. 6 and 
amended by Law No. 3-1965 which then replaced by Amiri Decree No. 5-1981 and Commercial Law No. 68-
1980. Company Law No.15-1960 precedes the board of directors to prepare and distribute to shareholders the 
audited Balance Sheet and Income Statement according to generally accepted accounting standards (GAAP). 
28 Three steps are: 1) Countries comparative studies of accounting profession from 1981 to 1982), 2) Conceptual 
framework for accounting and auditing stage from (1982-1986) and 3) 1992 establishment of SCOPA. SCOPA's 
13 board of directors are appointed by The Minister of Trade, seven from the governments and its agencies and 
six certified Saudi accountants. Up to 2006, SOCPA has issued 11 interpretations, opinions and standards and 
14 exposures drafts 
29 In fact, establishing SAMA at the beginning was to keep the gold and oil revenues on behalf of the kingdom. 
In 1966, SAMA issued the Banking Control Law and Regulation of Companies. 
30 This officially established by a Royal Decree No. (M/30)-1424 -Hijiri Calendar- as independent agency to 
regulate and issue rules for the provision of the Capital Market. 
31 Issued by Resolution No. 1/212/2006 and amended by Resolution No. 1-10-2010.  
32 The Function of the Currency Board was limited and purposed to replace other currencies that used in UAE. 
In 1973 Dirham is a first currency was circulated in the market and replaced the Bahraini Dinar, Qatari and 
Dubai Riyal. In 1980 Union Law No. 10-1980 changed the Currency Board to Central Bank of UAE. The law 
authorized the Central Bank to monitor and regulate the monetary, credit, supervision and banks policy. 
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followed by the issue of Notice No.3735-2006 designed to implement Basel II for all banks 
(full compliance is expected at Jan-2011). Then in 2000, the Abu-Dhabi Stock Market (ADX) 
was established by Law No. 3-2000 governing financial independent management. In the 
same year, the Dubai Stock Market was established as a second stock market in the UAE. 
After 1999, all financial statements were to be prepared according to IAS/IFRS. Governance 
mechanisms were not established prior to 2007. However, in 2007, the SCA released a code 
of corporate governance closely followed by the SCA Ministerial Resolution No. 518-2009 
which mandates the code of corporate governance for all listed firms in the UAE from 2009. 
This code consists of 16 articles that are based on the OECD corporate governance principals. 
Table 2.1: Summary of GCC’s background section 
Items Bahrain Oman Qatar K.S.A U.A.E Kuwait 
IFAC Membership Yes No No No No Yes 
IFRS/IAS Status 1992 1986 Yes 1999FF FF, 1994 FF, 1999 Yes:1990 
Security Market 1987 1988 1995 2003 2000 1983 
Capital Authority Market CB 1998 1995 2003 2000 2012 
Central Bank establishment 1973 1974 1993 1952 1973 1986 
*Auditor Number 1 1 2 2 3 FF 3 FF 
*Breaching Laws No Yes No No No Yes 
+Local ACC. Standards No No No Yes No No 
FF: only for financial firms;  
CB: Central Bank 
* Al-Shammari et al. (2008) 
+ Local stock exchange markets websites. 
 
3. MARKET RISK: CONCEPTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
 
Market risk is the risk of potential fluctuation of fair value or cash flows or earnings 
as a consequence of changes in market prices such as the risk of interest rate price change, 
currency exchange change, equity price change and other commodities change risks (BCBS 
2001). The reporting and regulatory requirement framework for the financial sector in the 
GCC to some extent is not diverse as compared to that of global financial institutions. 
Regulation is formed by different bodies, including Basel Committee, International 
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Accounting Standards Board (IASB), Central banks, and local accounting standard such as in 
K.S.A. 
Globally, the basic risk regulatory publication dates back to 1998 when the Basel 
Committee encouraged financial institutions to achieve greater transparency, effective and 
timely release of information (Woods et al. 2008). At that time, the qualitative and 
quantitative development of risk disclosures was general in nature, and often lacked explicit 
detail of how to manage those risks. Financial institutions had the option to measure internal 
risk using models such as Value-at-Risk (VaR) and stress test those models using various 
assumptions and scenarios (Basel II, 1998). Followed by the final draft "Pillar 3-Basel II" in 
2004, the disclosure requirements were clearly specified. Compliance with Basel II requires 
firms to provide qualitative and quantitative disclosures relating to capital structure, capital 
adequacy, market, credit; and liquidity risks (Basel Committee, 2006). The quantitative and 
qualitative market risk disclosures requirement was confirmed under the "Framework for 
supervisory information about derivatives and trading activates". BASEL illustrates that 
quantitative disclosures should be understood in the context of qualitative information (BCBS 
1999). 
The disclosure of sensitivity analysis relating to market risks commenced with the 
release of Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB), FAS-119-1994: Disclosures about 
Derivative Financial Accounting Standard in the U.S. (Woods et al. 2009). However, that 
standard has been criticized for its lack of informativeness relating to derivatives disclosures. 
For instance, Wong (2000) finds that market risk disclosures (proxy FX) under FAS-119 are 
insignificant and inconsistent with the derivative position and stock price. Hence, the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) introduced Financial Reporting Release No. 48 
(FRR No. 48) for market quantitative and qualitative risk disclosures. FRR No. 48 permits 
three formats of market risk disclosures comprising Value-at Risk, Sensitivity Analysis, and 
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Tabulation (see market risk disclosures formats section). Overall, studies that use FRR No. 48 
as a proxy for market risk disclosures find that FRR No. 48 is informative of derivative 
positions. For instance, Wong (2000) finds that FRR No. 48 is designed to overcome issues 
that FAS-119 does not cover. In 2000, the FASB issued FAS-133 Accounting for Derivative 
Instruments and Hedging Activities to improve market risk disclosures (Woods et al., 2009). 
Similarly, FRR N. 48 and FAS-133 in the U.S. and in the U.K.- Financial Reporting Council (FRC) in 
1998 issued FRS 13- Derivatives and other Financial Instrument Disclosures, effective from May-
199933.   
Until 1995, the IASB did not mandate disclosure of financial risk information in the 
GCC countries. The first standard published by the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC) on qualitative and quantitative disclosures related to financial instrument 
risk was IAS 32: Financial Instruments: Presentation (IASC, 1995). IAS 32 mandates 
disclosure of market risk (interest rate and currency risk), credit and liquidity risks. This 
standard was followed by IAS 30:- Disclosures on Financial Statements of Banks, which 
mandates further disclosure of risk information for banks and other financial institutions. 
Further, IAS 30 supplements other risk standards for disclosures such as IAS 32. In 2008, the 
IASB pronounced  IAS 39: Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement 
(effective from January 2001). IAS 39 was first issued by the IASC in 1999. It has shifted the 
risk disclosure requirements from IAS 32 (Woods et al. 2008)34. In 2005, the IASB published 
IFRS 7 (effective from January 2007). IFRS 7 was issued to complement IAS 32 and IAS 39, 
to remove the duplicative disclosures of IAS 32 and to supersede IAS 30. Moreover, IFRS 7 
                                                          
33 All entities including non-financial institutions and insurance companies are required to comply with FRS 13, 
since at least one of its capital instruments that is listed or publically traded on stock market.  FRS 13 also 
requires narrative and numerical market risk (interest rate and currency), liquidity, fair value and hedging 
activates disclosures.  Further, FRS 13 requires all entities to disclose at least one of these methods (Sensitivity 
Analysis, VaR, Gap Analysis and other methods) or to disclose a combination of approaches for their market 
risk exposures. 
34 Simultaneously, as many risk measurement techniques that gained acceptance by many entities, IASB 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in 2004, progresses the ED International Financial Reporting 
Standards 7:IFRS 7: Financial Instruments : Disclosures. 
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simplifies market, credit, concentration and liquidity risk disclosures (IASB, 2005). 
Qualitative and quantitative disclosures of market risk exposures are required for all public 
companies and it does not provide any separate guideline for financial institutions. Further, 
IFRS 7 allows reporting entities to use at least one of the models to disclose their market risk, 
namely Sensitivity Analysis, Value-at-Risk and other stress test models.  Australia adopted 
IFRS from 2005 and therefore the AASB standards are identical to the IASB standard. 
Equivalent to IFRS 7, the Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) issued AASB 7: 
Financial Instruments: Disclosures, to complements AASB 132- Financial Instruments: 
Presentation and ASSB 139- Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurements. In this 
standard, entities are required to disclose qualitative and quantitative information about their 
risk exposures. Also, AASB 7 requires the reporting entities to disclose at least of the potential 
market risk disclosures formats such as Sensitivity Analysis and Value-at-Risk.  
Although GCC countries adopted IAS/IFRS, listed firms were largely reluctant to 
comply with risk disclosure requirements (Al-Shammari et al. 2008; IFC/Hawkamah 2008). 
Risk disclosures requirements are not well covered in the GCC code of corporate governance 
(Hawkamah 2010). The OECD (2004) survey finds that only 9.1% listed banks and 26% non-
bank listed firms disclose material foreseeable risk factors. In addition, the IFC/Hawkamah 
(2008) survey documents that 76% of banks and 69% of non-banking listed firms do not 
consider disclosure as an effective tool to maintain shareholders value. Prior studies also note 
that companies in the GCC publish less information about their risk exposures (e.g., Kamla 
and Roberts 2010).  
Furthermore, in all GCC countries (except for KSA), the corporate governance code 
requires an audit committee to review firms’ risk management systems and policies. The 
KSA code of corporate governance requires the board to look after the risk management 
process. The corporate governance code in Bahrain requires the internal auditor to review the 
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adequacy and effectiveness of the company’s risk management process, while for other 
countries in the GCC, there is no such provision. In both the KSA and UAE, the corporate 
governance code is largely silent regarding risk disclosure. However, in Bahrain and Oman 
(and Qatar), the management discussion and analysis report (corporate governance report) 
requires disclosure of risk management. In Kuwait, the corporate governance code will 
become mandatory from 2016 and will require the board to form a specific risk committee to 
evaluate risk procedures and policies and to follow-up firms’ risk management.   
Moreover, all central banks in the GCC adopted Basel II (particularly pillar 3: 
Disclosure). Due to disclosure dissimilarities between Basel II (Pillar III) and IFRS 7 
(financial instruments disclosures) in terms of risk disclosure requirements, the central banks 
in the GCC countries require firms to explain the material difference between accounting 
standard and Basel requirements.  In sum, risk disclosure requirements in the GCC are not 
well developed, which give rise to noteworthy variation among the countries in terms of risk 
disclosure. Table 2.2 provides the risk management, disclosures and corporate governance 
regulation and practices in the GCC countries. 
 
Table 2.2: Corporate governance codes and provision for risk disclose 
Items Bahrain Oman Qatar K.S.A U.A.E Kuwait 
Year of release of  corporate 
governance code 
2011 2002 2009 2006 2007 2010/2013 
Compliance of corporate 
governance code 
Comply 
or explain 
Mandatory Comply 
or explain 
Mandatory Mandatory Mandatory 
Corporate governance 
requirement to disclosure risk 
management issues in annual 
report 
Yes Yes Yes No No No 
RC formation Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Mandatory 
after 2016 
Risk disclosure accountability AC AC AC Board AC - (RC after 
2016) 
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Risk Management Induction Yes - - - - Yes 
RC formation: under board or 
management? 
- - - - - Board 
Provision for independent 
director in risk committee 
- - - - - - 
Provision for qualified director 
in risk committee 
- - - - - - 
Internal Auditor’s review on the 
adequacy and effectiveness of 
the firm’s risk 
management 
Yes - - - - - 
Basel II ( Pillar III) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
3.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Market Risk Disclosures: 
The FASB and FRR No.48 require both qualitative and quantitative market risk 
disclosures, (e.g. FRR No. 48, section b paragraph 305). Although IAS/IFRS is mandatory in 
GCC, FRR No. 48 has been adopted by international firms. Under IFRS 7(paragraph 33) 
qualitative disclosure requirement is common for all risk (credit, liquidity and market risk) 
exposures. Quantitative risk disclosure requirements are specified as individual paragraph for 
each risk type. For instance, for market risk exposures, paragraph IFRS 7 40-42 provides 
guidelines for the quantitative disclosures for each individual market risk type (e.g. interest 
rate, currency risk and equity price risk).  
3.2 Qualitative Market risk Disclosures based on IFRS7: 
1- Entities shall disclose the market risk exposures and how these exposures arise, such as the 
description of gross and net of risk transfer and risk mitigation transaction.  
2- Entities shall provide qualitative description of exposures risk management, including the 
objective, policy, procedures and methods that used to measure the market risk, such as, the 
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scope and nature of reporting and measurement system. At least one of the effects of 
reporting figures should be reported (e.g. the effects to cash flow and fair value).  
3- Entities shall disclose the change in methods, policy and procedures, if the change was 
applied, sufficient reasons shall be provided to explain that change (e.g., from VaR (last year) 
to Sen (current year)). 
3.3 Quantitative Market risk Disclosures: formats: 
3.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis: (hereafter Sen) is a disclosure format that measures the 
potential loss in future income, fair value, and cash flow for market risk exposures, arising 
from a hypothetical change or reasonably possible change in over a short time-frame. The 
effects of the potential loss should show a decline in profit / loss and equity, or cash flow. 
Under FRR No. 48, any hypothetical change should not be less than 10 percent, while IFRS 7 
does not specify the hypothetical change unless the entity believes that it can estimate a 
reasonable rate. Further, IFRS 7 does not mandate disclosure of a worst case scenario. Multi- 
scenario and stress tests are voluntarily encouraged. Under both standards, disclosure of a 
time-frame of estimated risk assessment is required and should not exceed one year. Figure 1 
shows a multi-sceneries sensitivity analysis for the change of 15% or 150−
+  basis points, 10% 
or 100−
+  basis points and  5% or 50−
+  basis points,  in OMR' 000, at the end of the year, 
average, maximum and minimum amount level, will increases (reduce) the net interest 
income, under earning and economic value perspectives. 
3.3.2 Value-At-Risk (VaR): is a disclosure format that measures the highest potential 
loss in future cash, earnings and fair value over a selected period (holding or horizon period) 
with a likelihood of occurrence or probability in most cases at the 5% level (at 95% 
confidence level). There are several methods to calculate VaR’s loss probability such as 
historical market data, a variance-covariance method or via Monte Carlo simulation. VaR is 
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considered a worst case scenario as it measures the lowest probability of potential loss might 
occur (Hodder and Mcanally 2001b). VaR also, summarizes the effect of diversification, 
leverage and probabilities of adverse price changes (Perignon and Smith 2010a). 
Figure 1: Sensitivity Analysis of Bank Muscat: Earning and Economic perspectives: 
 
Source: Bank Muscat Annual Report: 2007. 
 
 As provided in Figure 2, the National Bank of Bahrain (NBB) in 2009 used VaR to 
calculate each single type of market risk exposure using 99% confidence level within a 10 
days holding period, by applying a Risk-Metrics Methodology. The potential loss is reported 
at the end of the year, as average, maximum and minimum levels. The average number 
(figure 2) in 2009 for Foreign Currency Exchange from NBB annual report, on average, the 
trading portfolio of interest rate 1377 million, for next trading day, 95% confident that NBB 
expects that the loss from foreign currency exchange will not excess 1377 million Bahrain 
Dinar or only 5 percent probability of occurring loss will be more than 1377 million Bahrain 
Dinar.  
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Figure 2: National Bank of Bahrain VaR market risk disclosures 2009. 
 
 Source: Annual Report NBB 2009. 
3.3.3 Tabular Analysis: (hereafter Tab) is a format that presents the market risk of 
fair value changes in financial instruments (e.g., future cash flow of contracts term based on 
expected maturity dates for at least five years)35. For instance, if a company A wants to 
disclose Tab for interest rate risk, it should disclose the instrument type, maturity, average 
rate, fair value of the end of each (combined) year(s) that is (are) disclosed and sensitivity tab 
(see Figure 3). In this format the market risk is not explicit, but sensitive instruments shall be 
categorized according to common characteristics such as based on functional currency rate 
risk. Tab tabulates market risk sensitivities based on assets and liabilities (Hodder & 
McAnally, 2001b). By this format the reader should be able to expect the cash flows from the 
firms' financial instruments (Hodder & McAnally, 2001b).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 FRR No. 48 does not require any comparable equivalent previous year figures, but aggregate amount is 
required. 
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Figure 3: Tabular Analysis Interest Rate position of assets and Liabilities:  
 
Source: Bank Muscat Annual Report: 2007. 
 
 Overall, the international and U.S. accounting standards and laws have enabled 
entities to voluntarily disclose some aspect of qualitative and quantitative market risk 
exposures. For instance, although, only material risk must be disclosed, the IFRS 7 
voluntarily allows entities to disclose immaterial risk exposures. Further, IFRS 7 requires 
companies to disclose the hedging instruments, trading, non-trading and mitigating devices 
that used to managed market risk exposures. 
4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
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Accounting disclosure is a meaningful monitoring element to control managers’ 
behaviour and makes them more accountable (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Accounting 
disclosure provides two significant functions in market based economies (Beyer et al. 2010). 
First, accounting disclosure helps to measure the feasibility of any investment opportunity - 
"ex-ante role"36. Second, disclosure provides fund providers with the ability to watch their 
fund allocations - "ex-post role"37(Beyer et al. 2010).  
4.1 Information asymmetry or "lemons problem" refers to the inequality of 
acquisition of information between fund providers ("outsiders") and controllers (“insiders") 
which could disrupt a capital market’s function (Akerlof, 1970). To explain the theory, 
consider a situation where projects have negative returns and positives returns, the 
entrepreneur claims that projects with negative returns as positive returns’ projects. If the 
investors are unable to recognize the positive returns projects, investors will achieve an 
average of the returns of both projects. Hence, the presence of information asymmetry means 
capital markets will overvalue the negative projects and undervalue the positive projects.  
LaFond and Watts (2008) and Bagehot (1971) posit that trading based on information 
affects the spread between bid-and-ask prices. Therefore, the investors with more private 
information will increase their return by larger bid-ask spread. Furthermore, from informed 
and uninformed participants’ perspective, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), suggest that high 
quality accounting disclosure can reduce information asymmetry between investors and 
managers. Using an Information Based Trade model “PIN", Easley and O'hara (2004) 
theoretically demonstrate that securities with higher private information compared to public 
information gain higher equilibrium rates of return38. Agency theory suggests that the 
separation of ownership and control also helps managers to acquire information about the 
                                                          
36 Expected event (e.g. expected rate of return) 
37 Actual rate of return 
38 Empirically, Easley et al., (2002) predict this conclusion. 
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current and future performance of the company before the owners or investors (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1990). Thus, managers could exploit their advantage of superior knowledge, 
unobserved by the owner, to engage in practices to increase their own welfare. 
4.2 Agency Theory: Agency theory is defined as a contractual relationship between 
agent and principal. The agent has legal and economic commitment towards the principal. 
The principal employs an agent based on experience and qualifications to perform activities 
on the behalf of the principal (Godfrey et al. 2010). Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that 
when ownership is separated from the control, managers become motivated to serve their 
personal interests at the expense of shareholders’ interests through expropriating 
shareholders’ funds.  For instance, if the owners acquire equity in company A, managers 
could expropriate the funds via perquisites, high compensation, making risky investments, 
shirking responsibility and other activities that could harm the owners (see Godfrey et al. 
2010; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Smith Jr and Warner 1979). Any loss or expense that 
incurs from such activities are considered as agency costs (Taylor 2008).  
A second form of agency cost could exist between directors and shareholders (Fama 
and Jensen 1983; Williamson 1979). These costs can be incurred when directors are 
contracted to serve the shareholders’ interest protection from the management’s opportunistic 
behaviour, agency problems may occur when directors seek welfare maximization for 
themselves by using and taking the actions that detrimental to shareholders but beneficial for 
them (Tricker 2000). 
Misalignment between large and small shareholders is another potential problem 
raised as part of agency theory. Although, large shareholders can improve the firm’s total 
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interest maximization (Grossman and Hart 1988; Shleifer and Vishny 1986) 39, a “controlling 
agency problem” could arise as a consequence of block-shareholder influence. That arises 
when major shareholders use their majority of shares to maximize their interest at the expense 
of minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). For instance, voting rights of major 
shareholders may exceed their cash flow rights and representation of board of directors’ 
memberships (Ali et al. 2007). Barclay and Holderness (1989) argue block-holder may 
receive more private benefits through controlling facilities. Hence, the alignment of minor 
and major shareholders is not completely achieved (Al Farooque et al. 2007).    
Opportunistic behaviour by management could be minimized by aligning agent’s 
workload and motivation and shareholders’ interest maximization. For instance, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), suggest formal contracts between the agents and owners will ameliorate 
these costs. Mechanisms such as governance policies and procedures, accounting covenants, 
debt contracting, contractual guarantees, compensation arrangement, quality auditors, audit 
committees, risk committee and independent board of directors are among other procedures 
the best to serve the contracting efficiency (Beatty and Weber 2003; Douglas 2003; Emanuel 
et al. 2003). Another example is that remuneration packages may motivate managers to 
transfer monitoring costs to themselves (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 
1990). For instance, Godfrey et al. (2003), argue that if managers are compensated by a 
percentage of the company's profit alongside other compensation types, this may cause 
managers to focus more on maximization of the shareholders welfare. 
Complex business structures, risk management, the increasing reliance on financial 
instruments and international transactions have caused firm management to place greater 
consideration towards risk reporting. Thus, in recent years, risk disclosure is an area of 
                                                          
39 Demsetz (1986) supports the large shareholders argument, that if more outsiders represent in the board that 
could shift to enhance the firm’s value. 
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interest to financial reporting regulators, practitioners and international researchers (Dobler 
2008). Risk disclosure is important for outsiders to evaluate the risks of an entity's future 
economic performance (Schrand and Elliott 1998). In addition to the disclosure literature, risk 
reporting is considered beneficial for disclosing entities, giving rise to both a lower cost of 
capital (Solomon et al. 2000) and initiating disciplining effects on risk management and 
governance (Jorion 2002a). 
Prior research on risk disclosure has to date been rather limited, the consequence and 
determinants of risk reporting studies in the GCC are virtually non-existent (Beretta and 
Bozzolan 2004). However, empirical studies also find large variations and deficits in risk 
reporting even in the presence of mandatory disclosure regimes (Dobler 2008). Yet, there is 
very little work on risk reporting incentives and their relation to regulation, in general, and 
even less going beyond the question of whether or not to impose mandatory disclosure, in 
particular the discretion that allowed in regulated disclosure such as with IFRS 7. 
 
4.3 Interaction of Mandatory and Voluntary disclosures: Boot and Thakor (2001) find 
that voluntary disclosure strengthens or weakens private information production incentive 
based on whether the disclosed information substitutes or complements information 
processed by investors. They conclude that mandatory disclosure might have an impact if 
there is conflict of interest between managers and investors. 
Consistent with this assertion, Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) contend that mandatory 
disclosures role is obvious when information asymmetry between firms and investors reduces 
firm’s value. Fishman and Hagerty (1995) show that a setting in which agents can choose not 
disclose all of their information, imposing mandatory disclosure improves the 
informativeness of that information.  
 
4.3.1 Interaction of Disclosure and Investment Efficiency 
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Cheng et al. (2013) investigate the association between externalities of mandatory 
disclosure and investment efficiency. They find that adoption of IFRS improves investment 
efficiency and their result is influenced by legal enforcement strength, peer competition and 
industry competition. In addition, Ostberg (2006) constructs an analytical framework for 
voluntary and mandatory disclosures. He suggests that more moderate mandatory disclosure 
is favorable in that it increases firm’s share price due to a reduction in rent seeking by 
insiders and thus improves investment efficiency. Ostberg (2006) argues that mandatory 
disclosure offers an advantage over voluntary disclosure through reduction in expropriation 
costs and an improvement in investment efficiency, while the absence of mandatory 
disclosure is worse-off for investors. In addition, Ostberg (2006) suggests that stringent 
disclosure is undesirable as it alleviates the expropriation problem (moral hazard) but 
exacerbates a debt overhang problem. Hence, positive NPV projects are not undertaken 
unless disclosure is partial. He concludes that mandatory disclosure is high in countries where 
investor protection is also very high. In frontier markets such as the GCC where the investor 
protection is weak, I expect to observe a moderate level of mandatory disclosure40. 
4.3.2 Association between Disclosure and Cost of Equity Capital: 
 
Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) find a firm that voluntary discloses risk 
exposures maintain a higher share price than one that does not and imposing mandatory full 
disclosure of firm’s risk lowers ex-ante share prices. It appears that mandatory disclosure 
forces firms not to disclose voluntary risk information to avoid incurring higher disclosure 
costs. The empirical evidence of Marshall and Weetman (2007) also show that managers 
provide less mandatory disclosure in regard to foreign currency exchange.  
                                                          
40 For instance, Weak & strength enforcement index developed by World-Bank shows a moderate score index 
for GCC, from 2007 to 2011, with a mean score of 4 (Oman; Bahrain; Kuwait, Qatar; U.A.E), minimum of 3 
and maximum of 5 in K.S.A. Also, the investor protection index extracted from WORLD-BANK, from 2007 to 
2011, illustrates (on average) K.S.A scores the highest investor protection index of 6.48, while the U.A.E scores 
the lowest investor protection index of 4.3). 
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Einhorn (2005) provides a model on the interaction between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures. He suggests that voluntary disclosure should be understood from the mandatory 
disclosure context and vice versa. More specifically, he posits that discretion in disclosure 
strategies of firms is influenced by the level of mandatory disclosures. He finds that 
mandatory disclosures have significant impact on voluntary disclosure strategies. In the 
Einhorn (2005) model, firms reduce voluntary disclosure when there is more discretion in 
mandatory disclosure, while increasing voluntary disclosure when there is flexibility with  
mandatory disclosures. He documents that disaggregated disclosure is more informative.  
Discretion in Mandatory Disclosure (“disaggregation”) enhances the usefulness of 
information to investors (Einhorn 2005). The SEC (1999) suggests that disaggregated 
accounting information is useful to investors who can use this information to make better 
informed decisions. Hirst et al. (2007) document that under a voluntary disclosure setting, 
investors believe disaggregation in management forecasts impedes managers to be able to 
manipulate earnings, and provides more relevant information. Furthermore, Verrecchia 
(2001) posits that both mandatory and voluntary disclosures can alleviate information 
asymmetry through an increase of disclosure’s quality and choices. Dye (1986) also predicts 
an interaction effects between mandatory and voluntary disclosures. In a recent study, 
Elshandidy et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence on the impact of aggregated disclosures, 
both mandatory and voluntary, on firms’ risk level.41  
Based on the theoretical foundation and empirical evidence of (Einhorn 2005; 
Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2003; Ostberg 2006), I develop a market risk disclosure index 
that determines the extent to which firms disaggregate or discretionary disclose mandatory 
market risk disclosures in their annual reports. When firms disaggregate market risk 
disclosures, I expect to observe a high level of quality and quantity of market risk items that 
                                                          
41 Firm’s level risk is measured by systematic risk (beta), financing risks and risk-adjusted returns and levels of 
stock return variability. 
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make up the index. Therefore, more disaggregation in mandatory market risk disclosures is 
effective in revealing firms’ private information to the public. This in turn reduces 
uncertainty, improves firms’ investment efficiency and reduces the cost of equity capital 
(Dobler 2008; Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2003; Ostberg 2006).  
In addition to information asymmetry issues, agency theory and disclosure theories 
such as mandatory and voluntary interaction view and cheap-talk models, I also incorporate a 
number of theories that apply accounting/finance models such as resource-based theories, 
stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory. 
5. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Prior disclosure studies investigate several theoretical frameworks. For instance, 
agency theory is employed in many risk (e.g., market risk) studies. Other studies link risk and 
market risk disclosures studies with capital management structure (e.g. cost of equity capital). 
Information asymmetry and legitimacy theory are also used to explain market risk disclosures 
(see Healy and Palepu 2001). Other types of market risk disclosures studies employ the ex-
ante and ex-post disclosure role through derivatives financial instruments studies (Gay 2011). 
In this section, market risk disclosures studies are viewed from two prospects: the 
consequences of market risk disclosures and economic determinants of market risk 
disclosures. The following discussion reviews major U.S. and other international market risk 
disclosure studies. Findings from this section would help to explain market risk disclosures 
trends for current and future periods.  
5.1 Consequences of Market Risk disclosures studies  
5.1.1 Informativeness and Value Relevance 
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Schrand (1997) uses a sample size of 208 saving and loan institutions to examine the 
relationship between off and on balance-sheet derivatives and interest rate sensitivity. She 
finds that on-balance-sheet and derivatives exposures are significantly positively associated 
with market interest rate sensitivity, while, off-balance-sheet derivatives has a positive 
association with interest rate sensitivity. Further, she finds that the significant association is 
dependent on firm size42.  
Using 287 U.S. multinational public firms, Jorion (1990) tests whether exchange 
currency rate exposures is sensitive to the value of firms43. Jorion applies the General Least 
Square (GLS) model for pooled data, and finds significant cross-sectional differences in 
foreign currency of U.S. multinational firms. Firms that do not have foreign operations and 
are not exposed to currency risk show little differences in their currency rate exposures.  
Barton and Bodnar (1994) select a sample of U.S. firms based on the following 
criteria that firstly, consistently report higher foreign currency adjustment in previous years 
and secondly, negatively correlated with trade weight index change of U.S. dollar, from 1978 
to 1983 and from 1984 to 1990. Stemming from limitations of the prior research  which failed 
to document a significant correlation between simultaneous stock returns and dollar 
fluctuations (Barton and Bodnar 1994). The former have corrected the sample selection bias 
and applied a lagged change variable in the dollar to correct for mispricing44. Despite their 
                                                          
42 For large firms, the market interest rate sensitivity is significantly associated to the derivatives not to maturity 
gap or Tab, vice versa in smaller firms. In this paper, Schrand (1997) straight criticizes the FASB's disclosures 
requirement for derivatives, as the FASB-119 requires companies to disclose the market value of the 
instruments but not the impact of derivatives on a firm's portfolio. 
43 Using time-series regression coefficient to measure the change of the firm' value to change of currency rate. 
Firm's value is measured by rate of return of firm' common stock The sample size is sub-divided into 6-sub 
sample; 1) 40 multinational firms with low-dispersion, 2) 40 portfolios with high dispersion, 3) 40 firms with 
lower foreign operation, 4) 40 largest local firms without foreign operation, 5) 40 firms with highest percent of 
foreign operations (using foreign total sale) and 6) 14 foreign firms. 
44 Mispricing arises as the complexity set modelling and estimating in this relationship and the short period of 
dollar floating exchange rates (since 1973). Hence, stock price adjustments as a result to movements in the U.S. 
dollar should take longer time. 
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claim to avoid the limitations of prior research, they fail to report any correlation with the 
contemporaneous dollar change for abnormal returns of those firms45. 
To test the usefulness of FASB No. 199 derivatives disclosures of U.S. manufacturing 
firms, Wong (2000) tests whether the stock market has contemporaneous information of on 
and off balance sheet currency exposure and derivatives disclosures. As a robust check of the 
first hypothesis, Wong (2000), expects current year currency exposures could predict the next 
year’s currency exposures (usefulness hypothesis). He provides mixed and inconsistent 
conclusion for both hypotheses. Thus, the aggregated and disaggregated fair value disclosures 
do not fully allow an assessment of currency risk exposures.  
Rajgopal (1999) provides early evidence concerning the informativeness of 
quantitative market risk disclosures using Tab and Sen Analysis (proxy for FRR No. 48).  In 
particular, Rajgopal (1999) tests the association between commodity price risk  and the 
sensitivities of firms' equity returns to change in oil and gas prices  46. He uses 149 firm year 
observations for firms that disclose Tab format (89 firm year observations for Sen Analysis 
from 1993 to 1996). Firms that disclose Tab have a negative association with firm betas, 
while for firms that disclose Sen Analysis have a significant positive association with firm 
betas.  
Ahmed et al. (2004) find Tab format exhibits significant association between current 
(one year) interest income and subsequent year interest income. Hence, they suggest that the 
Tab format is useful to predict the banks’ market risk disclosures. However, they find no 
                                                          
45 While the lagged change of dollar' value coefficient is more readable for the sub-sample from 1978 to 1983 
than to sub-sample from 1984 to 1990. They interpret this result due to the investors error to select the 
information that when predicting the value change of the firm. 
46 Rajgopal (1999) uses Tab and Sen as a proxy for the FRR .49 for Oil and Gas firms, because, firstly, the Oil 
and Gas firms early disclosing similar commodity price risk model to those that required under FRR. 48, though 
the requirement of SFAS No. 119 and SFAS No. 69.  Further, by choosing Oil and Gas sample, he provides 
advantage to this study as the Oil and Gas firms disclose clear commodity price risk exposures that usually 
managed through derivative instruments. 
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evidence for cross-sectional differences of the sensitivity interest rate for the subsequent three 
years; even after controlling the banks’ size and capital. 
In contrast to prior studies, Linsmeier et al. (2002) investigate daily trading volume 
sensitivity to underlying market rate and price changes. They employ Kim and Verrecchia 
(1994) model47 using 222 non-financial firms for all market risk exposures (184 firms for 
interest rate, 144 firms for foreign currency exchange, and 58 firms for commodity price). 
They find that before the release of FRR No. 48 (Pre-FRR), the volume sensitivity 
coefficients (a proxy for trading volume) are significantly and positively associated with 
market risk disclosures (underlying market rate and price change). However, these 
coefficients are significant and negatively associated with the underlying market rate and 
price changes following the release of market risk disclosures (FRR No. 48). Furthermore, in 
respect to interest rate exposures they find that both Sen and VaR market risk formats are less 
effective than Tab format, whereas for currency foreign exchange, Tab format is less 
effective compared to Sen and VaR formats to reduce the uncertainty and diversity of opinion 
among investors.  
 Using 22 oil and gas producers and 20 firms as a control sample (non-disclosers of 
market risk exposures), Thornton and Welker (2004) examine the informativeness of market 
risk disclosures (FRR No. 48) on share price’s sensitivity to commodities price (underlying 
market rate and price changes)48. First, Thornton and Welker (2004) find that firms that 
disclose Sen or VaR formats for market risk (commodity price) have experienced a 
significant shift in betas compared to the control sample (non-disclosers). Second, they test 
                                                          
47 Which builds based on the reactions of volume and price at the time of the public announcement and its 
characteristics and to the traders’ beliefs, to capture the uncertainty and diversity of opinion. 
48 Based on (e.g., Dontoh and Ronen 1993; Hirst and Hopkins 1998; Kim and Verrecchia 1994; Linsmeier et al. 
2002; Verrecchia 2001), Thornton and Welker (2004) hypothesize that share price is sensitive to new and 
précised signals’ increases and when investors hold heterogeneous private information (diversity of opinion) of 
market risk exposures before the release of mandatory requirement of FRR No. 48 
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whether this significant shift in betas is associated with 10-K49 disclosures, or with market 
risk disclosures. However, neither 22 disclosers nor 20 non-disclosers show any significant 
shift of commodity beta before FRR No.48. 
 Based on 222 foreign exchange derivatives from non-financial firms (500 Fortune), 
Sribunnak and Wong (2006) examine the association of Sen Analysis disclosures and market-
based risk measures50. They find users for derivatives-level fair value sensitivity have a 
negative relationship with future market-based risk, while users for entity-level earnings 
sensitivity have a positive association with future market risk measures51. 
Other studies consider the informativeness of VaR in the U.S. banking industry. The 
study of Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) is considered to provide some of the first evidence of 
bank’s performance using VaR52. They find that 99 per cent of VaR figures tend to be very 
conservative relatively to what banks disclose at the 99th percentile of daily trading returns 
and were imprecise for some banks (Berkowitz and O’Brien 2002). They find that GARCH 
model provides a lower VaR return volatility, thus, it is better predictive than banks’ VaR. 
Using eight listed banks spanning the period 1994 to 1999, Jorion (2002) provides 
evidence of market risk disclosures (as proxied by VaR format), through examining the 
                                                          
49 10-K is a comprehensive summery of public firm’s performance that must send to shareholders and required 
by SEC. 
50 After cleaning out the sample size from the sample selection bias using Hechman (1979) two-stage 
procedures, a total of 222 firms is obtained. In first stage “Probit selection model” is used to distinguish the 
foreign currency derivatives users that report Sensitivity Analysis format. Then in second stage, they regress the 
predicted probabilities from Probit model “inverse Mills ratio or Lambda” as an explanatory variable. Hence the 
present sample is represented by 55% of the foreign currency derivatives users. After selecting the final sample, 
Sribunnak and Wong (2006) notice a comparability’s issue from the foreign currency Sensitivity Analysis users, 
that users disclose Sensitivity Analysis either on derivatives level and entity level and report the effects 
“potential loss” of their market risk disclosures in different measures (fair value, cash flow and earnings). Then 
they sub-sample the selected firms into 1) Derivatives –level fair value sensitivity users and 2) Entity-level 
earnings sensitivity users. 
51 After controlling derivatives users model “dependent variable is stock return model” using, lagged debt to 
market ration, book to market value and total foreign sales over total sales, the entity-level users to test market 
risk measures, shows higher predictivity power, while for the derivatives-level does not show any significant 
predictive power. 
52 They investigate the daily VaR’s performance of 6 multi-national banks including large US banks that have 
distribution of historical dollar trading return (profit and loss). Sample is selected based on US bank compliance 
to Basle market risk capital requirements.  Their conclusion primarily is driven from two version (April copy) 
sample includes 600 daily observations and (May copy) has 25 per cent increase than the April copy, 750 daily 
observations. 
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relationship between quarterly VaR volatility and the absolute value of unexpected trading 
revenue53. He finds that unexpected volatility of trading revenue is positively associated with 
VaR in the next quarter for three banks. Therefore, Jorion (2002) concludes investors can use 
VaR figures for risk portfolios decision. 
Lim and Tan (2007) study the value relevance of market risk disclosures by selecting 
81 non-financial firms from 1997 to 200254. They find a negative significant association 
between returns, earnings and VaR values. After controlling for other factors (e.g. market-to-
book ratio, leverage and market value), the value relevance of earnings and earnings change 
are reduced55. In conclusion, Lim and Tan explain the result by arguing: 
 “investors perceive the earnings of firms with substantial market risk exposure to be less 
persistent and thus discount to a lager extent the future earnings, leading to lower stock 
returns in the current period” (2003, p. 366). 
 
Bali and Cakici (2004) measure market risk disclosures- to explain the cross-sectional 
variation in the expected returns of non-financial firms from the NASDAQ, NYSE and Amex 
stock exchanges for the period 1963 to 2001. After applying the Fama and French (1992) 
method for calculating beta56, regressing 1%, 5% and 10% VaR deciles with expected stock 
return, and controlling for liquidity and market capitalization (as a proxy for size), they find 
                                                          
53 Jorion (2002) questions the accuracy valuation of VaR via “back-testing” method, as the original information 
to calculate VaR is not provided by preparers. 
54 They intend to examine the relationship between VaR number and the informativeness of earnings based on 
information asymmetry issue. They measure the returns-earnings relation by regressing returns (250 daily 
returns) with earnings and earnings returns (EPS scaled by begging year stock price).  VaR is measured by total 
VaR numbers scaled market value at the begging of the year to remove the skewed distribution that created by 
firm’s size. 
55 Adding alternative risk variable (beta), the association between VaR with earnings and VaR with earnings 
change still negative and significant, result shows VaR still negative and significant while the association 
between earnings and beta and earnings change and beta are negative but not significant. This suggests a higher 
VaR figures that disclosed by firm, has a lower earnings-returns association. However, Lim & Tan (2007) 
examine the relation between VaR numbers with other risk measures (total risk, excess risk, firms-specific risk 
and beta, result is consistent, that VaR disclosures is positively and significantly associated with other 
alternative risk measures 
56  They sorted all stocks by size to identify the docile break-points, and then allocated the stocks in to 10 size 
portfolios. Then they subdivided each size deciles into 10 portfolios on historical beta. Hence each stock is 
grouped is assigned into one of 10 size deciles and one of 10 beta deciles.  468 monthly returns are obtained 
from 100 portfolios from 1963 to 2001. They estimated beta from the sum’s slopes from monthly return of the 
current and previous months.  Bali and Cakici (2004) use three confidences level (99%, 95 % and 90%) of VaR 
measure to check the validity of VaR to explain the expected stock return, while only one holding time period 
“one month” is used. 
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that size and VaR provide empirical evidence to explain the cross-sectional differences in 
expected return. However, they find that Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAMP) model has no 
power to explain the expected return as the average stock return is negatively associated with 
beta at the company-level. As part of time horizon sensitivity, they regress time-series 
average coefficients of the slope for two subsamples for the monthly cross-sectional and 
yearly cross-sectional regression. Size, liquidity and VaR appear to be capable of explaining 
cross-sectional differences in returns; however, beta appears not to have sufficient predictive 
power57. 
5.1.2 Cost of Equity Capital 
 
Chen and Gao (2010) use 24 commercial U.S. banks to examine the association 
between VaR values and the cost of equity capital from 1998 to 2008. They find a positive 
association between trading VaR activities disclosures and cost of equity capital58. This result 
is robust even after controlling for market capitalization and log average daily turnover 
measured as the number of stocks traded over total of stocks outstanding. They then conduct 
supplementary tests to check whether VaR’s quality (as measured by bank’s technical 
sophistication of banks) is incorporated into the cost of equity capital. The significant and 
positive result is robust.  
Gay, Lin and Smith (2011) investigate the association between cost of equity capital 
and derivative use. They use 1541 firm year observations for the period between 1992 and 
1996 and 2489 firm year observations from 2002 to 2004. They measure cost of equity 
capital by using the (Fama and French 1993) model. Gay et al. (2011) find firms that use of 
derivative financial instruments reduced firms’ cost of equity capital by 24 to 8 basis points 
                                                          
57 After repeating the regression based on portfolios-level, Bali and Cakici (2004) find all variables are capturing 
the cross-sectional differences. However, in term of R square, VaR provides better figure, even after controlling 
market size, book-to-market and liquidity. 
58 They use two measures to calculate cost of equity capital, 1) - Claus and Thomas (2010) and Easton (2004), 
for both measures they find significant and positive association.   
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compared to that of non-users. Then they extend the analysis to understand the sources of this 
reduction; they find clear evidence that was driven from lower Small and Big size factor 
(SMB). Finally, on average, derivatives users have 4.9% lower market beta compared to that 
of non-users. However, the relation between market risk disclosures and the cost of equity 
capital was not tested, especially from emerging type markets such as these in the GCC. In 
this study, I investigate how disaggregation of market risk disclosures impact firm’s cost of 
capital. Then I investigate the role of the conservative auditor on disaggregation of market 
risk disclosures and the cost of capital.  
5.1.3 Investment Efficiency 
 
Prior literature investigates investment efficiency from a financial reporting 
perspective.59  For instance, Biddle and Hilary (2006) investigate the relation between 
accounting quality and firm’s level of capital investment efficiency. Using an information 
asymmetry setting, they find that under different measures of financial reporting quality and 
different econometrics specifications, a high quality of financial reporting improves 
investment efficiency. Biddle et al. (2009) contribute to Biddle and Hilary (2006) in which 
they provide empirical evidence about the relationship between accounting quality reporting 
and investment efficiency which is conditional on the firm likely to over-invest and under-
invest. They find that firms with more cash are likely to over-invest and firms with more 
leverage are more likely to under-invest.60 Furthermore, Chen et al. (2011a) provide evidence 
regarding the association between investment efficiency and financial reporting quality, but 
                                                          
59 For instance, (Biddle et al. 2009)  use four accruals quality developed by Dechow & Dichev (2002), 2) 
Accruals quality modified by Wysocki (2008), 3) - Li’s (2008) financial disclosures transparency method (FOG 
Index)59, and 4) Average of prior three methods. Chen et al. (2011) use accruals by Kothari et al. (2005), 2) 
Revenue-based measure by McNichols & Stubben (2008); Stubben (2010), 3) Accrual measure by Dechow & 
Dichev (2002) and finally 4) Average of above three methods. 
 
60 I also provide this rank sampling technique for my test in investment efficiency hypothesis see Chapter 4 
Model 1 investment efficiency section. 
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for private firms. They find a negative association between investment efficiency and high 
quality financial reporting for the private firm is conditional on firms seeking bank loans. 
This conditional effect is positive for private firms that face tax pressures. Chen et al. (2011c)  
investigate the relation between government intervention in China and investment efficiency. 
They find that the association is weaker (stronger) for state (non-state) owned companies. 
Moreover, based on the accounting quality reporting hypothesis, Cheng et al. (2013) study 
the investment efficiency of firms that disclose the Mandatory Material Internal Control 
Weaknesses (ICW) required by Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act. Hypothesizing that ICW is an 
instrument for financial reporting quality, they find prior to ICW, firms that highly over- and 
under- invest and after disclosing ICW, the investment efficiency of those firms improved. In 
this study, I examine the association of discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures and 
financial firms’ investment efficiency. Then, empirically I re-test the (Einhorn 2005) model 
that firms with more discretion in mandatory disclosures, will provide credible voluntary 
disclosure, and in doing so, increase investment efficiency.     
5.1.4 Summary on market risk and consequences studies 
 
In this section, I review studies that investigate the consequences of market risk 
disclosures (e.g., value-relevant, cost of equity capital, informativeness and investment 
efficiency studies). Several papers investigate the consequences of market risk disclosures 
before and after the release of disclosure regulation (e.g. Pre & Post for FRR No. 49, FRS 13, 
and AASB 7). I incorporate IFRS 7 in the market risk disclosures index. Several trends 
emerge from these studies. First, some studies focused on single or aggregate market risk 
exposures such as the effects on foreign currency change or interest rate exposures. Second, 
several papers used single or two formats as a proxy for market risk disclosures. These 
studies applied a notional dollar amount or dummy variables for firms that disclose market 
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risk formats. Third, other studies used a small sample size and suffer from selection biased 
problems. For instance, some studies use only firms that disclose market risk effects on 
earnings. Fourth, some papers exhibit certain econometrics issues (e.g. no robustness check 
of the main model test, and omitted variables). In addition, some studies use two stages 
squared equation (2SLS), however, they have not justified their use of instrumental variables’ 
(IV). Finally, qualitative market risk disclosures are rarely examined in previous papers. 
Table 2.3 summarizes the consequences of market risk disclosures studies.  
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Table 2.3: Summary of consequences market risk disclosures studies 
Authors(s) Dependent Variables Independent Variables Methodologies Main Findings Comments/issues 
Schrand (1997) -Market risk (IR) and derivatives 
(Tab) 
- stock return 
- Maturity Gap  
-Hedging 
-208 Saving and loan 
institutions. 
- Two equation 2sls 
 
- 86% of the saving and loan institutions 
have negative interest rate sensitivity. 
- The significance result depends on firms’ 
size. 
- Use only interest rate as a proxy for 
Market risk. 
- Use saving and loan firms. 
- Only Sen & Quant. Only. 
Marshall and 
Weetman (2002) 
-Return of firm’s common stock Market Risk (FX) - 287 Multinational US 
public Firms (Sample 
divided into 6 sample sizes 
based on foreign 
operations) 
 -Time-series regression 
(GLS and Pool regression) 
- Firms that trading in no foreign operation 
and exposed to currency risk, show little 
difference in currency rate exposures 
-Sample selection based on 
multinational US firms that means 
these firms would be able to hedge 
potential exchange at low cost. 
-Exchange currency rate exposure only 
- Sen Only & No theoretical link 
-Quant. only Consequences & 
Determinates.  
Barton and Bodnar 
(1994) 
-Abnormal stock performance 
security 
- Change of US exchange rate 
index 
 
-208 (2264 observations)  
 
multi-industry firms 
- Contemporaneous and 
lagged, OLS regression. 
- Fail to report correlation with the 
contemporaneous dollar change for 
abnormal returns of these firms. 
-The lagged change of dollar' value 
coefficient is more readable for the sub-
sample from 1978 to 1983 than to sub-
sample from 1984 to 1990. 
-Including variables (structure break) 
with no explanatory power which 
violating the OLS power and its 
assumption. 
- Exchange rate only. 
-Sen only & Quant. only. 
Wong (2000) -Market risk (FX) Notional amount. - SFAS No. 119 Derivatives 
disclosures. 
 
-145 firms (500 S& P) 
from 1995-1006 
- OLS 
- Aggregate and disaggregate fair value 
disclosures do not complement the 
notional amount to assess the currency 
risk exposures. 
- 3 year time-series limitation generates 
measurement error and omitted 
variable. 
-Excluding firm-level data adds 
construction of firm’s specific 
exchange rate sensitivity & Quant. 
Only. 
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Rajgopal (1999) -Firm equity Return -Market risk Tab & Sen for Oil 
prices (Notional amount) 
- Percentage of hedge Oil & 
Gas Reserves. 
-149 observations firms 89 
US Oil and Gas firms. 
 - Time-series regression 
approach suggested by 
Sefcik and Thompson 
(1986). 
- Proxies Tab & Sen analysis format are 
significantly associated with O&G firms' 
stock return sensitivities to oil and gas 
price movements. 
- The proxies Tab format and Sen format 
disclosures are not substitutable 
explanations of firms' risk ex-exposures. 
- Usefulness of Tab and Sen Formats. 
- Not using market risk disclosures 
based on SEC- FRR. 48 -1997. 
-Firm after FRR. 48 -1997, only 
disclosing one format. 
- Oil prices only. 
- Tab & Sen & Quant. only 
Ahmed et al. (2004) -Net Interest Income 
-Weekly stock return  
- Rate Sen asset * IR earned on 
rate Sen asset. 
- Rate Sen Liability * IR earned 
from rate Sen Liability. 
- Other Sen * IR earned from 
other rate. 
- Weakly change in IR 
(Notional amount). 
- US Bank 
-107 bank for Qualitative 
disclosures (Hedger, 
Speculator and No Clear 
Policy. 
- Cross-sectional OLS 
regressions. 
-Tab format associate Significantly to 
current (one) year interest income Tabular 
and next (second) year ahead interest 
income.  
- Significant variation in Tabular market 
risk format based on sub-division of 
Hedger, Speculator and No Clear Policy. 
-Tab only 
-Interest rate only. 
-Quant. & Sem-Quali. 
-Change in asset size control has very 
high explanatory power this 
inconsistent with the assumptions of 
the static reprising gap model. 
-Interaction between Gap * Interest rate 
is 50% explains the model “Very 
High”.  
Linsmeier et al. 
(2002) 
-Firm value (Number of shares 
traded divided by the number of 
outstanding shares). 
-Squired Root (No. of shares 
traded by DJ Indus-trial 
Average firms divided by the 
number of shares outstanding 
for such firms. 
- SQRT-Absolute value of 
stock retunes. 
-SQRT –change IR & SQRT-
change FX. 
-SQRT-change in Commodity-
related disclosures 1, otherwise 
0. 
-222 non-financial firms 
-All market risk exposures 
Pre and Post FRR. No. 48-
97. 
-GLS 
Pre-FRR No. 48 the volume sensitivity 
coefficients (trading volume proxy) are 
significantly and positively associated 
with market risk disclosures. 
However, Post-FRR. No. 48 coefficients 
converted to be significantly and 
negatively associated with underlying 
market rate and price changes. 
-While they consider also all formats, 
they did not show reporting effects (e.g. 
Earning, cash flow and Fair Value) in 
regression models. 
- Variables are scaled by square root. 
- Disclosures format were included as a 
dummy variables and interaction 
variables. 
- Using Kim and Verreccha’s (1994) 
theoretical model 
 - Typical study for our thesis. 
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Thornton and 
Welker (2004) 
-Rate of Return - Market risk disclosures (beta). 
-Percentage of change of Oil 
and Gas prices. 
- Dummy variable if firm 
disclose of quantitative market 
risk format.  
-Dummy variable if firm 
disclosures at least one of 
qualitative policy, 0 if firms 
says immaterial.  
-22 Oil and Gas firms. 
-20 firms for non-market 
risk disclosers. 
Firm discloses Sen or VaR format for 
market risk exposure (commodity price) 
have experienced a significant betas’ shifts 
compared to the control sample (non-
disclosers). 
-Sen and VaR market risk disclosures 
formats are associated with commodity’s 
betas shift. 
-Small sample data reduce the 
generalizability of test. 
- Usefulness of FRR No. 48, by 
comparing Pre & Post. 
- Tab is not included, reporting effects 
and market risk exposure also not 
considered. 
(Sribunnak and 
Wong 2006) 
-Market risk (FX) using Sen Format 
1, otherwise 0. 
-Stock return 
-Log MV, Lev, BV, Export F 
Sale, Gross notional amount of 
FX derivatives Scaled by mv of 
equity. 
-123 final foreign exchange 
samples. 
-Non financial firms (500 
fortune) 
-OLS, 2sls & Probit 
Lambda model. 
- Derivatives-level fair value sensitivity 
users negatively associated with future 
market-based risk, while the entity-level 
earnings sensitivity users have a positive 
association with future market risk 
measures. 
-Controlling derivatives users, entity level 
users regression is predictive, and 
derivatives level not. 
-FX only 
-Sen format only. 
-Earning reporting effects. 
-Small & sample selective sample bias.  
- Consequences & determinants. 
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Berkowitz and 
O’Brien (2002) 
VaR daily disclosures. Size -6 non-public multinational 
banks, 750 daily 
observations. 
-ARMA  
-GARCH Residual. 
 
 
-99 percent VAR figures conservative to 
what bank disclose of 99th percentile of 
daily trading retune. 
-GRACH model provides a lower VaR 
return volatility, thus, it is a better 
predictive than banks’ VaR 
-VaR’s deviation is positively associated 
with |size| of shock to return. 
- Hence, VaR’s forecast that prepared by 
banks is supposed to provide superior 
forecast, compared to GRACH model. 
- Smaller sample size.  
-Non-public data. 
-Using VaR-only, irrespective to 
market risk formats. 
- Mixed evidences between historical 
derivatives disclosures and potential 
market risk disclosures. 
- GRACH model does not consider the 
current trading portfolio’s risk. 
-This result is not applicable yet for 
public firms since, Berkowitz & 
O’Brien (2001) bank’s data is 
accessible for bank regulators. 
(Jorion 2002a) -Quarterly trading revenue t+1 less 
expected trading revenue in quart 
year t. 
-VaR –based volatility in 
expected trading Revenue in t. 
- 8 public banks 
-OLS and SUR and Pool. 
-2GLS 
-Exp vol. of trading revenue positively 
associated with next quarter for three 
banks, 2 of 3 banks, the significant 
association is higher time-series and for 
the third one, as it was one of the first 
VaR’s bank disclosers in US. 
-VaR only, irrespective to other market 
risk exposure and formats. 
-Using multi-specific econometrics 
models. 
(Lim and Tan 
2007a) 
-Return (250 trading days. - EPS and Change in EPS 
-VaR /MV at the end of year. 
-Lev, MKBK 
-Persistence of fist order 
autocorr. of earning for 5 y., 
Beta. 
-81- Non-financial firms. 
-10-K filing data 
-Topit 
-240 observations. 
- Higher VaR figures that disclosed by 
firm, has a lower earnings-returns 
association. 
-VaR notional amount, which not 
considering VaR requirement and 
estimates which very important of 
investors. 
- Quant. Only. 
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Bali and Cakici 
(2004) 
Cost of Equity (CAPM) -Market Risk (VaR) 
-Return 
-Size(MC) 
-Liquidity 
-Non-financial firms 
-468 Monthly observations. 
-Time-series regression 
 
-VaR capable to explain the cross-
sectional differences in expected return 
but beta is not, result is robust.  
- R-square, VaR provides better figure, 
even after controlling market size, book-
to-market and liquidity. 
-VaR Only. 
- Using one cost of equity model, no 
robust test for (CAPM). 
 
Chen and Gao 
(2010) 
-COE-Claus and Thomas(2001) 
-COE- Easton (2004). 
-Market risk (VaR) 
-MC 
-Daily retune(No. 
stock/outstanding) 
-24 US Banks-1998-2008 
-OLS 
 
- Positive association between VaR 
disclosures that firm disclose for trading 
activities and cost of equity capital. 
-Technical sophistication is strongly 
correlated with market capitalization. 
-Banks only. 
-Only VaR. 
 
Gay et al. (2011) - Three-factor model of Fama and 
French (1993). 
-Derivatives users (Dummy 
Var.) 
-Leverage and industry Lev. 
-No. of Analysts. -No. of 
segment, -Quarter Return, Tax. 
Foreign sales/net sale, Others. 
-1541 years (1992-1996) & 
2489 years from 2002 to 
2004. 
-Multivariate tests, OLS 
and Probit. 
-Year FE. 
 
-They measure cost of equity capital by 
using  Fama and French (1993) model, 
hence, they find firms that use derivatives 
reduce their cost of equity capital by 24-8 
basis points compared to non-users. 
-Using only Portfolio based measures 
for COE. Three Factor model does not 
consider the information components. 
-Derivatives users main test, and they 
used the notional amount of exposures. 
-Historical derivatives data, not based 
on future exposures. 
A model based 2003-2004 has not 
significant intercept. 
-Using accounting firm level measures 
only. 
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Richardson (2006) -Free Cash Flow 
-I_New. 
-Market Value of Equity 
-Investment Efficiency 
Residual. 
(I-Total, t = CAPEX,t 
+Acquisitions, t +R&D,t +Sale-
PPE, t) 
-(I-New, t=I-Total, t +I-
Maintenance, t) 
-Cash, Lev., Age, Size, Stock 
Return, I-New, Growth. 
-58,053 firm-year 
observations from 1988-
2002. 
-Positive association between over-
investment and firm’s free cash flow. On 
average, he finds firms with free cash 
flow, have over-invested 20% of their cash 
flow and 40% of them retained their cash 
into cash or marketable securities. 
 
Only for Over-investment. 
-Industry and year effects. 
- He used Dep. as maintenance 
measures, in fact he includes R & D, 
and hence, Dep. is a noisy measure for 
R& D. 
- Omitted variable problems. 
-No direct link to disclosures. 
Biddle and Hilary 
(2006) 
-Residual from (Capx,t /Capx ,t-1) 
=b0 + b1 * Operation cash flow, t  
/CAPX, t-1) + b2* Tobin Q,t 
(MVBV) 
Disclosures quality index 
(CIFAR) 
-Legal origin. 
-Creditor and shareholder right. 
-Economic conditions and 
judicial efficiency 
-34 countries. 
-OLS & 2SLS-GMM. 
-They find higher accounting quality is 
associated with lower firms’ investment 
cash sensitivity. They also find creditor 
rights and quality of disclosures play 
significant role between financial quality 
and investment efficiency. 
-Only Cash flow Sen & Only Over-
investment. 
-Not obtain sufficient time-series from 
countries to estimate firm-specific 
measures. 
-Different countries from different 
contents have difference laws and 
regulation, hence reducing result 
generalization, and difficult to compare 
among them (e.g. asset revaluation), 
while this study uses Homogenous 
countries.  
- 2SLS analysis not presented. 
-Only second stage test is shown. 
-Do not check IVs-specification test- 
such as weak iv test.  
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Biddle et al. (2009) -Invest. Effi. Residual =Investment 
(N_PPE, t –R & D, t- Sale asset, t) + 
b1 *Rev. Change, t 
- FRQ, Analyst followers, 
Over-invest firm, MVBV, S.D 
(CFO), S.D (Sales), S.D 
(Investment), N_PPE & 
Dividend. 
-Age, Operation Cycle, Losses 
G-scores, Cash and Other 
conditional variables. 
-34791 Non-financial firm 
y observations from 1993 
to 2005. 
-OLS. 
-Ind. FE 
-High quality information reduces over-
investment and under-investment. 
-Result is conditional to firm that more 
likely to over and under invest. Hence, 
firm with high quality information is less 
influenced by macro-economic shocks 
compared to firm that with lower financial 
information quality. 
- Information quality based on accrual 
accounting measures. 
- No OLS robust 
-Intercept of OLS models is omitted. 
Chen et al. (2011a) Investment eff. Based on (Biddle et 
al. 2009b)= residual = b0 + b1 Rev 
Growth + b2* Nag(loss) +b3* Nag * 
Rev. Growth. 
- FRQ. 
- Log Asset, Log Age, Tang, 
Slack, Audit, Bank, Tax. 
-6321 non-financial private 
firms (multi-industry). 
-OLS & 2SLS. 
-Year FE 
-Financial reporting quality negatively and 
significantly associated with (under- over) 
investment efficiency.  
-More pronounced in case if the private 
firm looks for external finance.  
 -This relation is reduced when private 
firm face more tax pressure. 
-Financial reporting quality only. 
-They proxy for OCF, using net income 
–dep. 
- 2SLS is shortly explained & Did not 
show their work on 2SLS & 
Conditional test to alleviate omitted 
variable tests. 
-Using survey (Financial information in 
some means restricted for private firms.  
Cheng et al. (2013) - Total investment measured as the 
sum of research and development, 
capital, and acquisition expenditures 
less the sale of property, plant, and 
equipment multiplied by 100 and 
scaled by the lagged total assets. 
-Weak & Over-Firm, 
-Gov., Analyst, MVBV, Log 
asset, S.D(CFO), S.D (Sales), 
S.D(Investment) , Z-scores, 
Lev, Loss, Opr.cy., Ind. Lev, 
Age, And Others. 
- 545 firms disclosed ICW. 
-Pool OLS 
- Year FX 
-They find prior to ICW, firm over and 
under invest; and after disclosing ICW, 
investment efficiency improves. 
 
-They used Material Internal Control 
mandatory disclosures to proxy 
financial quality reporting. 
-Mandatory disclosures not related to 
risk  
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5.2 Determinants of Market risk disclosures studies 
5.2.1 The second strand of disclosure studies investigates the determinants of market 
risk disclosures. Determinants include corporate governance61, board of directors, firms’ size, 
and standards compliance.62 For instance, Eng and Mak (2003) investigate ownership 
structure (insiders, blockholder and government), board composition (percentage of 
independent director) and firm’s voluntary disclosure. They find that the disclosure level 
increases with lower levels of insider ownership and with a higher proportion of government 
directors. In addition, they find more outside directors on the board reduces the disclosure 
level. On the contrary, Chen and Jaggi (2001), find that financial disclosure improves with a 
higher proportion of independent directors although this association is weaker in family 
controlled firms. This view is also supported by  (Lim et al. 2007; Jaggi et al. 2009; Jaggi and 
Leung 2007; Cheng and Courtenay 2006; Chau and Gray 2010). However, the 
aforementioned studies have focused on firms’ overall disclosure (e.g., voluntary and 
financial level, earning management, and segment reporting) levels and board composition 
(e.g., ownership representative directors and independent directors. The next section will 
discuss the role of corporate governance structure and its relation with market risk 
disclosures. 
Tufano (1996) uses a sample of 48 U.S. gold mining firms to examine the cross-
sectional differences in risk management activities with financial distress and risk aversion. 
In this paper, Tufano (1996) tests the predictive power of the theories which could explain 
disclosure choices of these firms. In addition, Tufano tests whether the corporate risk 
                                                          
61 Corporate governance as a mechanism to control the agency cost and reducing the information asymmetry is 
well documented in previous literature (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2010; Beyer et al. 2010; Brickley and James 1987; 
Healy and Palepu 2001; Jensen 1986; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1993; Judge et al. 2003; Weisbach 
1988; Williamson 1979). 
62 Several papers discuss the corporate governance, compliance and voluntary disclosure for individual country 
in GCC (For instance, in K.S.A (Al-Turki 2006), in Oman (Dry 2003; Al-Yahyaee et al. 2011), in Kuwait ((Al-
Shammari and Al-Sultan 2010), in Qatar (Hossain and Hammami 2009), in Bahrain (Joshi and Wakil 2004) and 
in UAE (Hassan 2009). 
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management is associated with risk aversion of managers if they hold an equity interest in the 
firm63. First, the prediction of Smith and Stulz (1985) theory: when managers own more stock 
of the firms, they manage less gold price risk, is consistence with Tufano’s result. .  
Hirtle (2007); Perignon and Smith (2010a); and Woods et al. (2008) have adopted an 
index of Value-at-Risk (VaR) that was initially developed by BCBS (2001) Disclosures 
Survey.64. Hirtle (2007) who uses a sample of 24 U.S. Holding Banks (141 firm year 
observations) from 1994 to 2004, to examine whether the forward-looking estimates of risks 
disclosed could act as a substitute to market discipline. She examines the impact of market 
risk disclosures on future risk and returns of trading and market activities65. Hirtle (2007) 
finds a negative and significant association between VaR disclosures and lower risk and high 
risk-adjusted returns, for trading purposes and overall for the firm. Hirtle (2007) concludes 
that whenever VaR disclosures increase, the U.S. Holding Banks develop better risk-returns.  
Perignon and Smith (2010a) investigate two objectives, the level of VaR disclosures 
from 1996 (pre-FRR No. 48) to 2005 and to test the accuracy and usefulness of VaR 
disclosures66. Using a sample size of 10 U.S. banks, they find that average VaR index reports 
lower level of disclosures proceeding FRR No. 48 implementation, followed by a marked 
increase in disclosures post-FRR No. 48. After plotting the VaR index time-series for each 
bank, they find that the top four banks in the U.S. report higher VaR scores as compared to 
                                                          
63 Based on managerial risk aversion by Smith and Stulz (1985) hypothesis and based on signalling managerial 
skill theory by Breeden and Viswanathan (1998)  and DeMarzo and Duffie (1995), the financial distress is 
measured by operational costs and leverage using Smith and Stulz (1985) hypotheses by using the industry-
specific measure for firms' exposures, investment programs and cost structures. 
64 However, Hirtle (2007) use five sub-categories and 18 points for VaR informativeness index, Perignon and 
Smith (2010a) apply six sub-categories and 15 points. Nonetheless, Woods et al. (2008)  question the 
methodologies (in particular the indexes that applied in prior researches) as it is not only do not comprehend the 
market risk disclosures, but also because these indexes present only the informativeness of Value at Risk (VaR) 
disclosures. From the methodological prospective, this research is complementary to this strand of studies. 
65 This paper (Hirtle (2007) is a typical example from Nier and Baumann (2006), in sense they investigate the 
disclosed amount of information by banks and successive share price volatility. Except, they construct their 
index based balance sheet and income statement items, while Hirtle (2007b) develops her index based on banks 
that disclosed “Value-at-Risk”-VaR- in their annual reports. 
66 They construct VaR index based on 13 weighted items (16 points) with 6 sub-categories; which are 1) VaR 
Characteristics, 2) Summary VaR Statistics, 3) Inter-temporal Comparison, 4) Daily VaR Figures, 5) Trading 
Revenue and 6) Back-testing. 
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smaller banks67. To better understand the level of VaR disclosure environment, Perignon and 
Smith (2010a) compared the average of VaR index scores with the top six of the Canadian 
banks over the same period. They find that smallest U.S. and Canadian banks at the 
commencement of FRR No. 48 report a similar level of VaR information.  However, the 
average Canadian VaR index was found to be much higher compared to U.S. VaR score.68 
Perignon and Smith (2010a) find limited answers to link VaR and daily trading revenues69. 
However, they find that banks that use a Historical Simulation method to calculate VaR could 
slightly explain or forecast future trading revenue’ volatility. 
Using spearman rank correlations, Woods et al. (2008) 70 fail to find any significant 
correlation between banks size and the level of market risk disclosures. Additionally, they 
find some evidence that the level of market risk disclosures increases over time from 2000 to 
200671.  
                                                          
67 Further, they find some banks do not report a basic requirement of VaR characteristics such as horizon of 
their estimates; in fact this is a robust result to BCBS survey’s result. Forth, no banks report hypothetical 
trading-revenues that adjusted for bank trading fees. 
68 Range of Canadian VaR’s bank score is 10, while for the US banks is 7. 
69 They apply two tests, firstly using the Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) hypothesis that tests the year-end VaR 
exceptions, and they find banks that disclose exact number of exceptions increases in US banks but remain at 
low level compared to world’ banks sample, secondly, banks still overstate VaR’s figures hence, VaR’s quality 
is violated. Then to re-check “Quality of VaR”, like (Jorion 2002a), they construct daily VaR’s and trading 
revenues, by employing date of banks that score the highest VaR index, each from different countries. In this 
measure Perignon and Smith (2010a) try to investigate whether the daily VaR explains the trading revenue 
volatility? Using different econometrics approaches (Such as GRACH Model using (Mincer and Zarnowitz 
1969) and Guassian GRACH Model. 
70 This study covers the gap of the previous papers’ limitations by strengthening previous studies through 
addressing wider range of qualitative, quantitative, tables and graphs of market risk disclosures. Secondly, rather 
than one single country, this study seeks to investigate top 25 international banks. Therefore, Woods et al. 
(2008) construct 41 items index for market risk disclosures, to answer three main questions. First, the 
association between market risk disclosures and bank’s size. Second, the change of market risk disclosures over 
time. Third, the differences of disclosures practices level between institutional and international banks. 
71 However, fourth trends of market risk disclosures noticeably are obtained, 1) high level disclosures, 2) 
consistent average, 3) low level disclosures, and 4) strong increase disclosures. Then they compare the obtained 
results to the regulatory regimes. They find, some European countries have high disclosures, and some other 
European countries have low disclosures, secondly, North American has an increasing trend of market risk 
disclosures, and finally UK has a highest level of disclosures. Finally, Woods et al. (2008) find the levels of 
disclosures are linked to the number of annual reports pages.  
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Taylor et al. (2008) examine the pattern of financial instruments derivatives 
disclosures (FIDI)for Australian mining and petroleum firms.72 Taylor et al. (2008) find a 
significant increase of disclosures over time, particularly after the adoption of IFRS. Based 
on pooled regression model, they find, that (+) corporate governance index (+) capital 
management, cross-listing and (-) income tax specifications are significantly associated with 
FIDI disclosures index. This result is obtained after controlling for firms’ size, leverage, top 
20 shareholders, sub-industry and ROA73. Furthermore, Taylor et al. (2008) find that each 
individual item of FIDI is statistically significant with the independent and control variables. 
Using on multi-perspective theoretical framework74, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) extend 
the human factors impact theory of corporate governance to examine the level of voluntary 
disclosure of Malaysian listed firms. They found that the level of voluntary disclosure is 
significantly negatively associated with the occurrence of family members on the board and 
with the existence of a non-executive chair in the board.  This result is consistent even after 
using reduced regression variables (20 variables); except for racial ownership structure which 
reports positive and significant association. Myring and Shortridge (2010) investigate the 
importance of strong corporate governance as a mechanism to improve the quality of 
financial disclosures.75 Myring and Shortridge (2010) find no evidence that the corporate 
governance is an important tool to strengthen the firms’ quality of financial disclosure76. Htay 
et al. (2011) use a panel data of 12 listed Malaysian banks to study the association between 
                                                          
72 In this study, Taylor et al. (2008) apply diffident types of theoretical frameworks (e.g. agency theory, 
information asymmetry theory and legitimacy theory). Using longitudinal (panel) data for four years from 2003 
to 2006, and employing self-contractive financial instrument index (FIDI) that consists of 120 items (The index 
mainly is built from the financial instruments Australian Accounting Standards Board (e.g. AASB 1033, AASB 
132, and AASB 7).  
73 All control variables are statistically significant to explain the FIDI Index.  
74 They used corporate governance and social value of different races based on (Hofstede et al. 1991), and 
accounting value based on (Gray 1988).  
75 They measure the quality of financial disclosures by evaluating the analysts’ information that is extracted 
from IBES database.  While, the corporate governance index is obtained from the Corporate Library, that 
categorizes the corporate governance into seven levels, 1) Board effectiveness, 2) Board composition, 3) CEO 
compensation, 4) Shareholder responsiveness, 5) Accounting, 6) Strategic decision making, 7) Litigation and 
regulatory problems and takeover defence 
76 This study is additional supportive evidence to Koehn and Ueng (2005) and Farber (2005). 
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risk management disclosure and corporate governance.77 They find only two corporate 
governance variables have significant associations with the risk disclosure index:, (+) 
independent and non-executive and (-) director ownership.   
 
5.2.2 Summary of determents of market risk disclosures studies: 
Generally, studies that investigated determinates of market risk disclosures provide mixed 
and inconsistent results. Some of these studies, did not apply potential market risk 
disclosures, instead they had applied derivatives financial instruments (historical disclosures). 
Three papers discussed only VaR disclosures format by constructing indexes for VaR format, 
however, these papers had not applied that for other market risk formats78. Furthermore, 
banks and financial related industries, not examined in any of discussed papers. For example, 
past papers investigated the determinants of market risk disclosures only in banks or firms 
from mixed industries. Further, omitted variables problem is not very investigated from 
econometrics perspective. The discussed papers also used self-constructed indexes however; 
these disclosures indexes were not validated (except Taylor et al., 2008). Overall, qualitative 
risk disclosures were not well incorporated in some of market risk disclosures studies. Table 
2.4: provides a summary of studies of the determinants of market risk disclosures: 
 
                                                          
77 Risk management index consists of 33 variables that sub-divided into eight categories;1) Overall market risk 
exposures, 2) Interest rate, 3) Currency exposures risk, 4) Liquidity risk, 5) Credit risk, 6) Operational risk, 7) 
Derivatives, and 8) Hedging strategy.  The independent variables are the corporate governance elements 
(leadership separation, independent directors, board size, director ownership and block ownership), plus two 
control firms-level characteristics which are; log of total asset (size), and leverage (total debt over total equity) 
78 Methodologically I contribute in these studies by developing Sen Index alongside with VaR index. 
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Table 2.4: Summary of determinants market risk disclosures studies. 
Authors(s) Dependent Variables Independent Variables Methodologies  Main Findings Comments/issues 
Malone et al. (1993) -Extent of Financial 
disclosures scaled to 
maximum expected 
score-  
 
-Debt to total equity, No. 
of shareholder, Total asset, 
Ind. diversification, Rate of 
return (Net worth). 
-Earning margin, Big 8 
audit, Market type Listing.  
- Number of  
-Independent board 
directors. 
-Annual reports  
-125 oil and gas firms  
-Stepwise regression 
model 
 
-Only three variable retune in the 
model at .2 significance level which 
are listing status, 
, ratio of debt to total equity, and 
number of shareholders. 
- Systematic differences between 
firms that provide different amounts 
of information. 
-Limited to Oil and gas firms  
- No responding firms’ survey and analyst biased. 
- Dependent variable’s index items are not disclosed. 
-Self-constructed robust by Questionnaire to financial 
analysts. 
- Quant. Only. 
Tufano (1996) - Leverage  (Long-term 
debt scaled by firm size) 
- Cash costs. 
 
-Exploration activities  
-Acquisition activities  
- Firm size, Reserves, Tax 
loss carries forwards. 
- Direct share ownership 
- Large non-managerial 
blocks, Diversification, 
Cash balances. 
- 48 US Gold mining 
firms. 
 - Pool OLS 
regression  
Annual reports and 
10Ks.) 
- Firms whose managers hold more 
options manage less gold price risk, 
and firms whose managers hold more 
stock manage more gold price risk. 
-Suggesting that managerial risk 
aversion may affect corporate risk 
management policy. 
-Sample biased as they consider only firm with highly 
market risk for gold exposures. 
- Asymmetry information is existed between 
management and investors which is not considered. 
- Only Gold sensitivity. 
- Quant. only 
 
Chalmers (2001) -Percentage of Voluntary 
Financial instrument 
disclosures- self-
constricted) 
 -140 Listed Australian 
-Annual Report for 6 
years, Means tests. 
- Pre & Post 
Voluntary Regime. 
-Voluntarily financial disclosures is 
on increased trend (1992 to 1998) 
-Referring the increase 1) The release 
of ED65: (AASB 1033) & 2) After 
AASB 1033: Presentation and 
Disclosures of financial instruments, 
is mandated by AASB in 1997.  
-Not Fully complied with ED65 
(AASB 1033). 
- Historical Derivatives financial instrument 
disclosures only. 
-Not considering any market risk exposure, reporting 
effects & formats. 
- Considering only one year after the mandatory 
regime (1998).   
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Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) -Voluntary financial 
instruments(14 items 
self-constructed index) 
 
-Size, Industry 
classification, Leverage, 
News, New issue shares, 
Inde. BOD, Top 20 & 
Audit big 6. 
 
-199 listed Australian 
Firms 
-Annual 
Reports01992-1996 
-Per & Post ED59: 
Financial Instrument. 
-OLS regression 
- Extent of Vol.-Disc. Significant for 
all reporting years. 
- Extent of Vol.-Disclosures after 
Mandatory Regime. 
-Asset and Industry classification 
significant positive association all 
years & Lev Negative significant. 
- Positive significant with issuing new 
share. 
- Historical Derivatives financial instrument 
disclosures only.  
-Legitimacy theory 
-Not considering market risk disclosures. 
 -Not Year FE for time-series effects. 
-Not robust by any Panel data effects or by other 
econometrics models to overcome the estimator 
consistency problem of OLS. 
Mallin et al. (2004) -Voluntary financial 
derivatives disclosures. 
 -Semi-structured 
Interview 
-14 fund management 
firms. 
- Disclosing derivatives exposures 
before FRS13, stemmed from 
management attitudes for 
transparency & industry pressure after 
big earlier scandals, motivated 
towards new move to management 
risk, huge size of derivatives risk,  
- Derivatives financial instrument includes market risk 
exposure, but disclosures of derivatives disclosures is 
historical exposures not represents the actual market 
risk based on potential risk. 
 
Hirtle (2007) -Market risk VaR 
disclosures index (by 
BCBS Disclosures 
Survey 2001). 
-Performance: 1) 
Trading Revenue; 2) 
Trading volatility; 
=Trading Return. 
-Log (assets), Log (assets) 
sqr, Risk-weighted 
Assets/assets, Total Risk-
Based Capital Ratio, 
Trading Assets/Assets, 
Deposits/Assets, 
Loans/Asset, 
Securitizes/Asset, Fed 
Funds/Assets and Others. 
-24- US holding banks 
-141 observations 
from 1994-2004. 
-OLS 
 
- Neg. and significant association 
between VaR disclosures index, the 
lower risk and high risk- adjusted 
return, generally for trading and 
overall firm. 
-“This finding suggests that there may 
be learning cost for investors in 
assessing and putting into context new 
types of information about risk” (p 
25). 
-Index of VaR, considering the requirement of VaR, 
irrespective to type of market exposure, and reporting 
effects. 
- Sample selection bias as from 1994-2004, she select 
only firms that disclose VaR. 
-Variables biased to Banks sectors only. 
-Not considering any effects and time-series effects, 
during 10 years. 
Perignon and Smith (2010a) -Returns  Adopted Market risk VaR 
disclosures index (by 
BCBS Disclosures Survey 
2001). 
-10 US banks. 
-GARCH Model lead 
-regression. 
-VaR score higher Post to FRR No. 
49-1997. 
- Top 4 banks in US report higher 
scores compared to middle and lower 
banks size. 
- Some banks do not report a basic 
requirement of VaR characteristics. 
- VaR only. 
-Testing the quality of VaR based on end-year 
compared to back-test, using sample observations 5 
Canadian Banks and 21 International banks. 
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-Non-controlling for the competitive 
characteristics in both countries, the 
average Canadian VaR index much 
higher compared to US VaR score. 
-Find limited answers to link VaR and 
daily trading revenues. 
Woods et al. (2008) -Extent of MR 
disclosures. 
 
- Size -25 International 
banks (2000, 2003 and 
2006). 
-No regression. 
 
- No any significant relationship 
between bank’s size (measure on 
market capitalization) over three years 
(2003, 2000 and 2006). 
- Weak evidence that market risk 
index increases over time from 2003 0 
to 2006. 
-Some European countries have high 
disclosures, and some other European 
countries have low disclosures, 
secondly, North American has an 
increasing trend of market risk 
disclosures, and finally UK has a 
highest level of disclosures. 
-The levels of disclosures are linked to 
the number of annual reports pages. 
-Overcome to previous 2 papers that only consider 
VaR, this paper incorplllllorates more qualitative and 
quantitative items, however, but from 41 items, 23 
items are related to VaR, no disclosures items for Sen 
format. Hence; generalizability of firm’s market risk 
disclosures is flawed. They also, include the reporting 
effects (e.g. cash) also, market risk exposures (e.g. 
IR). 
Taylor et al. (2008) -Financial instruments 
market risk disclosures. 
-Corporate Governance. 
-Capital Management. 
-Cross-listing, Income Tax 
-Firm size, Leverage, 
Top20 
-Sub-Ind., ROA. 
-122 Australian 
Mining firms, annual 
reports from 2003-
2006. 
-Pooled OLS. 
-Sig increase of disclosures over four 
years (Post-IFRS). 
-Sig positive association between DV 
and CG, Cross-listing & Tax. 
-Sig Neg. with Capital Management 
(CoE). 
-Using Der. Instruments, which based on Historical 
exposure? 
-Targeting Mining industry, which more likely to 
expose commodity risk (e.g. O&G prices, gold...).  
-No omitted variable specifications. 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) -Voluntary Disclosures 
including Financial 
information. 
- CGs 
-Cultural Variables (e.g. 
finance directors, 
- 167 Malaysian 
Annual Reports, 1995. 
-Using full variables regression, the 
voluntary disclosures is only has a 
significant relationship with (-) family 
members of the board and (-) when 
-No direct reference to market risk. 
- Includes unique cultural variable that reflect unique 
cultural characteristics, which could be applied only in 
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qualification…) 
-Firms level (e.g. size, 
gearing, To 10, ROE... 
-OLS chair is not executive member Malaysia. 
-No robust evidence reported. 
Myring and Shortridge (2010) Quality of Financial 
Disclosures. Measured 
consensus and 
uncertainty can be 
measured in terms of 
three forecast properties: 
expected dispersion, 
expected squared error in 
the mean forecast, and 
the number of analysts 
issuing forecasts, N. 
-CGs from Corporate 
Library,  No. Analysts,  
S.D EPS last 3 ys, Abs 
change in Earnings, MK, 
MKBK & Director 
ownership. 
-1150 observations, 
IBES. 
-Ranked Regression. 
 
 
-No evidence that the corporate 
governance is an important tool to 
strengthen the firms’ quality of 
financial disclosures. 
- Measuring Quality of Financial disclosures, based on 
Analyst forecast (biased). 
-Appling Corporate Library index for corporate 
governance as independent variable. This index 
stemmed from the problems of 2002 collapses (e.g. 
Enron). 
 
 
Htay et al. (2011) -Management risk 
reporting. 
-Corporate governance. 
-Size(log asset) 
-Leverage 
-12 Malaysian local 
listed firms. 
-OLS 
-Independent and non-executive 
directors’ variable is positively 
influence on the risk management 
disclosures. - Director ownership is 
negatively associated with the risk 
disclosures index.  
-Selection of only local banks. 
-Focused only on market risk exposures (IR, FX...) 
-Including qualitative items. 
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6. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 2 
 
Prior studies investigated the informativeness of market risk disclosures by examining 
the effects pre- and post- market risk mandatory regulation internationally and in U.S. (e.g., 
FRR No. 48). Studies that examined market risk disclosures before the release of regulation 
(e.g. Pre-FRR No. 48) used firms belonging to the oil, gas and related industries, however, 
noticeable post-FRR No. 48 studies shifted to non-financial firms and banks. Financial firms 
incorporating commercial, investment, and retail, wholesale and insurance firms are not part 
of prior studies. Further, although the link between overall risk disclosures, transparency and 
corporate governance mechanisms were established, the association between the quality and 
quantity of market risk disclosures and corporate governance had not been addressed. In 
addition, investment efficiency studies also focused on the quality of financial reporting, 
while the quality and extent of risk information was not considered. In this study, the 
investment efficiency will be addressed from the discretion in mandatory market risk 
disclosures in GCC frontier markets.  
Prior studies have found a negative association between extent of disclosures and cost 
of equity capital (e.g., Botosan 1997; Botosan 2002, 2005; Botosan et al. 2011; Botosan 
2000; Cheng et al. 2013; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991; Easley and O'hara 2004; Francis et 
al. 2005; Hughes et al. 2009; Lambert et al. 2012; Sengupta 1998). Luez and Verrechhia 
(2000), notice that firms increase their disclosure level by adopting IAS/IFRS which in turn 
leads to a reduction in the cost of equity capital79. Li (2010) use 6456 firm-year observations 
comprising 1084 European firms from 1995 to 2006. On average, Li (2010) finds that the 
mandatory IFRS reduces the cost of equity capital80. This study examines the disaggregation 
                                                          
79 Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) use proxies for information asymmetry of the cost of capital which are bid-ask 
spread, Trading Volume, Share Price Volatility. However, Building on same assumption of Germany firms from 
1993 to 2002, (Daske 2006), fail to find similar result.    
80 Li (2010) justifies this result, to the strength of legal enforcement for each country. 
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in mandatory market risk disclosures and its impacts on the cost of equity capital. 
Furthermore, very few studies investigate the cost of equity capital in frontier markets (e.g. 
GCC) and emerging markets, particularly using forecast and growth models, due to the 
weaker disclosure regime and less analyst followers in these markets. This study also adopts 
different measures for the cost of equity capital (e.g. abnormal growth models, analyst 
forecast models, and realized return models). 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, I discuss development of the GCC stock market, financial reporting and 
governance framework, market risk, conceptual and background, and theoretical framework 
for this study through the mandatory and voluntary disclosures setting. This chapter also 
discusses the previous literature, the consequences and economic determinants of market risk 
disclosures, supplemented by table of summary for the studies in each section.  Finally, I 
provide a general summary of the literature.    
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE DESIGN 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This study uses a unique hand-collected dataset. The empirical analysis covers the period 
from 2007 through 2011. The number of listed firms on exchanges in the GCC increased 
from 399 in 2006 to 702 after 2007. Further, based on hand collected data, I develop a market 
risk disclosure index using disclosure requirements in IFRS 7: Financial Instruments: 
Disclosures. In addition, firm-specific corporate governance variables were obtained largely 
from 2007, as many financial firms start disclosing corporate governance from 2007. All 
countries require consideration of corporate governance after 2006 (except Oman when 
governance rules were introduced in 2003).  
The sample consists of the financial firms listed on the GCC stock exchanges. The 
financial firms comprise banks, insurance, financial and investment firms. There are several 
reasons why financial firms are used. The financial sector is one of the few sectors in the 
GCC that was allowed by the various GCC governments’ to engage in full competition 
(Hertog 2012). Prior studies on financial firms and market risk reporting show that the 
financial firms disclose comprehensive risk information relative to that of other industries 
(Nier and Baumann 2006; Perignon and Smith 2010a). Further, as suggested by Linsley and 
Shrives (2006), disclosure by financial firms should be understood and investigated 
separately to whom that of non-financial as financial firms are highly risk oriented 
institutions. There are far less studies on corporate governance, investment efficiency and the 
implied cost of equity capital from financial firms.  
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2. DATA SOURCE 
 
The sample was formed by utilizing a variety of databases and resources. The databases used 
for forming the sample are as follows: 
Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ (S & P Capital IQ):  
S&P Capital IQ has grown very rapidly to become one of the leading providers of software, 
data and analytics to the financial services community. Initially I used Capital IQ to list and 
select the number of active listed firms in the GCC stock markets. All control variables and 
firms’ annual reports are obtained from the Capital IQ.  
Annual Reports: 
The market risk disclosures index and corporate governance index are unique. No databases 
provide variables on disclosures and corporate governance for the GCC firms. This study 
constructs market risk disclosures index and corporate governance index based on 
information provided in the annual reports (see Appendix A & B for market risk disclosures 
index and corporate governance index). To collect the annual reports, I match the financial 
firms that I obtained from Capital IQ. Annual reports are collected from companies’ web-site, 
the GCC stock markets database, and Capital IQ filings. 
Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) 
I/B/E/S collects earnings estimates for U.S. and international companies. The dataset 
subsequently was used as the basis for academic accounting/finance journals for earning 
forecast, earning precision, consensus, and cost of capital.  I used IBES for the third objective 
to estimate the additional test of ICOE.  
Country Governance and Investor Protection 
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I also used Kaufmann et al. (2009) country governance index and La Porta et al. (2000) 
investor protection index to control for country-specific factors. I obtain these indexes from 
the World Bank database. 
Stock price and Beta 
Stock closing prices and firm’s 12 months beta were obtained from Bloomberg database.  
3. SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
I sort all active listed firms in the GCC stock markets. I find 629 active listed firms; 
excluding 421 non-financial firms, with a final list of 276 financial firms. I exclude firms that 
categorized under financial firms based the S&P capital IQ, but not classified as financial 
firms in the stock markets such as commodity contract pool operators, commodity contract 
trading companies, commodity contract brokers and dealers, and oil and gas lease brokers. 
This procedure yields 208 (1375 observations) financial firms. Then I also exclude joint listed 
firms and financial firms that do not have an accessible annual report, those have only have 
financial statements, and those missing a corporate governance section, and risk reporting 
section in their annual reports. The final sample is 141 (705 year observations) financial 
firms. However, for each objective, the final sample varies depending on the control variables 
and type of regression models used in the analysis. Table 3.1 and 3.2 show the sample 
distribution based on country and industry in each year. Table 3.1 exhibits that U.A.E 
represents highest number of observation (170), followed by Kuwait (Oman) with 150 (125). 
Finally, Table 3.2 shows that my sample comprises four industries, namely Banks (300), 
financial firms (180), insurance (140) and investment (85). 
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Table 3.1 Sample Distribution based on Country and Year  
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Bahrain 17 17 17 17 17 85 
K.S.A 18 18 18 18 18 90 
Kuwait 30 30 30 30 30 150 
Oman 25 25 25 25 25 125 
Qatar 17 17 17 17 17 85 
U.A.E 34 34 34 34 34 170 
Total 141 141 141 141 141 705 
 
 
Table 3.2: Sample Distribution based on Industry   
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Banks 60 60 60 60 60 300 
Financial 36 36 36 36 36 180 
Insurance 28 28 28 28 28 140 
Investment 17 17 17 17 17 85 
Total 141 141 141 141 141 705 
 
Table 3.3 shows that initially the sample comprises 1,375 firm-year financial firm 
observations. Exclusion of joint listed firms (15 firm years), firms with no annual reports 
(670 firm years), and firms with missing values relating to the control variables (13 firm-
years) yields a final sample size of 677 firm-year observations for the first objective 1 
“Market risk disclosures, corporate’s life cycle and board risk committee”.  
Table 3.3 Sample Selection “Objective 1” 
Number of observation available for financial firms in S & P Capital IQ for the GCC 
countries from 2007 to 2011 1,375 
Less: 
           Joint listed firms (15)
          Firms with unavailable annual report for disclosure items (670) 
          Firms with missing values in control variables (13) 
Total firm year observations  677 
 
In the second objective “Discretion in Mandatory Risk Disclosures and Investment 
Efficiency”, I utilise a lagged regression model to test whether the current year “investment” is 
influenced by the previous years “discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures”. This 
procedure omits one firm year observations. Table 3.4 shows the final sample size for the 
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second “objective 2” as follows; for model 1, the final sample is 550, for model 2 the final 
sample is 557 and for model 3, the final sample is 547.  
Table 3.4 Sample Selection “Objective 2” 
Number of observation available for financial firms in S & P Capital IQ for the 
GCC countries from 2007 to 2011 1,375 
Less: 
           Joint listed firms (15)
          Firms with unavailable annual report for disclosure items (670) 
          Firms with missing values in control variables (13) 
          Firms dropped due to Lagged regression- Model1 a.(127) 
          Firms dropped due to Lagged regression- Model2 b.(120) 
          Firms dropped due to Lagged regression- Model3 c.(130) 
Total firm year observations  a.550, b.557& c.547 
 
For the third objective - Disaggregation in Market Risk Disclosures, Auditor Conservative 
and the Implied Cost of Capital” I use the same procedure for sample selection used in first 
objective. However, I follow Easton (2006); Daske (2006); Chen et al. (2010); and Dickinson 
and Sommers (2012) to measure the ICOE using a portfolio (Easton and Sommers 2007) 
measure including firm-specific variables. Easton (2006) and Daske (2006) suggest the 
inclusion of a firm risk control variable in the portfolio-based measure; therefore, I use a 
constant sample size where a firm. Using this procedure I obtain a final constant sample size 
of 588 firm-year observations. Table 3.5 presents the distribution of 588 firm-year 
observations of the final sample based on country and year. The UAE represents 24% of the 
sample, followed by Kuwait (Oman) with 17% (18%), respectively, of the total observations. 
In addition, the highest number of firm-year observations, derived from 122 annual reports, 
occurs in 2009. 
Table 3.5 Sample distribution based on country and year “Objective 3” 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Bahrain 15 16 17 17 16 81 
Saudi Arabia 15 16 15 15 14 75 
Kuwait 21 21 23 22 20 107 
Oman 20 20 22 17 21 100 
Qatar 14 17 17 17 17 82 
U.A.E 29 29 28 30 27 143 
Total 114 119 122 118 115 588 
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4. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
In this chapter, I discuss the data sources that used to collect and filter my sample. Also this 
chapter presents the data period and sample distribution in each country, industry and year. In 
addition, this chapter shows the sample criteria, and sample selection relating to each 
objective.  
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CHAPTER 4 
MARKET RISK DISCLOSURES, CORPORATE’S LIFE CYCLE AND BOARD RISK 
COMMITTEE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Numerous studies (e.g., Jorion 2002a; Linsmeier et al. 2002; Rajgopal 1999) and professional 
surveys (e.g., CFA institution, 2012; (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision BCBS 2002, 
2003) have articulated the usefulness of information content of market risk disclosures. These 
studies and surveys show that market risk disclosures help investors understand the risks 
associated with on- and off-balance sheet items, and forecast financial statement and cash 
flow effects when key inputs such as interest rates, prices and exchange rates change between 
reporting periods. Market risk disclosures thus improve transparency regarding risk 
exposures (Rajgopal 1999), increase investor confidence in financial statements (Dobler 
2008), reduce mispricing of risk and misallocation of capital (Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 
2003), and assist with market discipline on a timely basis (Jorion 2002a). Prior studies (e.g., 
Dobler, 2008; Subramaniam, McManus & Zhang, 2009) also indicate that the existence of a 
risk management committee can ensure credible communication and effective oversight on 
organisational risk management strategies, policies and processes. However, the majority of 
these studies and surveys are conducted in the U.S. One logical question is whether the 
findings relating to market risk disclosures are peculiar to the U.S. or whether they can be 
extrapolated to developing markets, or if they are also prominent in countries where the 
disclosure regime and/or institutional and economic characteristics are significantly different. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of risk committee (hereafter RC) 
concentration and specialization, and the firm life cycle stages in affecting market risk 
disclosures in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. In particular, I test whether the 
RC existence has any impact on the extent and quality of market risk disclosures. I also 
 76 
 
examine the relevance and significance of RC characteristics in explaining the market risk 
disclosures level. Furthermore, I study whether the role of the RC in affecting market risk 
disclosures varies with different stages in the firm life cycle.  
 Several important economic and institutional features make the GCC a unique and 
interesting environment for examining the impact of a standalone RC, characteristics of RC 
and firm life cycle in relation to market risk disclosures. First, the GCC countries are 
characterized by limited disclosure and transparency, resulting from weak corporate 
disclosure requirements (Islam 2003). Although all GCC countries adopted IAS/IFRS, listed 
firms are largely reluctant to comply with risk disclosure requirements (Al-Shammari et al. 
2008). Prior studies (e.g., Kamla and Roberts 2010) also document that firms in the GCC 
publish less information about their operations and risk exposures. An IFC/Hawkamah (2008) 
survey finds that only 9.1 percent listed banks and 26 percent non-bank firms in the GCC 
disclose material foreseeable risk factors. The GCC is also characterized by a scarcity of 
professional financial analysts and management forecasts (Al-Yahyaee et al. 2011). 
Furthermore, the GCC lacks credible media to disseminate financial information, which in 
most developed countries is provided by a specialized part of the press and electronic media. 
Thus, investors in the GCC have very limited sources of information, making annual reports 
as the most important source of information on market risk exposures. The aforementioned 
factors suggest that establishment of qualified RC can be used as a channel to promote 
disclosure of risk information.  
  Second, most firms in the GCC are owned by a small number of investors who have 
controlling interests (Al-Yahyaee et al. 2011). The National Investor-TNI (2008) survey 
reveals that the top five families in Dubai control between 10 percent and one third of all 
board seats while the top fifteen families control between 18 and 50 percent. This survey also 
reports that royal family directors represent 60 percent of the GCC equity capitalization. 
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Thus, a relatively small and tightly knit economic elite effectively control the financial 
markets in the GCC which can result in a power imbalance and a greater level of information 
asymmetry (Al-Sehali and Spear 2004; Mazaheri 2013).   
 Third, risk disclosure requirements are not well covered in the GCC code of corporate 
governance (Hawkamah 2010). In the KSA and UAE, the corporate governance code is 
largely devoid of any requirements to disclose risk information. The IFC/Hawkamah (2008) 
survey documents that 76 percent of GCC banks and 69 percent of non-banking listed firms 
do not consider disclosure as an effective tool to maintain shareholders value. The lack of 
public dissemination of financial information and the family controlled nature of businesses 
in the GCC provides us with a unique opportunity to test the role of a standalone RC in 
enhancing market risk disclosures. If I find that market risk disclosures correspond to the 
existence of a separate RC, then this will shed light on their ability in enhancing risk 
disclosure in emerging markets, and these findings could be particularly useful to investors, 
regulators, and policy makers in the GCC and other emerging markets in terms of 
understanding the contributing factors of market risk disclosures. 
Whether or not a separate RC can improve the extent and quality of risk disclosures in 
the GCC is an empirical question. Studies (e.g., Brown et al. 2009) in developed markets 
suggest that a traditional audit committee (hereafter AC) is insufficient for overseeing 
financial and non-financial risks when faced with complex and high-risk environments. Since 
an RC concentrates on and specializes in risk monitoring and risk management, it strengthens 
a firm’s risk management system which eventually leads to an improvement in the firm’s risk 
reporting facets (Dobler 2008; Subramaniam et al. 2009). However, the picture is less clear in 
the GCC region. On the one hand, the lack of disclosure, professional analysts, reliable 
media, existence of concentrated ownership; and weaker corporate governance rules 
regarding risk disclosure suggest that a dedicated RC may have little impact on market risk 
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disclosures in the GCC. On the other hand, the voluntary formation of risk committee reflects 
firms’ willingness to improve risk management and risk related disclosures and thus, a 
standalone RC may still be an important channel to enhance disclosure of risk related 
information.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Risk Committee (RC) 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, corporations (primarily in the financial services 
sector) focused on the formation of separate RCs to cope with risk-related issues. In many 
companies, the responsibility of risk oversight rests with the AC, considering that AC 
members have financial expertise to deal with the risk management process. However, given 
the complexity of the numerous risks faced by modern organizations and the overwhelming 
responsibility of the AC in the financial reporting process, the AC might not have sufficient 
time, skills, and support to assess the firm’s overall risks (Field et al. 2013). The stand-alone 
RC is more apparent in the financial sector due to this sector’s greater exposure to different 
types of risk (e.g., credit, market, trading, capital adequacy, regulatory, and compliance risk) 
(Andres and Vallelado 2008). 
 The determinants and consequences of the RC are under-researched. In the only study 
on the determinants of the RC, Subramaniam et al. (2009) document that the RC tends to 
exist in companies with an independent board chairman and larger boards. Obviously, the RC 
benefits firms by improving the board oversight of risk management and by anticipating and 
reacting to events and trends that might otherwise be inscrutable. Furthermore, a stand-alone 
RC is more capable of devoting more time and effort towards integrating and managing 
various organization-wide risks (Brown et al. 2009). 
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2.2 Market Risk Disclosures 
IFRS 7 defines market risk as the risk that the fair value or future cash flows of a financial 
instrument will fluctuate because of changes in market prices. Market risk is comprised of 
three types of risks associated with market prices: currency risk, interest rate risk, equity and 
other (e.g. commodity) price risk. Risk-related disclosure allows outsiders to monitor the 
performance of senior managers (Eng and Mak 2003) and to assess the future economic 
performance of the firm (Hodder et al. 2006; Schrand and Elliott 1998). Disclosure of risk-
related information improves risk management and governance, a disciplining effect (Jorion 
2002a) and reduces information asymmetry and cost of capital (Easley and O'hara 2004; 
Solomon et al. 2000). Risk-related disclosure is in line with the firm's commitment to 
legitimacy and reputation; thus, it improves the trust of various stakeholders.  
 Market risk disclosures are of immense importance for firms operating in the financial 
sector. Risk disclosure in banks is viewed as an effective tool for avoiding banking crises. 
Linsmeier et al. (2002) find that market risk disclosures reduce investors' uncertainty and 
diversity of opinion arising from changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, and 
commodity prices. Jorion (2002) and Lim and Tan (2007) document that value-at-risk (VaR) 
disclosures are informative as these can predict the variability of trading revenues.  
 
2.3 Connection between the Risk Committee (RC) and Market Risk Disclosures 
Theoretical perspectives may provide greater insights into managerial motivation for 
disclosure and hence, I resort to a number of theories (e.g., legitimacy theory, stakeholder 
theory and resource-based theory) to explain the formation of a RC and its relation with 
market risk disclosures. Extensive research suggests legitimacy theory is a major driver of 
corporate disclosure (Neu et al. 1998; Cho et al. 2015). According to this theory, financial 
institutions may disclose market risk information in an attempt to satisfy external pressures to 
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conform to socially acceptable norms. Market risk disclosures may also be viewed from the 
context of stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984). This theory stipulates that corporation seeks to 
provide a balance between the interests of various stakeholders to ensure that each interest 
constituency receives some degree of satisfaction. According to this theory, financial 
institutions may form a RC to safeguard its stakeholders’ interest, which in turn can enhance 
the disclosure of risk information to more effectively interact and better communicate with a 
diverse set of stakeholders (Barakat and Hussainey 2013). The formation of RC may be 
examined from resource-based view which posits that the existence and application of 
resources generate the basis of competitive advantage and heterogeneity in organisational 
capabilities. This view suggests that firm with more resource may have the required capacity 
to form a separate RC to enhance the risk management process (Dobler 2008).   
 Over the past decade, there has been a growing emphasis from regulators, policy 
makers, and other stakeholders on better governance, management, and reporting of financial 
and business risk (Brown et al. 2009). To satisfy this demand, firms, especially in the 
financial sectors, are resorting to the formation of a separate RC, which can effectively 
manage organizational risk and improve risk reporting. The RC can improve the extent and 
quality of market risk disclosures in two ways. First, as risk monitoring and risk management 
are the sources of information for risk reporting (Solomon et al. 2000), the possible 
information content of risk reports is linked to the information endowed by corporate risk 
management (Dobler 2008). Second, it is argued that a stand-alone RC allows committee 
members to concentrate on corporate risk processes only and, therefore, provides better 
quality risk monitoring, management, and reporting than that provided by a combined audit 
and risk committee. A combined committee would not only have to oversee the risk 
management function but would need to be actively involved with the financial reporting and 
related audit oversight function. As the RC is primarily responsible for risk management and 
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risk reporting, I posit that firms with a separate RC are associated with greater extent and 
higher quality of market risk disclosures than firms without a separate RC. Hence I 
hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1a. The extent of market risk disclosures is greater for firms with a stand-
alone RC. 
Hypothesis 1b. The quality of market risk disclosures is higher for firms with a stand-
alone RC. 
 
2.4 Risk Committee (RC) Characteristics and Market Risk Disclosures 
In this section, I focus on the individual characteristics of the RC that can potentially enhance 
market risk disclosures. 
2.4.1 Independence of Members of Risk Committee (RC) and Market Risk Disclosures 
 
Independent directors are viewed as a potential solution to many of the corporate 
governance problems (Wan-Hussin 2009). Agency and stakeholder theories suggest that 
independent directors can make impartial judgments in corporate decision making, increase 
the monitoring of manager’s behaviour and thus can enhance stakeholders’ interests (e.g., 
Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990). However, empirical evidence regarding the impact of 
independent directors on corporate disclosure and transparency is inconclusive. For example,  
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) and Wan-Hussin (2009) document a positive association 
between board independence and financial disclosures. Carcello and Neal (2003) find that 
independent directors in an AC improve the disclosures of financially distress firms. Thus, 
these empirical findings suggest that independent directors in a RC are likely to devote more 
effort to improve the quality of monitoring and management of risk, which eventually 
improves risk reporting. 
Other studies, on the contrary, show that independent directors may not have the same 
effect on disclosure of risk information as  insiders do. For example, Eng and Mak (2003) 
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find that the independent (outside) directors are negatively associated with the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. Resource-dependence theorists also posit that if a firm board comprises 
only of independent directors, this can harm the performance of the firm. Furthermore, Ho 
and Shun Wong (2001) and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) find no association between the 
disclosure level and existence of independent directors.  
Hypothesis 2a1. There is a positive association between independence of a majority of 
members in the RC and extent of market risk disclosures.   
Hypothesis 2a2. There is a positive association between independence of a majority of 
members in the RC and quality of market risk disclosures. 
2.4.2 Qualifications of Members of Risk Committee (RC) and Market Risk Disclosures 
 
The nature of market risk exposures requires directors with relevant qualifications and 
experience to ensure that risks are understood and accounted for by the firm. For example, a 
tabular disclosure format of risk information requires no loss outcomes to be specified, while 
both Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Sensitivity Analysis (Sen) requires a single point estimate of 
risk (Hodder et al. 2001b). In addition, both VaR and Sen can be disclosed as an aggregate 
measure. Such aggregate disclosure can obscure important information about the component 
risks, which may lead an investor to react in a different way than if component risks are 
detailed (Hodder et al. 2001a). A financially literate or experienced RC member is expected 
to observe the disadvantages of such disclosure and take a prudent approach to ensure that 
further detail of risk information is provided. One may argue that the RC consists of board 
members with professional qualifications or expertise chosen by the overall board or 
nomination committee. However, the GCC board directors institue BDI (2011) documents 
shortages of qualified and financial skilled directors, which could be one of the main barriers 
to board effectiveness of firms in the GCC. Moreover, corporate governance codes in the 
GCC do not require directors of RCs to have academic and/or professional qualifications. 
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Resource-dependence theory suggests that boards with qualified members can help 
connect a firm to its external environment and obtain valuable resources (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978). Moreover, agency theory indicates that qualified boards improve managerial 
monitoring (Cabedo and Tirado 2004) and thus enhance stakeholders’ interests. In support of 
these theories, prior studies (e.g., Lee and Stone 1997) suggest that the directors of board sub-
committees should have relevant experience and qualifications to carry out the monitoring 
functions in efficient way. DeZoort and Salterio (2001) find that a financial literate director 
with audit knowledge in an AC is more likely to make expert judgments than those without 
such knowledge. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and Dhaliwal et al. (2010) also argue that 
directors with financial expertise can exercise more effective monitoring in the financial 
disclosure process. Consistent with these findings, I also posit that if RC members are well 
qualified, they can improve the RC's ability to ensure high-quality risk management and risk 
reporting. Thus, I hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis2b1. The extent of market risk disclosures is higher if an RC consists of at 
least one member with an academic and/or professional qualification. 
Hypothesis2b2. The quality of market risk disclosures is higher if an RC consists of at 
least one member with an academic and/or professional qualification 
2.4.3 Size of Risk Committee (RC) and Market Risk Disclosures 
Studies in corporate governance (e.g., Abbott et al. 2004; Bedard et al. 2004) present 
inconclusive evidence regarding the impact of board size on corporate financial outcomes 
(e.g., transparency). One school of thought (e.g., Jensen 1993; Yermack 1996) argues that a 
large board may lack group cohesiveness, which gives rise to communication, and 
coordination difficulties, and may impede the well-functioning of the firm. For example, 
Beasley (1996) finds that fraudulent financial reporting increases with larger boards. On the 
other hand, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) and Abbott et al. (2004) document an insignificant 
association between board size and the extent of voluntary disclosure.  
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Consistent with a resource-based view, another school of thought suggests that a large 
board can enhance firm transparency as it can provide more resources, knowledge, skills, 
enhance external links, and bring highly qualified counsel (e.g., Beasley and Salterio 2001; 
Haniffa and Cooke 2002). Moreover, agency theory also indicates that increased managerial 
monitoring is associated with larger boards, which may positively influence corporate 
disclosures, including corporate risk disclosure (Ntim et al. 2013). Felo et al. (2003) report a 
positive relation between board sub-committee size (audit committee) and financial reporting 
quality. Therefore, a larger RC is likely to offer greater information sharing and provide a set 
of necessary skills to coordinate and address risk management and risk reporting.   
Thus, since there are two conflicting views regarding the impact of committee size on 
corporate disclosure and transparency, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2c1. There is positive association between RC size and extent of market risk 
disclosures.   
Hypothesis 2c2. There is positive association between RC size and quality of market 
risk disclosures.   
 
2.5 Connection of Risk Committee (RC) and Firm Life Cycle with Market Risk 
Disclosures (EMRD and QMRD) 
Prior studies (e.g., Liu et al. 2004; Miihkinen 2012; Solomon et al. 2000) provide evidence 
that the key factors affecting the level of risk disclosure is firm size
81 and not firm risk level. A number of possible reasons have been advanced in the literature 
in support the expectation that the extent and quality of disclosure is positively associated 
with the firm maturity life cycle stage and size. Corporate life cycle is tested between mature, 
young (or growth) and old stages.  Extant literature distinguishes life cycle between 
pioneering, growth, mature, and decline stages of the company (Wokukwu 2000), while 
                                                          
81 Till today, no study explicitly examines the association between disclosure and firm life cycle. However, 
Owen and Yawson (2010) show that firm maturity is positively correlated with firm size. In a recent study, 
Hasan et al., (2013) show that firm size in positively (negatively) associated with mature and growth 
(introduction and decline) stages. 
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Miller and Friesen (1984) categorized company life cycle into birth, growth, maturity, revival 
and decline stages. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggest that the firm relies on a finite set of 
important resources for its survival and growth, and that it competes with other firms to 
benefit from and control these resources. According to this view, the resource base and 
capabilities of mature firms are large, diverse, and rich, while those of young firms and firms 
in the decline stage are small, concentrated, and limited. As a result, I argue that mature firms 
can use their resources to establish a separate RC, which they can utilize as a mechanism to 
attract cheaper capital (Mallin 2002), widen their customer base, and maintain their 
reputation (Linsley and Shrives 2006). Prior studies (e.g., Stigler 1961) also suggest that 
economies of scale in the production and storage of information allow larger firms to allocate 
relatively greater amount of resources to the production and dissemination of information. 
Buzby (1975) argues that disclosure puts small companies at a competitive disadvantage 
compared to their large counterparts. Singhvi and Desai (1971) suggest that a smaller firm is 
more likely to perceive that greater disclosure would be detrimental to its competitiveness. 
Thus, since gathering, generating, and disseminating of information are costly activities, 
small companies may not be able to afford such costs and therefore, a RC in young and small 
companies is less likely to be able to function in its capacity to disclose market risk 
information than in mature and larger counterparts. 
Agency theory suggests that the demand for transparency by outsiders increases as the 
firm moves to a mature stage in its life cycle. Bulan and Subramanian (2009) posit that the 
agency problem is either absent or not significant in the initial stage of a firm’s life cycle. In 
the similar vein, Jensen (1986) notes that the shareholder-manager conflict is particularly 
severe in firms with large free cash flows, as managers may be tempted to use free cash flow 
for excessive perks and benefits. Prior studies also suggest that mature firms usually attracts a 
broader range of stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers, analysts and regulators) since these 
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firms produce and distribute a greater proportion of goods and services, employ large 
numbers, consume a larger quantity of raw materials, and pay the largest portion of taxes to 
the government (Wallace and Naser 1996). Lang and Lundholm (1993, p: 251) note that, 
“information provided by and about firms is increasing in firm size”. They suggest that large 
firms have more analyst followings and therefore are subjected to greater demand for 
information. Furthermore, Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Watts and Zimmerman (1990) 
argue that large firms are generally exposed to risk arising from societal demands for more 
disclosure and exercise of socially responsible behaviour, which may prompt RC in large 
firms to disclose more comprehensively. Therefore, the RC in mature firms, in response to 
increased public demand for transparency, may provide a better monitoring role in the risk 
management and reporting process, which eventually improve market risk disclosures.  
 Empirical evidence documents a positive relationship between firm size and 
disclosure (e.g., Cerf 1961; Firth 1979; Inchausti 1997; Lang and Lundholm 1993; Singhvi 
and Desai 1971). For example, Cooke (1991) finds that firm size is an important factor in 
explaining variability in the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure. Choi (1973) provides 
evidence that the extent of disclosure in annual reports tends to increase in the period 
following a firm's entry into the European capital market. Wallace and Naser (1996) provide 
evidence that disclosure in annual reports vary positively with asset size and the scope of 
business operations. Lang and Lundholm (1993) suggest that large firms have incentives to 
disclose more information than smaller firms to enhance firm value because non-disclosure 
may be perceived by investors as bad news. Thus, based on the theoretical guidance and 
empirical findings, I infer that the RC in mature stage firms plays a more dominant role in 
enhancing the extent and quality of market risk disclosure than that of firms in young stages 
and, therefore, I hypothesize that:   
Hypothesis 3a. RCs in mature stage firms are associated with greater extent of market 
risk disclosures. 
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Hypothesis 3b. RCs in mature stage firms are associated with greater higher quality of 
market risk disclosures. 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT 
 
3.1 Dependent Variable   
I construct indices to capture the extent and quality of market risk disclosure (EMRD and 
QMRD) based on the disclosure types (qualitative or quantitative) and disclosure regime 
(mandatory or voluntary). The qualitative section of the indices covers 14 mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure items (value at risk [VaR] and sensitivity analysis [Sen]) that are 
allowed under IFRS 7. The quantitative section of the index covers five facets of VaR 
disclosures (namely VaR characteristics (four items), summary VaR statistics (five items), 
inter-temporal comparison (one item), back-testing (two items) and daily VaR figures (two 
items)) and three facets of Sen Disclosures (namely Sen Characteristics (four items), 
summary Sen statistics (five items) and inter-temporal comparison (four items)). I follow 
Pérignon and Smith (2010a) by allocating equal weight to all disclosure items. Details of the 
disclosure indices are provided in the Appendix A.     
Prior literature on market risk disclosures uses only single risk exposures (e.g., 
interest rate see Ahmed et al. 2004) or employs one market risk format (e.g., Tabular format 
see Rajgopal 1999; Jorion 2002a). I avoid this limitation by incorporating all risk exposures 
(e.g., interest rate, foreign currency risk and equity price risk), reporting effects (e.g., cash 
flow, fair value, earnings) and diverse market risk formats (Sen, VaR and tabular). 
Furthermore, to improve accuracy, validity and consistency of my indices, I consider several 
steps. First, I develop the indices based on the prior academic literature (e.g., Hodder and 
Mcanally 2001; Pérignon and Smith 2010a). Second, consistent with Plumlee et al. (2009), I 
use guidelines from professional bodies (e.g., BCBS 2002, 2003) in constructing the indices. 
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Third, I follow the prior studies (e.g.,  Clarkson et al. 2006) to apply accounting standards 
(e.g., the IFRS 7 market risk disclosures section) to increase the credibility of the scoring.  
 
 
Extent of Market Risk Disclosures (EMRD) 
I construct the extent of market risk disclosures (EMRD) index based on the total score 
obtained from both the VaR and Sen formats scaled by the formats’ maximum expected 
score:   
𝑬𝑴𝑹𝑫 = ∑
𝑸𝒖𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆_𝑰𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔 𝑿𝒊𝒋
𝒏𝒆,𝒋
𝒏𝒊𝟏=𝟏𝟒  
𝐭=𝟏  + ∑
𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆_𝑰𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔  𝑿𝒊𝒋
𝒏𝒆,𝒋
𝒏𝒊𝟐=𝟏𝟒(𝟑)+𝟏𝟑(𝟑)  
𝐭=𝟏             Eq. (1) 
Xij = 1 if i
th item is disclosed for jth firm 
nej = total maximum expected score for qualitative and quantitative disclosures for j
th 
firm 
nj1 = total score (nj1 ≤ 14) from qualitative disclosures for jth firm 
nj2 = total score from quantitative disclosure for j
th firm. For VaR format score = 
number of quantitative risk disclosure x maximum number of risk exposures disclosed. Same 
process is applied for Sen format.82  
 
Quality of Market Risk Disclosures (QMRD) 
Quality of market risk disclosures (QMRD) index is constructed based on the risk coverage, 
which is the sum of the score of: (1) qualitative market risk disclosures and (2) 
disaggregation in quantitative market risk disclosures scaled by the number of risk exposures 
reported in the annual report: 
𝑸𝑴𝑹𝑫 = ∑ 𝑸𝒖𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆_𝑰𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔 𝑿𝒊𝒋
𝒏𝒋𝟏=𝟏𝟒  
𝐭=𝟏  + ∑
𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆_𝑰𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔  𝑿𝒊𝒋
𝑵𝒐.𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒌 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆
𝒏𝒋𝟐=𝟏𝟒(𝟑)+𝟏𝟑(𝟑)  
𝐭=𝟏         
Eq. (2)  
                                                          
82 Quantitative disclosure component is derived from the Var and Sen format. For both formats, maximum 
number of risk exposures in the GCC financial firms can be three. For example, if firm j discloses two risk 
exposures (e.g., interest rate and foreign currency risk)  under  VaR format, maximum quantitative VaR score 
will be 28 (14 items * 2 exposures). Same process is also followed for Sen format. 
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Xij = 1 if i
th item is disclosed for jth firm 
nj1 = total score (nj1 ≤ 14) from qualitative disclosures for jth firm 
nj2 = total score from quantitative disclosures for j
th firm. For VaR format, the score = 
number of quantitative risk disclosures x maximum number of risk exposures disclosed. I 
follow same process for Sen format. Then, the total score from quantitative risk disclosures is 
calculated as the sum of the scores from VaR and Sen formats scaled by the number of 
market risk exposures. Thus, QMRD is the sum of the total qualitative and quantitative 
disclosures.   
3.2 Independent Variable 
The independent variable (RC) consists of a number of aggregated and disaggregated 
variables.  
3.2.1 Risk Committee – Dummy (RC_D). 
The independent variable, RC_D, is a dichotomous variable which captures the 
existence of a separate RC. More specifically, RC_D takes the value of 1 if the firm has a 
dedicated RC in year t; 0 otherwise.  
3.2.2 Risk Committee (RC) Characteristics. 
To estimate the role of RC characteristics in affecting the extent and quality of market 
risk disclosures, I regress individual RC characteristics with respect to EMRD and QMRD. In 
the regression model, the following variables are considered:  
3.2.2.1 RC_Independence: I closely follow the GCC code of corporate governance in 
defining independence of member of RC in the GCC. The GCC corporate governance codes 
consider several aspects (e.g., directors’ prior career in the firm, material relationships, 
remuneration, family relationship, director relationship, ownership, and board long term 
tenure) in this regard. For example, in Oman, K.S.A, and U.A.E, an independent director 
should not be an employee or senior executive of the firm in the previous two years, in Qatar 
within the proceeding three years and one year in Bahrain, while prior career is not 
mentioned in the code of corporate governance of Kuwait. In term of material business 
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relationship, in Bahrain the director is independent if he/she does not have any financial 
relationship exceeding 31,000 Bahrain Dinar. Corporate governance codes in all GCC 
countries restrict the independent director from having any material family ties with any of 
the companies’ advisors, directors and employees. In Bahrain, Qatar, K.S.A and U.A.E, 
independent directors should not have significant shareholdings (defined as more than 10% of 
the issued capital of the firm). Hence, in this study, the director is considered independent if 
he/she meets the criteria of independence as per that country’s code of corporate governance. 
Although all codes in the GCC discuss the independent director’s requirement on the board 
and audit committee, there is no such requirement for the RC. In this study, I follow Kang et 
al. (2007) and measure RC_Independence as a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if 
the majority of directors in a RC are independent; 0 otherwise.  
3.2.2.2 RC_Qualification: I incorporate two measures of qualification. First, following 
Song and Windram (2004), I proxy financial literacy by academic qualification in finance and 
accounting (i.e., Bachelor/ Master/PhD). Second, I follow Bedard et al. (2004) and Tao and 
Hutchinson (2013) and use professional qualification in finance and accounting (e.g., CPA/ 
CFA/ ACCA). Since the background, experience and skills of directors are mostly 
unavailable in the annual reports (corporate governance codes also do not require firms to 
disclose these in annual report), I am unable to include these attributes in measuring the 
qualification. In sum, qualification is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if at least 
one director in RC has academic and/or professional qualification in finance/accounting, 0 
otherwise. 
 3.2.2.3 RC_Size: Risk committee size is a discrete variable that captures the number of 
directors in RC.  
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3.2.2.4 Factor Analysis of Risk Committee (RC_Factor) 
This independent variable captures RC characteristics as a whole. Following Tao and 
Hutchinson (2013), I conduct factor analysis of the three RC characteristics explained above 
(See Table 4.2, Panel A for detail RC_Factor).  
3.3 Control Variables 
Prior research relating to risk disclosure reveals several firm characteristics, industry factors 
and country-specific variables that affect the extent of risk disclosures. I control for these 
variables. Firm size (Size) has consistently been associated with increased disclosure levels 
(Eng and Mak 2003; Linsley and Shrives 2006). I measure firm size as the natural log of total 
assets at year end. Firms with high leverage are expected to have more disclosure owing to 
greater monitoring by creditors. Hence, I control for Leverage which is the sum of the total 
short- and long-term liabilities scaled by total assets. Singhvi and Desai (1971) suggest that 
firms with good performance may have an incentive to disclose detailed information to 
support the continuance of their positions and remuneration. Hence, I control for firm’s 
profitability using return on equity (ROE). Furthermore, Al-Shammari et al. (2008) find that 
IAS/IFRS compliance in GCC countries is driven by auditor quality. Hence, I control for 
auditor quality by incorporating a Big4 variable that takes on a value of 1 if the firm is 
audited by a Big4 audit firm; 0 otherwise. Prior studies (e.g., Carcello and Neal 2003b; 
Srinivasan 2005) show that AC characteristics (e.g., AC independence, qualification, 
experience and size) have a significant impact on disclosure and financial reporting quality. 
To control the impact of these characteristics, I conduct the factor analysis of four AC 
characteristics (See Table 2, Panel B) and include AC_Factor with eigenvalue >1 as a control 
variable. I also control for firm level corporate governance by including a Firm_CG index 
that covers three items (e.g., independence of BOD, duality of CEO/Chairman, and firm’s 
director with outside directorship seat). Ali et al. (2007) find that family ownership and 
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directors who represent family ownership on the board have reduces the disclosure of 
corporate governance. Eng and Mak (2003) and Cheng and Courtenay (2006) find that the 
directors who represent government shareholding plays a significant role in enhancing a 
firm’s transparency. Therefore, I control for both shareholding pattern by including family 
(Family_Dir) and government (Gov_Dir) ownership variables that take a value of 1 if there is 
at least one director in the board who represents family ownership (and government 
ownership), 0 otherwise. I include fixed year effects and market risk format fixed effects to 
control for year effect, and effect of the type of method used to disclose market risk 
exposures. To control for industry and country-level differences on the disclosure level, I 
include industry and country dummy variables respectively. I also add MRD format to fix the 
effects of the firms that disclose 2 or more formats, which consequently increases the 
disclosures’ items of the firms. Finally, in all regression models, I include standard errors to 
mitigate potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation dependence issues. 
3.4 Empirical Model 
To examine the association between the existence of a separate RC and the extent and quality 
of market risk disclosures, I employ the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model:  
𝐸𝑀𝑅𝐷/𝑄𝑀𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑅𝐶_𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑎4𝑅𝑂𝐸 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎5𝐵𝑖𝑔4𝑖,𝑡 +
𝑎6𝐴𝐶_𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎7𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐶𝐺𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑎8𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦_𝐷𝑖𝑟 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑎9𝐺𝑜𝑣_𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑖,𝑡 +   𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷 𝐹𝐸 +
𝑀𝑅 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡 𝐹𝐸 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡            Eq. (3) 
 
Main variable of interest is RC_D. I predict 𝑎1 to be positive and significant for both H1a and 
H1b. 
To examine the association between RC characteristics and market risk disclosures, I 
replace RC_D with RC_Independence, RC_Qualification, and RC_Size. I also test the 
association between the factor value of RC characteristics and the extent and quality of 
market risk disclosures by replacing RC_D with RC_Factor.  
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics for the variables included in the regression models. 
The mean values for EMRD and QMRD indices are 0.564 and 7.707 with a standard 
deviation of 0.281 and 3.754, respectively. Although none of the GCC corporate governance 
codes during the sample period require firms to establish a separate RC, 38.70% of the 
sample firms exhibit the existence of a separate RC. Panel A also shows that for only 12% of 
firms, the majority of the directors are independent. Moreover, only 6.8% of firms have at 
least one director with academic/ professional qualification. I also report that in the GCC 
countries, the mean size of the RC is 0.993 (with a standard deviation of 1.876). However, 
when firms with only a separate RC are considered, the mean RC_Size becomes 4.1. 
Moreover, descriptive statistics show that there is a large dispersion among the sample firms 
in terms of control variables, which illustrates a considerable diversity in the sample.   
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable n Mean S.D. Mdn 0.75 
EMRD 677 0.564 0.281 0.550 0.740 
QMRD 677 7.707 3.754 7.500 10.000 
RC_D 677 0.387 0.487 0.000 1.000 
Factor_RC 677 -0.007 0.836 -0.602 0.000 
RC_Independence 677 0.120 0.325 0.000 0.000 
RC_Qualification 677 0.068 0.300 0.000 0.000 
RC_Size 677 0.994 1.862 0.000 0.000 
Size 677 7.126 2.023 6.970 8.593 
Leverage 677 0.663 0.319 0.716 0.851 
ROE 677 0.086 0.153 0.110 0.171 
Big4 677 0.901 0.299 1.000 1.000 
AC_Factor 677 0.002 0.837 0.000 0.803 
Firm_CG 677 0.374 0.278 0.333 0.667 
Family_Dir 677 0.648 0.478 1.000 1.000 
Gov_Dir 677 0.415 0.493 0.000 1.000 
The variable definitions are in Appendix C. 
 
4.2 Factor Analysis 
Table 4.2, Panel A and B presents results for the factor analysis of RC and AC characteristics 
respectively. The eigenvalue of the RC(AC) Factor, divided by the number of characteristics, 
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gives 53.45% (66.8%) as the proportion of the variance of the characteristics explained by the 
Factor. This proportion of the eigenvalue suggests that the RC_Factor and AC_Factor are 
highly representative.  
4.3 Univariate t-Test  
Table 4.3, shows the mean difference and t-statistic of variables for firms with (and without) 
a separate RC. I find that the extent and quality of market risk disclosures are significantly 
higher for firms with a separate RC (t-value = 3.064 and 2.959, p<.01 for EMRD and QMRD, 
respectively). This supports the hypotheses (Hypotheses 1a and 1b) that firms with a separate 
RC disclose more market risk information. This table also shows that firms that establish a 
separate RC are larger in terms of size, and have more government directors (Gov_Dir), 
better AC characteristics (AC_Factor) and corporate governance (Firm_CG), and assign a 
quality auditor (Big4).   
  Table 4.2: Factor Analysis for Risk Committee (RC) and Audit Committee (AC) 
Panel A: Factor Analysis for Risk Committee 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference 
Proportion 
Loading 
Cumulative 
RC_Independence 1.604 0.650 0.535 0.535 
RC_Qualification 0.954 0.511 0.318 0.853 
RC_Size 0.443 . 0.147 1.000 
Rotation: Promax 
    
Factor Variance Proportion 
  RC_Factor 1.604 0.5345     
Factor Loading 
Variable Factor1 Uniqueness  
RC_Independence 0.8577 0.2644 
RC_Qualification 0.3415 0.8833 
RC_Size 0.8668 0.2487 
 
Panel B Factor Analysis for Audit Committee 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
AC_Independence 2.671 1.908 0.668 0.668 
AC_Qualification 0.763 0.360 0.191 0.859 
AC_Size 0.403 0.239 0.101 0.960 
AC_Chair Independence 0.164 . 0.040 1 
Rotation: Promax 
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Factor Variance Proportion 
  AC_Factor 2.671 0.668 
 
  
Factor Loading 
Variable Factor1 Uniqueness  
AC_Independence 0.8607 0.2592 
AC_Qualification 0.5319 0.717 
AC_Size 0.7945 0.3688 
AC_Chair Independence 0.8706 0.2421 
Table 4.3 Mean Comparison between firm with RC and without RC 
 
Risk Committee t-value 
 
Yes No 
 
EMRD 0.605 0.538 3.064*** 
QMRD 8.241 7.37 2.959*** 
Size 7.603 6.825 4.963*** 
Leverage 0.682 0.651 1.243 
ROE 0.089 0.084 0.396 
Big4 0.939 0.877 2.633*** 
AC_Factor 0.334 -0.207 8.617*** 
Firm_CG 0.323 0.406 3.831*** 
Family_Dir 0.65 0.645 0.147 
Gov_Dir 0.492 0.3662 3.264*** 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (Two-tail). 
Robust t-values in brackets  
The variable definitions are in Appendix C. 
4.4 Correlation Analysis 
Table 4.4 reports the Pearson correlation matrix for variables included in the regression 
model. As expected, correlations between the extent and quality of market risk disclosures 
(EMRD and QMRD, respectively), and the existence of a separate RC (RC_D) are positive 
and significant (both at p<0.01). Moreover, EMRD and QMRD are also positively correlated 
with RC_Factor (both at p <0.05). Correlation analysis also shows that individual RC 
characteristics (except independence of the RC) have a positive and significant (at p<.05) 
relation with EMRD and QMRD. Overall, the correlations between EMRD and QMRD and 
control variables have the expected signs and statistical significance.  
Regression Analysis   
4.5 Association between Risk Committee (RC_D) and Extent and Quality of Market 
Risk Disclosure (EMRD and QMRD) 
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Table 4.5 presents the OLS estimates83 of the association between the existence of a separate 
RC (RC_D) and the extent and quality of market risk disclosures (EMRD and QMRD, 
respectively). Consistent with Hypothesis 1a and 1b, I find that the coefficients of the 
relationship between a separate RC (RC_D) and market risk disclosures (EMRD and QMRD) 
are positive and statistically significant (with a1 = 0.0493 and 0.5980, respectively; both at p 
< 0.01), suggesting that the existence of a separate RC enhances both the extent and quality 
of  market risk disclosures. These findings are largely consistent with the predictions of 
multi-theoretical framework that incorporates insights from agency, legitimacy, resource-
based and stakeholder theories. The regression results support the theoretical argument that a 
separate RC has more time, skills and resources to follow robust processes to identify, 
monitor, manage, and report market risks to satisfy its diverse stakeholders. These results also
                                                          
83 In examining the association between the existence of a separate RC and market risk disclosures, I conduct 
the Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test of the random effect model, which suggests that the cohort effect is zero 
and that the pooling regression is most suitable in this case. Moreover, Hausman test (1978) for fixed vs random 
effect models reveal that fixed effect model is not suitable for my study. 
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Table 4.4: Pearson Correlation Matrix  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
EMRD 1 
              
QMRD 0.977*** 1 
             
RC_D 0.117*** 0.113*** 1 
            
Factor_RC 0.08** 0.084** 0.745*** 1 
           
RC_Independence -0.014 -0.01 0.464*** 0.789*** 1 
          
RC_Qualification 0.089** 0.088** 0.214*** 0.372*** 0.114*** 1 
         
RC_Size 0.078** 0.08** 0.672*** 0.851*** 0.647*** 0.223*** 1 
        
Size 0.490*** 0.495*** 0.188*** 0.066* -0.031 0.097** 0.058 1 
       
Leverage 0.304*** 0.29*** 0.048 0.014 -0.043 0.022 0.024 0.483*** 1 
      
ROE 0.069* 0.056 0.015 0.023 0.000 -0.069* 0.019 0.200*** 0.069* 1 
     
Big4 0.249*** 0.255*** 0.101*** 0.113*** 0.107*** 0.026 0.06 0.264*** 0.192*** 0.116*** 1 
    
AC_Factor 0.076** 0.059 0.315*** 0.411*** 0.332*** 0.166*** 0.34*** -0.022 0.095** 0.032 0.089** 1 
   
 Firm_CG -0.054 -0.063* -0.146*** 0.108*** 0.262*** 0.12*** 0.249*** -0.170*** -0.109*** -0.052 0.031 0.203*** 1 
  
Family_Dir 0.006 0.008 -0.006 -0.029 -0.005 0.064* 0.051 0.062 0.008 0.014 -0.130*** -0.087** 0.242*** 1 
 
Gov_Dir 0.202*** 0.184*** 0.125*** 0.109*** 0.059 0.069* 0.149*** 0.263*** 0.079** 0.107*** 0.169*** 0.136*** -0.002 0.055 1 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively (Two-tail). 
The variable definitions are in Appendix C. 
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reveals that the extent and quality of market risk disclosures are higher for larger firms with a 
stronger corporate governance structure. On the other hand, the existence of a family director 
is an impediment to both the extent and quality of market risk disclosures (β = -0.0613 and -
0.7352, at p<.01). This conforms with the findings of Ali et al. (2007) that a family director 
has more power to obtain and hold a firm’s information, and to act in a manner to benefit 
themselves rather than for the shareholders’ benefit. The regression results indicate that a 
separate RC can play a significant role in improving the extent and quality of market risk 
disclosures in the presence of reputable auditors (Big4) and AC characteristics (AC_Factor). 
These results are consistent with the assertion by Aebi et al. (2012) that separating risk 
management from the AC through forming a stand-alone RC, specifically in financial firms, 
helps the board of directors to have more control over the firm’s risk management and risk 
reporting.  
Table 4.5: Association between RC_D and Market Risk Disclosures (EMRD and QMRD) 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable EMRD QMRD 
Intercept 0.6539*** 9.0062*** 
 (8.806) (9.621) 
RC_D 0.0493*** 0.5980*** 
 (3.956) (3.149) 
Size 0.0056 0.1417* 
 (0.982) (1.707) 
Leverage 0.0192 -0.0259 
 (1.313) (-0.114) 
ROE -0.0124 -0.9282* 
 (-0.368) (-1.676) 
Big4 -0.0042 0.0886 
 (-0.248) (0.400) 
AC_Factor -0.0102 -0.1467 
 (-1.063) (-1.100) 
Firm_CG 0.1211*** 1.3971*** 
 (4.695) (3.831) 
Family_Dir -0.0613*** -0.7352*** 
 (-4.240) (-3.602) 
Gov_Dir 0.0240* 0.1241 
 (1.778) (0.647) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Method FE Yes Yes 
N 677 677 
Adj. R-sq 73.9% 69.1% 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (Two-tail). 
Robust t-values in brackets, the variable definitions are in Appendix C.  
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4.6 Association between Risk Committee (RC) Characteristics and Extent and Quality 
of Market Risk Disclosure (EMRD and QMRD) 
Table 4.6 reports the results of the association between RC characteristics, and extent and 
quality of market risk disclosures (EMRD and QMRD, respectively). Model 1 (Model 2) 
shows that the association between RC_Independence and EMRD (QMRD) is positive, albeit 
insignificant. In accordance with the view that independent directors of the RC are more 
effective monitors than inside directors, board independence is likely to improve the EMRD 
(QMRD) significantly. However, the insignificant association in regression result support the 
view that independent directors lack the institutional context as insiders do and thus, may not 
play a significant monitoring role. Moreover, institution settings (e.g., dominance of family 
directors, lack of qualified independent directors) may also constrain the effective functioning 
of independent directors in the GCC. This result is also consistent with the findings of 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) that the presence of independent directors has no association with 
disclosure levels. Model 3 and Model 4 suggest that RC_Qualification has a positive (a1 = 
0.0868 and 1.1011) and significant (both at p<.01) association with EMRD and QMRD, 
respectively. These results support hypothesis 2b. The positive and significant association of 
RC_Qualification with EMRD and QMRD is consistent with the notion that qualified 
directors better understand and apply the risk management and accounting principles and 
standards in the risk management process, which improves the effectiveness of the RC in risk 
monitoring, management, and reporting. These results also justify the regulation of GCC 
countries requiring qualifications for the members of different board committees. For 
example, in Bahrain, all directors in the AC must be qualified, while in the other remaining 
countries, the regulators require at least one of the directors of AC to be qualified. Although I 
do not have any expectation with respect to RC_Size and EMRD (QMRD), the regression 
results in Model 5 (Model 6) suggest that RC_Size improve (a1 = 0.0229 and 
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Table 4.6: Association between Risk Committee (RC) Characteristics and Market Risk Disclosures (EMRD and QMRD) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 EMRD QMRD EMRD QMRD EMRD QMRD EMRD QMRD 
Intercept 0.6745*** 9.2473*** 0.6985*** 9.5571*** 0.6635*** 9.1009*** 0.6713*** 9.3506*** 
 (8.859) (9.675) (8.985) 9.828 (9.723) 10.598 (8.796) (9.816) 
RC_Independence 0.0276 0.3777       
 (1.34) (1.23)       
RC_Qualification   0.0868*** 1.1011***     
   (2.892) (2.65)     
RC_Size     0.0229*** 0.3066***   
     (7.051) (6.45)   
RC_Factor       0.0201*** 0.2531*** 
       (3.60) (3.03) 
Size 0.0086 0.1774** 0.0067 0.1544** 0.0072 0.1590** 0.0070 0.1574* 
 (1.483) (2.13) (1.267) (1.97) (1.367) (2.07) (1.24) (1.92) 
Leverage 0.0117 -0.1131 0.0129 -0.1002 0.0145 -0.0757 0.0162 -0.0585 
 (0.797) (-0.51) (0.921) (-0.47) (0.962) (-0.31) (1.11) (-0.26) 
ROE -0.0145 -0.9469* -0.0031 -0.8059 -0.0103 -0.8915* -0.0066 -0.8386 
 (-0.428) (-1.70) (-0.088) (-1.42) (-0.315) -(1.65) (-0.19) (-1.52) 
Big4 -0.0008 0.1261 0.0024 0.1684 0.0000 0.1384 -0.0040 0.0888 
 (-0.050) (0.57) (0.141) (0.76) (0.003) (0.62) (-0.24) (0.40) 
AC_Factor -0.0057 -0.0968 -0.0084 -0.1279 -0.0175* -0.2543* 0.0109 0.2145 
 (-0.575) (-0.70) (-0.902) (-0.99) (-1.850) (-1.94) (0.41) (0.57) 
Firm _CG 0.0895*** 1.0108*** 0.0819*** 0.9170** 0.0746*** 0.8110** 0.1036*** 1.1808*** 
 (3.426) (2.74) (3.137) (2.49) (2.931) (2.26) (3.90) (3.16) 
Family_Dir -0.0577*** -0.6924*** -0.0617*** -0.7422*** -0.0624*** -0.7556*** -0.0535*** -0.6306*** 
 (-3.944) (-3.34) (-4.383) (-3.69) (-4.456) (-3.80) (-3.82) (-3.16) 
Gov_Dir 0.0243* 0.127 0.0246* 0.1305 0.0195 0.0632 0.0246* 0.1313 
 (1.815) (0.66) (1.835) (0.68) (1.497) (0.33) (1.86) (0.70) 
Year FX Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FX Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FX Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method FX Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 677 677 677 677 677 677 677 677 
Adj. R-sq 73.5% 68.70% 74.2% 70% 75.0% 70.30% 74.5% 70% 
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0.3066; p<.01) the extent and quality of market risk disclosures respectively. The association 
of RC_Size with EMRD and QMRD supports a resource-based view that posits that a large 
RC facilitates the accumulation of diverse risk management skills, knowledge, experience 
and external links, which in turn, facilitates extensive and quality risk disclosures. Model 7 
and Model 8 reports the results for hypothesis 2d, suggesting that the factor value of RC 
characteristics (RC_Factor) is positively (a1 = 0.0201 and .2531; at p<.01) associated with 
both the extent and quality of market risk disclosures.  
4.7 Additional Analysis: Risk Committee, Firm Life Cycle, and Market Risk Disclosures 
(EMRD and QMRD) 
Motivated by the prior findings (e.g., Liu et al. 2004; Miihkinen 2012; Solomon et al. 2000) 
that firm size, not the risk level, is the key characteristic affecting the level of risk disclosure, 
I test the role of the firm life cycle on the association between the RC and market risk 
disclosures. Following DeAngelo et al. (2006), DeAngelo et al. (2010), Owen and Yawson 
(2010) and Hasan et al. (2013), I use retained earnings as a proportion of total assets (RE/TA) 
and retained earnings as a proportion of total equity (RE/TE) as proxies for firm life cycle. 
DeAngelo et al. (2006) argue that these proxies measure the extent to which a firm is self-
financing or reliant on external capital. A high RE/TA and RE/TE imply that a firm is more 
mature or old, while a firm with a low RE/TA and RE/TE tend to be young and growing. The 
regression model is: 
EMRD/QMRD
i,t
= β
0
+ β
1
RC_Di,t + β2RE/TAi,t(or RE/TE)  +  β3RC_Di,t 
∗ RE/TA
i,t
(or RE/TE
i,t
) +
β
4
Sizei,t + β5Leverage i,t +  β6ROE i,t + β7Big4i,t + βa8AC_Factori,t + β9Firm_CGi,t +  β10Family_Dir i,t +
β
11
Gov_Diri,t +  Year FE + IND FE + Country FE + MRD Format FE +  εi,t       Eq. (4) 
To examine the association between factor value of RC characteristics (RC_Factor) and 
market risk disclosures, I replace RC_D with RC_Factor in the above model.  
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Table 4.7: Risk Committee (RC), Firm Life Cycle (RE/TA) and Market Risk Disclosures (EMRD and QMRD) 
  RE/TA    RE/TA_3 years 
Dependent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 EMRD QMRD EMRD QMRD  EMRD QMRD EMRD QMRD 
Intercept 0.1079* 1.0210 0.1129*   1.1091 
 
0.1485** 2.4461** 0.2010*** 3.0087*** 
 
(1.80) (1.12) (1.87)    (1.18) 
 
(2.451) (2.517) (3.515)    (3.271) 
RC_D 0.0232 0.1674 
 
                
 
0.0760*** 0.6889*                 
 
(1.39) (0.64) 
 
                
 
(3.180) (1.781)                 
RE/TA 0.0324*** 0.5159*** 0.0637*** 0.9982*** 0.2074*** 2.8231** 0.0544**  0.8405** 
 
(3.05) (3.51) (6.54)    (7.05) 
 
(2.688) (2.559) (2.101)    (2.237) 
RC_D *  RE/TA 0.1446*** 2.3388***                 
 
-0.2216 -0.7891                 
 
(6.00) (6.90) 
 
                
 
(-1.489) (-0.336)                 
RC_Factor 
  
0.0175*** 0.2223** 
   
0.0260**  0.3075* 
   
(2.63)    (2.17) 
   
(2.404)    (1.948) 
RC_Factor * RE/TA 
  
0.0304*** 0.4194*** 
  
0.0532**  0.8764** 
   
(3.97)    (3.90) 
   
(2.108)    (2.539) 
Size 0.0180*** 0.3466*** 0.0185*** 0.3390*** 
 
0.0035 0.1002 0.0032    0.1022 
 
(2.62) (3.48) (2.67)    (3.37) 
 
(0.536) (1.052) (0.515)    (1.136) 
Leverage 0.0475* 0.3232 0.0548**  0.4441 
 
0.0460* 0.2502 0.0475*   0.2535 
 
(1.93) (0.94) (2.15)    (1.26) 
 
(1.715) (0.677) (1.858)    (0.723) 
ROE -0.0892** -2.1748*** -0.0723*   -1.9307*** 
 
-0.0515 -1.7927** -0.0385    -1.5066* 
 
(-2.33) (-3.55) (-1.88)    (-3.11) 
 
(-1.083) (-2.287) (-0.786)    (-1.843) 
Big4 0.0096 0.3234 0.0036    0.2456 
 
0.0183 0.4143 0.0111    0.3194 
 
(0.44) (1.19) (0.16)    (0.88) 
 
(0.692) (1.253) (0.413)    (0.942) 
AC_Factor -0.0232** -0.3594** -0.0270**  -0.4152*** 
 
-0.0154 -0.2429 -0.0239**  -0.3823** 
 
(-2.14) (-2.39) (-2.44)    (-2.69) 
 
(-1.323) (-1.474) (-2.086)    (-2.388) 
Firm_CG 0.1024*** 1.0997** 0.1084*** 1.2539*** 
 
0.1290*** 1.4372*** 0.0691*   0.7111 
 
(3.18) (2.46) (3.32)    (2.74) 
 
(3.657) (2.911) (1.895)    (1.398) 
Family_Dir -0.0567*** -0.6568*** -0.0637*** -0.7743*** 
 
-0.0550*** -0.6445** -0.0440**  -0.4991* 
 
(-3.28) (-2.72) (-3.68)    (-3.17) 
 
(-2.861) (-2.336) (-2.303)    (-1.849) 
Gov_Dir -0.0005 -0.2629 0.0042    -0.1685 
 
0.0120 -0.0283 0.0183    0.0336 
 
(-0.03) (-1.08) (0.24)    (-0.71) 
 
(0.681) (-0.116) (1.055)    (0.139) 
Year FX Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FX Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FX Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method FX Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 529 529 529    529 
 
492 492 492    492 
Adj. R-sq 66.7% 60.3% 65.8%    58.9% 
 
0.649 0.570 0.661    0.588 
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Table 4.8: RE/TA based on Sample Partition: Young, Maturity and Old  
 
Young 
 
Mature 
 
Old 
 
EMRD 
 
QMRD 
 
EMRD 
 
QMRD 
 
EMRD 
 
QMRD 
Intercept -0.3370*** -0.3054*** 
 
-4.5218*** -4.250*** 
 
0.6824*** 0.702*** 
 
8.9474*** 9.6985*** 
 
0.0676 0.2672** 
 
-0.6126 3.6901** 
 
(-3.53) (-3.20) 
 
(-3.19) (-2.91) 
 
(4.61) (5.46) 
 
(4.46) (5.69) 
 
(0.70) (2.04) 
 
(-0.46) (1.99) 
RC_D 0.0051 
  
-0.4097 
  
0.0602* 
  
1.0529** 
  
0.0871*** 
  
1.3729*** 
 
 
(0.20) 
  
(-0.88) 
  
(1.92) 
  
(2.41) 
  
(3.17) 
  
(3.33) 
 
Factor_RC 
 
0.0216 
  
0.1987 
  
0.0300** 
  
0.542*** 
  
0.0412** 
  
0.7476** 
  
(1.64) 
  
(1.02) 
  
(2.28) 
  
(2.98) 
  
(2.08) 
  
(2.34) 
Size 0.0492*** 0.0459*** 
 
0.7287*** 0.6420*** 
 
0.0235* 0.0230* 
 
0.4366** 0.4286** 
 
-0.0193 -0.0186 
 
0.0293 0.0409 
 
(3.85) (3.53) 
 
(4.00) (3.57) 
 
(1.74) (1.79) 
 
(2.28) (2.38) 
 
(-1.61) (-1.48) 
 
(0.17) (0.23) 
Leverage 0.0962*** 0.0788*** 
 
1.4281*** 1.5939*** 
 
0.0793 0.0869 
 
-0.1800 -0.0381 
 
0.0178 0.0375 
 
-0.3663 -0.0000 
 
(3.49) (3.43) 
 
(3.58) (4.00) 
 
(1.11) (1.24) 
 
(-0.18) (-0.04) 
 
(0.37) (0.79) 
 
(-0.51) (-0.00) 
ROE -0.1324** -0.1163* 
 
-2.2975** -2.1250** 
 
-0.0719 -0.0831 
 
-2.6497* -2.8371* 
 
-0.2157** -0.2030* 
 
-3.8504*** -3.5511** 
 
(-2.01) (-1.79) 
 
(-2.29) (-2.11) 
 
(-0.73) (-0.85) 
 
(-1.78) (-1.86) 
 
(-2.13) (-1.96) 
 
(-2.69) (-2.44) 
Big4 -0.0621 -0.0608 
 
-0.9842* -0.9977* 
 
0.0742 0.0778 
 
1.1815 1.2446* 
 
-0.0182 -0.0230 
 
0.3055 0.2318 
 
(-1.49) (-1.52) 
 
(-1.77) (-1.93) 
 
(1.34) (1.47) 
 
(1.62) (1.80) 
 
(-0.59) (-0.78) 
 
(0.78) (0.62) 
AC_Factor -0.0588*** -0.0617*** 
 
-0.6369** -0.7317** 
 
-0.0027 -0.0092 
 
-0.0536 -0.1777 
 
-0.0360** -0.0265 
 
-0.4628* -0.3383 
 
(-2.90) (-3.00) 
 
(-2.14) (-2.52) 
 
(-0.13) (-0.44) 
 
(-0.20) (-0.65) 
 
(-2.16) (-1.57) 
 
(-1.91) (-1.48) 
Firm_CG 0.0529 0.0338 
 
0.5971 0.6855 
 
0.1758*** 0.1119* 
 
1.9164** 0.7917 
 
0.1180** 0.0934* 
 
1.2779* 0.8772 
 
(1.03) (0.66) 
 
(0.80) (0.88) 
 
(3.01) (1.74) 
 
(2.45) (0.92) 
 
(2.43) (1.88) 
 
(1.90) (1.29) 
Family_Dir -0.062 -0.0593 
 
-0.8354 -0.7857 
 
-0.0246 -0.0201 
 
-0.1060 -0.0295 
 
-0.0885*** -0.0965*** 
 
-1.0628*** -1.2082*** 
 
(-1.55) (-1.47) 
 
(-1.60) (-1.48) 
 
(-0.78) (-0.63) 
 
(-0.25) (-0.07) 
 
(-3.66) (-3.97) 
 
(-3.32) (-3.75) 
Gov_Dir -0.0248 -0.0238 
 
-0.4061 -0.3239 
 
-0.0254 -0.0245 
 
-0.3100 -0.2905 
 
0.0791*** 0.0892*** 
 
0.2307 0.3587 
 
(-0.89) (-0.87) 
 
(-1.03) (-0.84) 
 
(-0.77) (-0.75) 
 
(-0.68) (-0.64) 
 
(2.68) (2.93) 
 
(0.55) (0.88) 
Year FX Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Industry FX Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Country FX Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Method FX Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 193 193 
 
193 193 
 
162 162 
 
162 162 
 
174 174 
 
174 174 
Adj. R-sq 67.7% 67.9% 
 
59.7% 59.7% 
 
64.6% 64.8% 
 
62.2% 62.7% 
 
73.9% 73.3% 
 
68.8% 68.4% 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (Two-tail). 
Robust t-values in brackets,  
The variable definitions are in Appendix C  
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Table 4.7 reports the regression results for the association between the RC, firm life 
cycle, and market risk disclosures. Model 1 and Model 2 show that the interaction between 
firm life cycle proxy (RE/TA) and the RC proxy (RC_D) are positive and significant for both 
measures of market risk disclosures (EMRD and QMRD). In particular, for the EMRD and 
QMRD, the interaction term (β = 0.1446 and 2.3388; p < 0.01) indicates that the role of a 
separate RC in enhancing the extent and quality of the market risk disclosures is more crucial 
for a mature stage firm (proxied by RE/TA). Likewise, Model 3 and Model 4 also reflect the 
vital role of the RC characteristics (RC_Factor) in enhancing the market risk disclosures (β = 
0.0304 and 0.4194; p<.01) of mature stage firms. These results are also economically 
significant. For instance, Model 3 (Model 4) shows that RC_Factor enhances (i.e., net effect) 
EMRD (QMRD) of mature stage firms by 0.0037 (0.3886), which are significant at p<.01.84 
An f-test (f-stat 34.31) on the equality of RC_D * RE/TA + RC_D = RC_D for Model 1 
(EMRD) is rejected at the one percent level. A similar interpretation holds for the interactive 
variable in Model 2 – Model 4. The impact of firm life cycle on the association between the 
RC (RC_D and RC_Factor) and market risk disclosures (EMRD and QMRD) is consistent 
with agency theory, stakeholder theory and resource-based theory. Agency theory suggests 
that conflicts between managers and outside investor increase as the firm moves to the mature 
stage. Therefore, investors in mature stage firms demand more disclosure and transparency to 
reduce the informational gap. The regression results support this view and show that 
existence of a separate RC (RC_D) and RC characteristics (RC_Factor – that consists of 
RC_Independence, RC_Qualification and RC_Size) improve both the extent and quality of 
market risk disclosures of mature stage firms (proxied by RE/TA). A positive and significant 
role of RC_D and RC_Factor in improving market risk disclosures may also provide an 
incentive of mature firms to disclose more information to enhance firm value by satisfying 
                                                          
84 Net effect for Model 3 is estimated as (0.0175 x RC_Factor)  + 0.0304 x (RC_Factor * RE/TA) [from Model 3 
of Table 5, Panel A] – (.0442 x RC_Factor) ) [from Model 4 of Table 4, Panel B]  
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diverse stakeholders. The results are also consistent with the resource-based view that 
suggests that mature firms have more resources to form a RC with adequate independence, 
skills, knowledge, experience and size that may enhance firms’ disclosure to entice investors, 
suppliers and customers. The role of a RC in improving risk disclosure of mature stage firms 
may also reflect the fact that these firms have more operational complexity and risk 
exposures that a separate RC can efficiently monitor, manage and report.  
One may, however, argue that a high RE/TA in a single year may be an outlier and hence 
may not necessary reflect firm maturity. To address this concern I construct RE/TA ratio at 
time t by using RE/TA information from the past 3 years (i.e. from t-3 to t). Model 5 to 
Model 8 show that regression results, using a rolling average of RE/TA as a life cycle proxy, 
remain qualitatively similar to those obtained in Model 1 to Model 4. 
Despite the analysis using RE/TA and rolling RE/TA strongly supporting the 
hypothesis that a RC in mature stage firms plays important role in improving the extent and 
quality of market risk disclosures, it does not provide an indication of the stage the firm has 
reached in its life cycle. Consequently, I modify DeAngelo et al. (2006) life cycle measure 
(RE/TA) by partitioning the sample into three life cycle stages. Young firms are those 
belonging to the cohort with the lowest one-third of RE/TA, mature firms are those belonging 
to the cohort with the middle one-third of RE/TA and firms with one third of the top RE/TA 
ratios are classified as old firms. Owen and Yawson (2010) also follow a similar approach to 
investigating the impact of corporate life cycle on takeover activity. As reported in Table 4.8, 
RC plays significant positive role in improving risk disclosures for firms with high retained 
earnings (i.e., mature and old firms). Results also show that a RC in young firms does not 
have any significant impact on disclosure of risk information. These results suggest that the 
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findings related to the firm life cycle reported in Table 4.7 are driven by the mature firms in 
the sample.85 
To further mitigate the concerns as to whether the results on the impact of RC in 
improving EMRD and QMRD are sensitive to how the life cycle is measured, I use RE/TE 
(another life cycle proxy proposed by (DeAngelo et al. 2006)). Table 4.9 shows that RE/TE 
and Rolling RE/TE give us qualitatively similar results. As a robustness check, I also use firm 
age as an alternative life cycle measure. It is viewed that life cycle stages are naturally linked 
to firm age. Pástor and Pietro (2003) also use firm age as a “natural proxy” for investors’ 
uncertainty about the profitability of the firm. I define age as the difference between the 
current year and the year of incorporation of the firm. Un-tabulated results show that RC_D 
and RC_Factor have positive and statistically significant (p<.05, mostly) impact in enhancing 
the EMRD and QMRD of an aged firms. Overall, the results using age as an alternative 
measure of the firm life cycle are similar to those obtained in my main analysis and this helps 
to justify that the results are not sensitive to the choice of the life cycle proxy.  
4.8 Endogeneity Test: Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) 
Even though OLS estimation suggests a positive and significant association between the 
existence of a stand-alone RC and market risk disclosure proxies (EMRD and QMRD), the 
sign, magnitude, or statistical significance of these estimates may be biased due to 
endogeneity, i.e., if the RC and the error term are correlated. To address this concern, I adopt 
a two-stage instrumental variable approach to re-examine the main findings reported in Table 
4.5. This approach is appropriate only if the instrumental variables are correlated with the 
endogenous regressor (here RC proxies) but uncorrelated with the error term of the second-
stage regression.  
                                                          
85 For brevity, results for RE/TE using Owen and Yawson (2010) approach are not tabulated; they may be 
requested from the authors. 
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Table 4.9: Risk Committee (RC), Firm Life Cycle (RE/TE) and Market Risk Disclosures (EMRD and QMRD) 
 RE/TE t  RE/TE t-3 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Dependent Variable EMRD QMRD EMRD QMRD  EMRD QMRD EMRD QMRD 
Intercept -0.0139 0.1617 0.0251    0.4526  0.1709*** 2.6415*** 0.2015*** 3.0195*** 
 (-0.25) (0.18) (0.46)    (0.49)  (2.894) (2.858) (3.521)    (3.282) 
RC_D 0.0569*** 0.7252***                   0.0122 -0.0934                 
 (3.64) (2.94)                   (0.486) (-0.252)                 
RE/TA 0.0159** 0.2709*** 0.0225*** 0.3868***  0.0204 0.2751 0.0545**  0.8429** 
 (2.07) (2.59) (3.26)    (4.04)  (0.821) (0.766) (2.104)    (2.241) 
RC_D *  RE/TE 0.0019*** 0.0237***                   0.0991** 1.7595**                 
 (4.49) (4.05)                   (2.006) (2.528)                 
RC_Factor   0.0435*** 0.6023***    0.3095* 0.0261**  
   (5.27)    (5.17)    (1.959) (2.410)    
RC_Factor * RE/TE   0.0042*   0.0350    0.8772** 0.0533**  
   (1.66)    (0.97)    (2.540) (2.109)    
Size -0.0062 -0.0272 -0.0064    -0.0249  0.0037 0.1147 0.0032 0.1016    
 (-1.01) (-0.31) (-1.08)    (-0.30)  (0.563) (1.224) (0.509) (1.130)    
Leverage 0.0352 0.1199 0.0466*   0.3069  0.0293 -0.0332 0.0475* 0.2538    
 (1.47) (0.35) (1.85)    (0.90)  (1.138) (-0.093) (1.860) (0.724)    
ROE -0.0616 -1.7570*** -0.0528    -1.5986***  -0.0679 -1.9806** -0.0386 -1.5093*   
 (-1.55) (-2.77) (-1.32)    (-2.61)  (-1.359) (-2.414) (-0.788) (-1.845)    
Big4 0.0149 0.4057 0.0143    0.3439  0.0176 0.4260 0.0110 0.3193    
 (0.67) (1.44) (0.66)    (1.28)  (0.631) (1.214) (0.413) (0.942)    
AC_Factor -0.0119 -0.1874 -0.0179    -0.2959*  -0.0124 -0.2020 -0.0243** -0.3919**  
 (-1.08) (-1.19) (-1.54)    (-1.93)  (-1.055) (-1.237) (-2.106) (-2.433)    
Firm_CG 0.1356*** 1.6832*** 0.0410    0.9865**  0.1159*** 1.2730** 0.0691* 0.7129    
 (4.12) (3.63) (0.77)    (2.10)  (3.206) (2.529) (1.899) (1.402)    
Family_Dir -0.0532*** -0.6374*** -0.0433*** -0.6416***  -0.0500** -0.5738** -0.0441** -0.5018*   
 (-3.29) (-2.77) (-2.84)    (-2.81)  (-2.571) (-2.077) (-2.311) (-1.861)    
Gov_Dir 0.0167 0.0025 0.0224    0.0470  0.0118 -0.0624 0.0183 0.0339    
 (0.96) (0.01) (1.33)    (0.20)  (0.664) (-0.253) (1.056) (0.141)    
Year FX Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FX Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FX Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method FX Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 506 506 506    506  492 492 492    492 
Adj. R-sq 65.5% 57.1% 65.3% 58.3%  0.649 0.574 0.661    0.588 
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I use three firm-specific characteristics as instrumental variables (board size, board 
qualification, and firm level risk). The use of board size as an instrument is justified on the 
basis that more directors on the board provides firms with necessary skills, strength and 
diversity of expertise to form different board sub-committees. Carson (2002) finds that board 
size is one of the main determinants of voluntary formation of audit, remuneration and 
nomination committees. Thus, I expect that board size is also positively associated with the 
formation and functioning of a separate RC. I also use board qualification (dummy variable 
coded as 1 if at least one of the directors has academic or professional qualification in 
accounting and finance) as instrumental variable. Certo (2003) suggests that a board with a 
qualified director has an incentive to form a specialised committee (e.g., RC). Finally, 
motivated by Tao and Hutchinson (2013) I use firm level risk (Beta) as an instrumental 
variable. They argue and find that firms experiencing increasing levels of risk require a RC to 
manage and monitor risk to ensure a positive association between risk and performance.    
First-stage regression results in Table 4.10, Panel A show that coefficients on the 
instrumental variables are significant, suggesting that the RC is positively associated with 
board size, qualification and firm level risk. The estimated coefficients in Panel B of Table 
4.10 (Model 1 to 4) of the association between RC_D and market risk disclosures (EMRD 
and QMRD) (β= 0.3930 and 5.442 respectively and both at p<.001) in the 2SLS regression 
suggest that the positive and significant relationship between RC_D (and Factor_RC) and 
market risk disclosure (both EMRD and QMRD) remains robust even after accounting for the 
endogenous relation between them. Moreover, the coefficients between RC_Factor and 
market risk disclosures (EMRD and QMRD) are also positive (β= 0.1478 and 2.046 
respectively) and significant (at p<.001).  
In support of the theoretical connection of using the instruments, I also conduct 
Under-Identification; Hansen’s Over-Identifying restrictions and Hausman endogeneity tests. 
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The Under-Identification test results (LM statistic) reveal that the excluded instruments are 
"relevant". The Weak-instrument test results suggest that excluded instruments are correlated 
with the endogenous regressors because the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is greater than 
Stock and Yogo (2002) critical value. Results from the Hansen test of Over-Identifying 
restrictions do not reject the null hypothesis (p-value>.10), suggesting that instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term but are correctly excluded from the 2nd-stage regression, 
which reflects the validity of the instruments used for 2SLS. Finally, Hausman (1978) test 
strongly rejects (p<.01) the exogeneity of RC, suggesting that 2SLS estimates are preferable 
to the OLS estimate. 
5. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
This study provides evidence on whether the formation of a separate risk committee (RC) can 
improve the extent and quality of market risk disclosures of financial firms in GCC countries. 
In this study, I posit that the formation of a separate RC provides firms with sufficient skills, 
time, and dedication to enhance the monitoring and management of risk, which is likely to be 
reflected in the level of market risk disclosures. The results reveal that the extent and quality 
of market risk disclosures are significantly higher for firms with a separate RC. Moreover, I 
find that RC characteristics (e.g., RC qualifications and size) are also significantly associated 
with market risk disclosures. Additional analysis shows that the RC has an important role to 
play in the market risk disclosures of mature stage firms. These results remain unaffected 
even after taking care of the endogeneity concern.   
Overall, empirical evidence contributes to the growing body of governance and 
disclosure literature. The findings strongly support the formation of a separate RC as a 
governance mechanism to protect shareholders’ interests. The results also justify the recent 
endeavour of financial firms to form a separate RC to enhance risk monitoring, management, 
 110 
 
and reporting. My study also extends prior studies by empirically showing that the RC in 
mature stage firms plays a significant role in the extent and quality of market risk disclosures. 
Table 4.10: Endogeneity Test 
Explanatory Variable EMRD QMRD EMRD QMRD 
Panel A: First-Stage Regressions     
Instruments Model-1 Model-2 Model-3 Model-4 
Board_Size 0.0191* 0.0191* - - 
 (1.78) (1.78) - - 
Board_Qualification 0.3954*** 0.3954*** 1.258*** 1.258*** 
 (7.00) (7.00) (8.29) (8.29) 
Beta - - 0.1735* .1735* 
 - - (1.94) (1.94) 
Unreported Control Variables Included in Regression 
All Variables in Main Specification Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FX Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FX Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FX Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method FX Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 628 628 674 674 
adj. R-sq-Concentrated 61.4% 61.4% 44.6% 44.6% 
Under Identification test     
Kleibergen-Paap rk  LM statistic 21.151 21.151  24.074 24.074 
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Weak Identification test     
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 25.683 25.683 38.479 38.479 
Stock-Yogo (2005) critical value 19.93 19.93 19.93 19.93 
Over Identification test     
Hansen J statistic   0.769  0.769  3.219  1.683 
p-value 0.3804 0.3804 0.0728 0.1946 
Panel B: Second-Stage Regressions     
Explanatory Variable     
Potentially Endogenous Instrumented Variable    
RC_D 0.3930*** 5.442***   
 (3.52) (3.53)   
RC_Factor   0.1478*** 2.046*** 
   (4.77) (4.84) 
Unreported Control Variables Included in Regression 
All Variables in Main Specification Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FX Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FX Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FX Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Method FX Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 628 628 674 674 
Hausman Test for the Effect of RC_D & RC_Factor (Coefficient 2SLS = Coefficient OLS) 
Cluster-robust F-statistic 8.001 8.294 12.579 11.847 
p-value 0.0047 0.0040 0.0004 0.0006 
Notes: EMRD is a proxy for the extent of market risk disclosures; QMRD is a proxy for quality of market risk 
disclosures;  RC_D is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm has dedicated risk committee, 0 
otherwise; RC_Factor is Eigenvalue obtain from three RC characteristics;  RC_Size is the number of directors in 
RC; Board_Size is the number of director in the board; Board_Qualification is a dummy variable that takes a 
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value of 1 if at least one of the directors in the board holds accounting/finance academic and professional 
qualification; Beta represents systematic risk which is calculated over 12 months by regressing the share price 
against the respective market index. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCRETION IN MANDATORY RISK DISCLOSURES AND INVESTMENT 
EFFICIENCY  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, I investigate the effect of discretion in mandatory risk disclosures on investment 
efficiency86 of financial firms belonging to six emerging markets in the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) region. Specifically, I examine whether discretion in mandatory market risk 
disclosures reduces agency related issues stemming from under- and over-investment. I also 
investigate whether the presence of both voluntary disclosure and discretion in mandatory 
risk disclosures improves firms’ investment efficiency.   
This study is motivated by the desire of accounting policy makers and regulators for a 
common accounting standard. The adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) enhances transparency of financial risk disclosures and the accuracy of risk 
management information (Li 2010). Under IFRS, firms have some degree of discretion in 
their communication of financial information. For instance, IFRS mandate disclosure of 
prior-period accounting figures while earnings forecasts by management remain voluntary in 
nature. Whilst disclosure of aggregate accounting numbers is mandatory, decomposition of 
these amounts is voluntary (Einhorn 2005). Moreover, discretion in mandatory risk 
disclosures increases diversity in financial reporting and improves the precision of risk 
information, which can be used by stakeholders to make more informed investment decisions. 
Thus, I posit that discretion in mandatory risk disclosure has implications for investment 
efficiency through reduction in information asymmetry and agency problems. Further, 
Einhorn (2005) posit that discretion in mandatory disclosure occurs when managers possess 
                                                          
86 Investment efficiency refers to the propensity of a firm to undertake all the projects with only positive NPV. 
For this study, I define investment efficiency as the reduction of both under-investment and over-investment. 
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quality information relevant for investors. This will reduce the requirement for management 
to voluntarily disclose information that may be subjective in nature or lacking in credibility 
(Gigler 1994). The provision of both discretion in mandatory disclosure and credible 
voluntarily disclosed information (e.g. release of good news) will reduce information 
asymmetry and improve investment efficiency (Gigler 1994).  
Despite the potential effect that mandatory risk disclosure may reduce problems 
arising from information asymmetry, there has been comparatively little research on 
information asymmetry in the context of developing and emerging economies such as the 
GCC. In recent years, there has been increasing interest by international investors in the GCC 
markets which provide tax haven opportunities and strong return in capital markets (Bley and 
Saad 2012; Ariss et al. 2011; Bolbol and Omran 2005). The institutional settings and 
regulations in the GCC differ from that of typical well-established developed capital markets. 
The existence of a high level of ownership concentration may constrain dissemination of risk 
related information in these markets (Al-Yahyaee et al. 2011). Further, lack of credible media 
and lower investor protection in GCC markets makes financial information the primary 
source of the firm’s overall information set to be utilized by investors for investment decision 
making (Al-Yahyaee et al. 2011; Abu-Nassar and Rutherford 1996). Given this lower level of 
informational environment, whether discretion in mandatory disclosures limits the 
opportunistic behaviour of the management in emerging markets such as the GGC has not yet 
been investigated. Given the economic and political importance of the GCC, the importance 
of the financial sector in those countries, and the interplay between mandatory risk reporting, 
voluntary disclosure and investment efficiency in determining business decisions, it is 
important to gain an understanding of the relationship between the nature and benefits of 
discretion in mandatory financial risk information.   
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Discretion in Mandatory in Market Risk Disclosure: Theory 
It is well documented that an increase in disclosure quality enhances firm value (Ostberg 
2006) through the reduction of information asymmetry and agency problems (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Myers and Majluf 1984). One of the major perspectives of voluntary 
disclosure stems from the notion that managers possess superior information about the 
profitability and value of the firm compared to that of outside investors. Admati and 
Pfleiderer (2000) and Boot and Thakor (2001) contend that the role of mandatory disclosure 
is important when information asymmetry between firms and investors reduces firm’s value. 
Fishman and Hagerty (1995) show that in an analytical setting in which agents discloses all 
information, imposing mandatory disclosure improves the informativeness of reporting 
media. In this regard, Ostberg (2006) also finds that mandatory disclosure offers an 
advantage over voluntary disclosure through the reduction in expropriation costs and 
improvement in investment efficiency, while the absence of mandatory disclosure is 
disadvantageous to investors. Ostberg (2006) also suggests that stringent disclosure is 
undesirable as it alleviates the expropriation problem (i.e. moral hazard) but exacerbates a 
debt-overhang problem. Moreover, Einhorn (2005) posits that discretion in firms’ disclosure 
strategies is influenced by mandatory disclosure requirements. He finds that mandatory 
disclosure has a significant impact on voluntary disclosure strategies. Firms reduce voluntary 
disclosure when there is more discretion in mandatory disclosure (Einhorn 2005). 
Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) show that firms’ which voluntarily disclose risk 
information maintain a higher share price than those that don’t disclose risk information. 
Moreover, imposition of mandatory disclosure of risk information lowers ex-ante share 
prices. Based on Einhorn (2005), Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) and Ostberg (2006) 
studies, I develop a discretion in mandatory market risk index that captures market risk 
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information available in annual reports (see section 4.2.2). I posit that, in conjunction with 
prior studies (Jorion 2002a; Rajgopal 1999; Perignon and Smith 2010a) that market risk 
disclosures are informative to market participants.  
 
2.2 Investment Efficiency: Theory 
An investment decision is the most important decision taken by the manager and hence, it 
continues to be a key research area in accounting and finance (Harvey et al. 2004; McConnell 
and Servaes 1995). Theoretically, firms continuously invest in net present value projects at a 
positive rate of return, until the marginal benefit of investment equals the marginal cost 
(Chen et al. 2011c). Prior studies (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986; Myers 1977; 
Myers and Majluf 1984; Morgado and Pindado 2003) show that capital-market imperfections, 
such as informational asymmetry and agency problems arising from interactions between 
shareholders, debtholders, and management may lead managers to take inefficient investment 
decisions leading to either underinvestment or overinvestment. The theory of 
‘underinvestment’ posits that equity-value maximizing managers may forgo low-risk projects 
with a positive net present value (NPV) when the investment is financed by shareholders. 
This is because equity holders bear the costs of investment while a large share of the benefits 
flow to the bondholders. Thus, equity-value maximizing managers pursue riskier projects that 
can provide greater benefits for shareholders, whereas if large losses occur, these will be 
passed on to the bondholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). On the other hand, 
‘overinvestment’ arises from the misalignment of the interests of managers and shareholders. 
In the presence of free cash flows, managers have a propensity to expand the scale of the firm 
even if that means undertaking negative NPV investment projects and reducing shareholder 
value (Aivazian et al. 2005). 
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2.3 Hypothesis Development 
Firm specific risk information is fundamental to investment decisions (Abraham and Cox 
2007). Prior studies provide evidence on the informativeness of mandatory market risk 
disclosures. For example, Jorion (2002) examine the association between stock price 
sensitivity and foreign currency risk exposures of multinational firms. He finds that stock 
price sensitivity to U.S. dollar foreign exchange is higher for a firm with more extensive 
foreign operations.87 Investors consider risk level relative to their own or other clients risk for  
their investment decision (Markowitz 1991). Linsley and Shrives (2006) suggest that risk 
disclosure motivates the suppliers of capital to remove a part of the risk premium to 
compensate for uncertainty of the firm’s risk position, thereby reducing the cost of capital 
(Solomon et al. 2000; Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2003). Rajgopal (1999) observes that 
even in the presence of mandatory disclosure there are major variations and deficits in firm 
level risk reporting. Indeed, this variation is driven from the nature of risk reporting such as 
its subjectivity and uncertainties in future earnings (Dobler 2008). Therefore, discretion 
allowed  under mandatory risk disclosures have implication on firm’s investment decision 
(Admati and Pfleiderer 2000).  
In a perfect market, firms depend on internal funding for their investment (e.g.,  
Modigliani and Miller 1958) and all positive net present value projects should be financed 
internally (Biddle and Hilary 2006). External funding for implementing net present value 
projects has two main impediments: moral hazard (Ostberg 2006) and adverse selection 
(Hoshi et al. 1991). Moral hazard suggests that managers work to maximize their own 
interests (Fama and Jensen 1985); hence they over-invest the firms’ capital for empire 
building by not choosing the projects that maximize the stockholders’ benefits (Biddle et al. 
                                                          
87 Furthermore, Rajgopal (1999) finds that oil and gas firms’ market risk disclosures (Tab and Sen Formats) are 
positively associated with firms’ stock returns. Ahmed et al. (2004) incorporate a Tabular (Tab) proxy for 
commercial banks’ maturity gap disclosures. They find that Tabular (Tab) disclosure could predict the banks’ 
net interest income.  
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2009). Moreover, adverse selection theory posits that managers, as insiders, possess superior 
information and they try to sell stocks at the best time to avail higher price (Biddle et al. 
2009). If managers are successful in this process, they over-invest the proceeds. However, 
investors may recognise managers’ strategy and ration their capital, which consequently 
increase the cost of capital. If the managers reject that discounted price, despite the presence 
of positive net present value projects, they under-invest the firm’s capital (Myers and Majluf 
1984).  
 
The role of risk related information is highly important in decision making. Jorgensen 
and Kirschenheiter (2003), for example, suggest that firm has less risk premium if managers 
disclose risk exposure. If firms disclose quality risk information, as suggested by Einhorn 
(2005), through discretion in mandatory disclosures, informational signals become more 
precise and informative. Discretion in mandatory discloses reduces the likelihood of 
impairment of information flows, uncertainty of future earnings and improve the precision 
and/or quality of information, and thereby enhance corporate transparency. Thus, I expect 
that if firms disclose more precise market risk information relating to their exposures, this 
improves investment efficiency by reducing the information asymmetry and moral hazard. 
Based on this, I hypothesize that: 
H1a: All else being equal, discretion in market risk disclosures are negatively associated 
with under -investment. 
H1b: All else being equal, discretion in market risk disclosures are negatively associated 
with over-investment. 
Discretion in mandatory disclosure may allow managers to resort to voluntary 
disclosure if needed. When managers believe that discretion in mandatory disclosure is not 
sufficient for investors, they may voluntarily disclose risk exposure as additional information 
for investor (Graham et al. 2005; Healy and Palepu 2001; Popova et al. 2013).      
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 The coexistence of discretion in mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosures 
provide investors with more information about the projects and firm’s private signals, 
compared to non-disclosed or full disclosure (Einhorn 2005; Ostberg 2006). Therefore, this 
coexistence alleviates firm’s distorted disclosure incentive. In this regard, Gigler (1994) 
asserts that firms voluntarily disclose their private information to increase the credibility of 
mandatory disclosure88, which improves investment efficiency of the firm by reducing 
information risk.89 Thus, existence of both voluntary disclosure and discretions in mandatory 
market risk disclosures offer managers with alternative means to design disclosure to reduce 
the cost of disclosure. Therefore, coexistence of discretion in mandatory disclosure and 
voluntary disclosure provides investors with projects specific information the and encourage 
firms to disclose precise firm specific risk exposure information, which eventually alleviate 
agency problems and information risk, and thus lead to investment efficiency of the firm. I 
hypothesize that:  
 H2a: All else being equal, the existence of both voluntary and discretion in mandatory 
market risk disclosures significantly reduces firm level under-investment. 
H2b: All else being equal, the existence of both voluntary and discretion in mandatory 
market risk disclosures significantly reduces firm level over-investment. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT of VARIABLES 
 
3.1 Dependent Variable: Proxy for Investment Efficiency 
I investigate how discretion in market risk disclosures of current year affects the 
investment efficiency in the subsequent year. I measure investment efficiency based on two 
                                                          
88 The model of Gigler (1994) assumes “a manager wants to overstate profitability to the capital market in the 
absence of verification. But, since voluntary disclosures are unaudited and firms can lie, credibility becomes an 
issue. And when disclosures are not believed, they are ignored. So, there is no reason for a firm to make a 
voluntary disclosure which is not credible” p.225. 
89 On the other side, Dye (1986) finds a positive assocaiton between mandatory and voluntary disclosure are 
complementary. Here, I study the implication of the existence of both voluntary and discretion in mandatory risk 
disclosures on investment efficiency. 
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approaches. In my first approach, I use the average of cash and leverage to rank firms on their 
likelihood of over- and under-investment. Jensen (1986) and Blanchard et al. (1994) assert 
that a firm with a higher free cash balance is likely to over-invest that cash, while a firm with 
more leverage is more likely to under-invest by giving up positive net present value projects 
(Myers 1977). In the second approach I use residuals from parsimonious regression models to 
calculate residuals from investment and revenue change. Then I regress the residuals with the 
main independent and control variables (Biddle et al. 2009).  
3.2 Independent Variable  
Market Risk Disclosures 
I construct a disclosure index based on risk disclosure forms (qualitative and 
quantitative) and risk reporting requirements (mandatory and voluntary). The qualitative 
section of the index comprises a total of 14 mandatory and voluntarily disclosure items 
relating to VaR and Sen. The quantitative section of the index covers five facets of VaR 
disclosures ((such as: VaR characteristics (4 items), summary VaR statistics (5 items), inter-
temporal comparison (1 item), back testing (2 items), and Daily VaR Figures (2 points)) and 
3 facets of Sen disclosures (such as: Sen Characteristics (4 items), Summary Sen Statistics (5 
items), and Inter-temporal Comparison(4 points)). Consistent with Perignon and Smith 
(2010b), I allocate equal weight to all disclosure items.90 The disclosure index is provided as 
Appendix A. I closely follow prior studies (e.g., Hirtle 2007; Perignon and Smith 2010a), and 
Banking Supervision survey of Basel Committee (2001, 2002, 2003) in selecting the index 
items.  
                                                          
90 Perignon and Smith (2010a) and Hooks and Staden, 2011 find the correlation between the first principle 
components and (weighted index) and unweighted index of VaR disclosure index significant. For instance, 
Perignon and Smith (2010a) find the correction is significant at 95% (Pearson correlation: 95.25; Spearman 
correlation: 95.34). Thus I expected that my results are not driven by my choice of weighting scheme of index. 
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Prior literature on market risk disclosures tend to use a single risk exposure (e.g., 
interest rates - Ahmed et al. 2004) or they employ one market risk format (e.g., Tabular 
format - Rajgopal 1999) or apply single market risk disclosure format (e.g., Value-at-Risk 
(VaR) Jorion 2002a). However, these studies provide only a partial picture of market risk 
disclosures. I avoid these limitations by incorporating all risk exposures (e.g., interest rate, 
foreign currency risk and equity price risk), reporting effects (e.g., cash flow, fair value, 
earnings), and diverse market risk formats (Sensitivity Analysis, VaR and Tabular). I also 
ensure that the index to captures firms’ discretion in mandatory market risk disclosure. In the 
GCC, market risk disclosures are mandatory under IFRS 7. However, disclosure relating to 
the type, format and other specific risk characteristics is discretionary in nature.  
Market Risk Disclosures: DMRD1  
Proxy for mandatory market risk disclosures (DMRD1) explicitly takes into account 
both forms (qualitative and quantitative) and number of market risk exposures (e.g. interest 
rate risk, foreign currency risk and equity risk) disclosed by the firms in annual report. The 
index is calculated as:   
𝑫𝑴𝑹𝑫𝟏 = ∑ 𝑸𝒖𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆_𝑰𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔 𝑿𝒊𝒋
𝒏𝒋𝟏=𝟏𝟒  
𝐭=𝟏  + ∑
𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆_𝑰𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔  𝑿𝒊𝒋
𝑵𝒐.𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒌 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆
𝒏𝒋𝟐=𝟏𝟒(𝟑)+𝟏𝟑(𝟑)  
𝐭=𝟏         
see Eq. (1)  
Xij = 1 if ith item is disclosed for jth firm 
nj1 = total score (nj1 ≤ 14) from qualitative disclosure for jth firm 
 nj2 = total score from quantitative disclosure for jth firm. For VaR format score = 
number of quantitative risk disclosure x maximum number of risk exposures disclosed. Same 
process is applied for Sen format. Then, total score from quantitative risk disclosure is 
calculated as sum of score from VaR and Sen format scaled by number of market risk 
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exposures.  Thus, total value for DMRD1 is the sum of total qualitative and quantitative risk 
disclosures.   
Market Risk Disclosures: DMRD2  
My second proxy for market risk disclosures (DMRD2) is calculated based on total 
score obtained from both qualitative and quantitative form of disclosure. In calculating the 
qualitative and quantitative score, I scale both forms of disclosure by their maximum 
expected score, which is as follows:   
𝑫𝑴𝑹𝑫𝟐 = ∑
𝑸𝒖𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆_𝑰𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔  𝑿𝒊𝒋
𝒏𝒆,𝒋
𝒏𝒊𝟏=𝟏𝟒  
𝐭=𝟏  + ∑
𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆_𝑰𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔  𝑿𝒊𝒋
𝒏𝒆,𝒋
𝒏𝒊𝟐=𝟏𝟒(𝟑)+𝟏𝟑(𝟑)  
𝐭=𝟏         
   see Eq. (2) 
  Xij = 1 if ith item is disclosed for  jth firm 
  nej  = Total maximum expected score for qualitative and quantitative disclosure  for jth firm 
  nj1 = total score (nj1 ≤ 14) from qualitative disclosure for jth firm 
  nj2 = total score from quantitative disclosure for jth firm. In calculating the quantitative 
score I follow the same methodology as in DMRD1. So that 0≤ DMDR2 ≤ 2    
 
Thus, DMRD2 captures the extent of disclosure by each firm in each year in the 
annual report. 
3.3 Control Variables 
I include both firm-specific and country-specific control variables that influence 
investment efficiency. Motivated by previous literature on investment efficiency (e.g. Biddle 
et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2011a) and risk disclosure (e.g. Abraham and Cox 
2007), I control for firm’s size (Log of total assets). Larger firms frequently act to preserve 
their reputation and avoid government’s intervention (Watts and Zimmerman 1990). In GCC 
countries, large financial institutions are economically important and more visible (Al-
Shammari et al. 2008). Following Lang and Lundholm (1993), I control for firm’s 
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profitability using Return of Equity (ROE). Consistent with Biddle et al. (2009) and Biddle 
and Hilary (2006), I also include Log Age (log of the difference between current year and 
year of incorporation), Slack (total cash balance divided by total asset), and Leverage (total 
short and long term liabilities divided by total asset). Then I control for Tab (a dummy 
variable that takes value of 1 if firm discloses tabular format, 0 otherwise) to check whether 
tabular format complements or substitutes the market risk measure. Furthermore, following 
Skinner (1994), I proxy for voluntary disclosure (VD), (e.g. dummy variable takes a value of 
1 if current earning is higher than previous year). Firms with good news are more likely to 
voluntary disclose their earning (Verrecchia 2001). However, firms with bad news are more 
likely to withhold private information (Akerlof 1970). In addition, I add McapDev (Market 
Capitalization divided by country level GDP in year t) as a country specific measure to 
control for country omitted variables. Biddle et al. (2009) and Chen and Chen (2012) shows 
that corporate governance has an impact on the firm level investment efficiency. Hence I use 
a firm level corporate governance index (which is composed of fifteen corporate governance 
attributes) as a control variable. Moreover, following Leuz et al. (2003) and Gul et al. (2013), 
I conduct factor analysis of country level governance (Factor) (which covers regulatory 
quality and control of corruption Kaufmann et al. (2009) and country investor protection 
index (which covers extent of director liability and ease of shareholders’ suit against directors 
and managers (La Porta et al. 2000). 
3.4 Empirical Models 
To test H1, I use the following empirical model: 
𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊,𝒕,⌈𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓 ⌉ 𝒐𝒓 ⌈𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓⌉ = 𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏𝑫𝑴𝑹𝑫𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒂𝟐𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒂𝟑𝑺𝒍𝒂𝒄𝒌𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 +
𝒂𝟒𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒂𝟓𝑨𝒔𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒊,𝒕−𝟏𝒂𝟔𝑨𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒂𝟕𝑻𝒂𝒃𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒂𝟖𝑴𝒄𝒂𝒑𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒂𝟗𝑭𝒊𝒓𝒎 𝑪𝑮𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 +
𝒂𝟏𝟎𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒆𝒔 +  𝒆𝒊,𝒕   Eq. (5) 
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I regress over-and under investment on market risk disclosures proxy (DMRD) and 
control variables. Over- and under investment is measured based on three models. In model 
1, following on Chen et al. (2013) and Biddle et al. (2009), I rank firms into deciles based on 
firm’ cash balance 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest), and leverage 1 (highest) to 0 (lowest). Then I 
obtain the average of both deciles for each firm’s year. Firms with an average rank less than 
the median deciles is more likely to be in under-investment position, while firm with average 
rank higher than the median deciles is more likely to be in over-investment position. In model 
2, second proxy is constructed based on Richardson (2006), Biddle and Hilary (2006), Biddle 
et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2011a). I measure investment efficiency based on how it 
deviates from the expected investment level. Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggest that 
expected investment is function of growth opportunities. Hence, I use parsimonious 
regression models based on a relation between revenue growth and investment. Then I proxy 
under-investment firm with negative residuals –e i,t and over-investment firm with positive 
residuals +e i,t.  Thus, firm more close to zero is more efficient.   The model is: 
𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊,𝒕 = 𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏𝑹𝒆𝒗𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉%𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒆𝒔 +   𝒆𝒊,𝒕  Eq.( 6) 
 
Where investment is measured as the sum of firm new investment (current) in 
Machinery, Equipment, Vehicles, Land, Building, (less Depreciation and Amortization, and 
sale of Net PPE). Total investment in each year is scaled by Total Assett-1. DMRD i,t-1 is 
proxy for market risk disclosures. Consistent with (Biddle et al. 2009; Chen et al. 2011b), 
then I fixed the effect for years. In model 3, I regress (_- and +) e i,t  obtained from 
parsimonious regression in equation 6 on the firm’s sample that I attained from Model 1. 
Thus, I test whether firms with more likelihood to over-invest (under-invest) actually over-
invest (under-invest) firms’ fund.   
3.5 Mandatory Market Risk Disclosure, Voluntary Earning Disclosure and Investment 
Efficiency 
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To test H2, I repeat the regressions for the existence of both discretion in market risk 
disclosures and voluntary disclosure (proxied by firm’s good news in all the above models). 
Einhorn (2005) suggests that firms with more discretion in mandatory disclosure are more 
likely to limit voluntary disclosures. While, under the ‘cheap-talk model’ of Gigler (1994) 
firms may release quality voluntary (private) as a signal or expression of its mandatory 
disclosure. In all the models, I replace the main independent variable DMRD (1 & 2) by an 
interaction term (DMRD x VD) and (DMRD x NO_VD).  
𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕𝒎𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒊,𝒕,⌈𝑼𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒕 ⌉ & ⌈𝑶𝒗𝒆𝒓𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒆𝒔𝒕⌉ = 𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏𝑫𝑴𝑹𝑫 ∗ 𝑽𝑫 𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒂𝟐 𝑫𝑴𝑹𝑫 ∗
𝑵𝑶𝑵_𝑽𝑫
𝒊,𝒕−𝟏
+ 𝒂𝟑 𝑵𝑶𝑵 − 𝑽𝑫 𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒂𝟒𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍 𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒆𝒔 + 𝒆𝒊,𝒕   Eq. 
(7) 
 
In H2, I expect a negative association between over-and under investment and discretion in 
mandatory disclosure and voluntary disclosure. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The sample is equally distributed throughout the years. Table 5.1 reports summary 
statistics for the variables included in the regression models. The mean (median) investment 
for the sample is 0.05 (.01) with a standard deviation of 0.15. These numbers are very similar 
to that obtained in prior studies. For example, Chen et al. (2011c) report mean investment of 
.05 and .06 for non-state owned and state owned firms respectively. The mean (median) for 
over-investment and under-investment models are 0.04 (0.01) and 0.05 (0.01) and these 
descriptive statistics are very similar to that of Chen et al. (2011a) that report mean over 
(under) investment of 0.12 (0.043). Moreover, the signed and unsigned mean (median) 
investment residuals are 0.000 (-0.04) and 0.066 (0.04) respectively. These statistics are 
consistent with that of Chen et al (2011) in which they report a signed investment residual 
 125 
 
mean (median) of 0.002 (-0.023). The mean (median) DMRD1 and DMRD2 for the sample 
are 7.51 (7.5) and 0.55 (0.54) with a standard deviation of 3.75 and 0.28 respectively. I 
winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the effect of any 
potential outliers. Table 5.1 shows that there is a large dispersion among the sample firms in 
terms of control variables, and this dispersion indicates a considerable diversity in the 
sample. In the regression analysis, I use log transformations of both firm age and firm size. 
The descriptive statistics of other control variables are also generally in line with prior 
studies, which suggest that the sample is representative.  
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean Standard Deviation Minimum 0.25 Medium 0.75 Maximum 
Investment  0.05 0.13 -0.20 0.00 0.01 0.02 1.49 
Investment (Under)  0.05 0.16 -0.10 0.01 0.01 0.03 1.49 
Investment (Over)  0.04 0.11 -0.20 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.92 
Residual (U &O)  0.00 0.13 -0.25 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 1.43 
Residual (Under)  -0.04 0.02 -0.25 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 
Residual (Over)  0.18 0.25 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.25 1.43 
|Residual (U &O)|  0.06 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.05 1.43 
DMRD1 t-1  7.61 3.76 0.00 5.00 7.50 10.00 18.70 
DMRD2 t-1  0.56 0.28 0.00 0.37 0.55 0.74 1.39 
ROEt-1  9.29 15.94 -54.30 3.20 12.00 18.10 44.80 
Slackt-1  0.12 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.65 
Leveraget-1  0.65 0.30 0.00 0.47 0.70 0.85 2.39 
Assett-1(log)  7.10 1.99 2.64 5.49 6.90 8.52 11.26 
Aget-1  2.98 0.76 0.00 2.56 3.26 3.50 4.04 
Tabt-1  0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
McapDev t-1  75.89 37.84 24.60 36.90 78.40 96.20 163.90 
Firm CGt-1  7.17 6.38 0.00 1.00 7.00 12.00 22.00 
Factort-1  0.04 1.02 -1.47 -0.94 -0.11 1.21 1.78 
The variable definitions are in Appendix C. 
 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
Table 5.2 reports Pearson correlations of the variables included in regression analysis. 
As predicted, DMRD1 and DMRD2 are significantly negatively correlated (at 1% level) with 
the proxy for investment efficiency. In addition, the disclosure proxies (DMRD1 and 
DMRD2) are positively and significantly correlated with each other. Moreover, proxies for 
investment efficiency are also highly significantly correlated. Consistent with Biddle et al. 
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(2009) and Chen et al. (2011a), the proxy for investment efficiency is significantly negatively 
correlated with assets and age. Moreover, the correlation between discretion in mandatory 
market risk disclosures and VD is negative, which implies that voluntary disclosure 
complements the discretion in mandatory disclosure of firms. This view is also consistent 
with Einhorn (2005) that the presence of high discretion in mandatory disclosures reduces the 
firms’ voluntarily disclosures.  
4.3 Regression Analysis 
4.3.1 Association between Mandatory Risk Disclosures (DMRD) and Investment 
Efficiency   
Table 5.3 reports Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates of the association between 
discretion in mandatory risk disclosures and investment efficiency. I test whether investment 
efficiency of the firm depends systematically on DMRD1 through three models of investment 
efficiency. DMRD1 is a proxy for the discretion in mandatory risk disclosures, which 
captures the quality of market risk disclosures. Table 5.3 shows that the coefficient on 
DMRD1 is negative and statistically significant for all investment efficiency estimates. 
Specifically, regression results in model 1, model 2 and model 3 shows that discretion in 
mandatory market risk disclosures reduce firms’ under (over) investment by 0.0060 (0.0045), 
0.004(0.0012) and 0.0064 (0.0045) (p<0.05 level except for model 2). These results suggest 
that discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures reduce both underinvestment and 
overinvestment behaviour of the firm. These findings are consistent with the expectation in 
H1 that discretion in mandatory risk disclosures encourages firms to disclose more firm 
specific information, which reduces the information asymmetry and curbs managerial 
opportunistic behaviour in making value destroying investment decisions, which ultimately 
improves the investment efficiency of the firms. These results also reveal that profitability 
(ROA) and leverage is negatively associated with both under investment and
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Table 5.2: Pearson Correlation Matrix  
 1 2 3 4 5 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Investment 1              
Residuals (U&O)  0.9982*** 1             
DMRD1t-1 -0.0601 -0.2006*** 1            
DMRD2t-1 -0.1976*** -0.1919*** 0.9065*** 1           
Slackt-1 0.0069 0.0144 -0.1132*** -0.0651** 1          
Assetst-1(log) -0.1378*** -0.1913*** 0.4996*** 0.5273*** -0.0637* 1         
Leveraget-1 -0.1716*** -0.1773*** 0.2939*** 0.2919*** 0.0984** 0.4607*** 1        
Aget-1 -0.0981** -0.0428 0.2867*** 0.2468*** -0.2516*** 0.2156*** 0.0613 1       
Tabt-1 -0.1238*** -0.1232*** 0.3618*** 0.3643*** 0.0714* 0.3749*** 0.2488*** 0.1235*** 1      
VDt-1 0.0582 0.0352 -0.0255 0.0121 0.0314 0.0172 0.0568 0.0036 0.0396 1     
McapDevt-1 0.0951** 0.0603 -0.0208 -0.0061 0.1117*** 0.0991** -0.0925** 0.0249 -0.0327 0.1150*** 1    
ROEt-1 -0.1597*** -0.1769*** 0.0409 0.0898 0.0573 0.1752*** 0.0897** 0.0681 0.1596*** 0.1736*** 0.0889** 1   
Firm CGt-1 0.0171 0.0133 0.1744*** 0.2013*** -0.0333 0.1844*** 0.1746*** -0.0533 0.1335*** 0.0232 -0.1768*** 0.0414 1  
Factort-1 0.0281 0.0177 -0.0778* -0.0778* -0.0816* -0.0790* -0.0312 0.0436 -0.0319 -0.0099 -0.0098 -0.1650*** -0.0647 1 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (Two-tail). 
The variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
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over-investment of the firm. In the regression models, I control for year effects. However, I 
do not include an industry fixed effect since the sample covers only the financial sector.  
4.3.2 Existence of Voluntary Disclosure (VD), Mandatory Market Risk Disclosures 
(DMRD), and Investment Efficiency   
Table 5.4 reports the joint impact of discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures and 
voluntary earning disclosures on investment efficiency. Firms with discretion in mandatory 
market risk disclosures are expected to have more voluntary disclosure when they have more 
good news to release. For this reason, I use growth in earnings as a proxy of good news. 
Firms that have discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures and do not have voluntary 
disclosure will enjoy comparatively less investment efficiency than firms with both types of 
disclosures. The reason for this is that firms with only mandatory market risk disclosures 
suffer from information asymmetry which does not exist with firms that have both types of 
disclosures.  
Table 5.4 exhibits that the coefficient on interactions between voluntary disclosure (VD) and 
mandatory market risk disclosures (DMRD1) (i.e. VD x DMRD1) is negative and significant 
for both underinvestment and overinvestment in all the models. These results suggest that 
existence of both voluntary disclosure and discretion in mandatory disclosure have an 
economically significant effect in reducing over-and under investment, as compared to the 
provision of discretionary market risk disclosures alone. For example, the coefficients 
between the interaction term and under (over) investment in model 1of 5.4 is higher than the 
coefficient between discretion in mandatory disclosure alone and investment efficiency by 
58% (57%). These results are consistent that of Gigler (1994) in that the presence of both 
voluntary disclosure and mandatory disclosure firms resort to voluntary disclosure more 
extensively to enhance the credibility of mandatory risk disclosures.  
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Table 5.3:  Association between Discretion in Mandatory Risk Disclosures (DMRD1) and 
Investment Efficiency 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Under- 
Investment 
Over- 
Investment 
Under- 
Investment 
Over- 
Investment 
Under- 
Investment 
Over- 
Investment 
DMRD1t-1 -0.0060** -0.0045** -0.0004 -0.0127* -0.0064** -0.0045** 
 (0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0003) (0.0064) (0.0028) (0.0021) 
ROEt-1 -0.0011 -0.0046 -0.0001** -0.0028 -0.0012 -0.0019* 
 (0.0007) (0.0104) (0.0001) (0.0017) (0.0007) (0.0011) 
Slackt-1 -0.2217 -0.7333 0.0121* 0.6280 0.2420 0.0452 
 (0.2088) (1.5057) (0.0067) (0.4534) (0.2135) (0.0675) 
Leveraget-1 -0.0998** 1.8575** 0.0040** -0.2946*** -0.1034** -0.069 
 (0.0421) (0.9019) (0.0018) (0.0872) (0.0434) (0.0523) 
Assets t-1 -0.0035 0.3305** 0.0002 0.0250 -0.0037 0.0039 
 (0.0088) (0.1335) (0.0005) (0.0196) (0.0089) (0.0057) 
Age t-1 0.0037 0.2449 0.0020** -0.0192 0.0054 0.0127 
 (0.0276) (0.1869) (0.0009) (0.0486) (0.0278) (0.0082) 
Tabt-1 0.0017 1.0766*** 0.0023* -0.0069 0.0021 -0.0068 
 (0.0300) (0.3568) (0.0014) (0.1076) (0.0308) (0.0105) 
McapDevt-1 0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0001** 0.000 0.0003 0.0005** 
 (0.0003) (0.0072) 0.0000 (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Firm CGt-1 0.0014 0.1442*** 0.0002 0.0020 0.0015 0.0020** 
 (0.0018) (0.0072) (0.0001) (0.0038) (0.0019) (0.0009) 
Factort-1 0.0119 0.1023 -0.0002 0.0184 0.0130 -0.0026 
 (0.0155) (0.1534) (0.0006) (0.0275) (0.0157) (0.0065) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.1293** -0.1337 -0.0479*** 0.2628* 0.0866 -0.0327 
 (0.0617) (1.2282) (0.0053) (0.1561) (0.0605) (0.0459) 
N 211 339 452 95 209 338 
Adj. R2 5.61% 16.57% 15.71% 10.30% 16.60% 16.30% 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (Two-tail). 
Robust p-values in brackets 
The variable definitions are in Appendix C. 
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Table 5.4: Association between Interaction of Voluntary Disclosure, Discretion in Mandatory 
Market Risk Disclosures (DMRD1) and Investment Efficiency 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
     Under- 
Investment 
Over- 
Investment 
Under- 
Investment 
Over- 
Investment 
Under- 
Investment 
Over- 
Investment 
VDt-1*DMRD1t-1 -0.0095** -0.0071** -0.010*** -0.0070** -0.0006** -0.0182* 
 (0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0003) (0.0101) 
NON-VDt-1* DMRDt-1 0.0042 -0.0018 0.0041 -0.0019 -0.0001 0.0032 
 (0.0035) (0.0020) (0.0036) (0.0020) (0.0003) (0.0109) 
VDt-1 0.1216** 0.0629 0.1257** 0.0598 0.0023 0.1756* 
 (0.0491) (0.0397) (0.0504) (0.0401) (0.0039) (0.1012) 
ROEt-1 -0.0012 -0.0021* -0.0012* -0.0021* -0.0001** -0.0031* 
 (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0016) 
Slackt-1 0.2008 0.0644 0.2228 0.0619 0.0122* 0.5861 
 (0.2028) (0.0704) (0.2066) (0.0712) (0.0066) (0.4280) 
Leveraget-1 -0.0931** -0.0865* -0.0970** -0.0836 0.0042** -0.328*** 
 (0.0429) (0.0517) (0.0444) (0.0535) (0.0019) (0.0939) 
Assetst-1 -0.0051 0.0058 -0.0054 0.0056 0.0002 0.0196 
 (0.0087) (0.0061) (0.0088) (0.0062) (0.0005) (0.0205) 
Aget-1 0.0000 0.0139* 0.0017 0.0141* 0.0020** -0.0202 
 (0.0281) (0.0080) (0.0282) (0.0080) (0.0009) (0.0485) 
Tabt-1 0.0026 -0.0074 0.0031 -0.0079 0.0024* -0.0037 
 (0.0300) (0.0105) (0.0306) (0.0106) (0.0014) (0.1060) 
McapDevt-1 0.0003 0.0004* 0.0003 0.0004* -0.0001** 0.0002 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 0.0000 (0.0008) 
Firm CGt-1 0.0012 0.0018** 0.0013 0.0019** 0.0002 0.0017 
 (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0037) 
Factort-1 0.0145 -0.0017 0.0158 -0.0017 -0.0001 0.0188 
 (0.0151) (0.0063) (0.0154) (0.0064) (0.0006) (0.0265) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0582 -0.0082 0.0133 -0.0636 -0.049*** 0.1684 
 (0.0513) (0.0438) (0.0453) (0.0488) (0.0060) (0.1496) 
N 211 339 209 338 452 95 
Adj. R2 7.02% 11.44% 7.37% 11.30% 16.67% 16.44% 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (Two-tail). 
Robust p-values in brackets 
The variable definitions are in Appendix C  
4.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
As a robustness check, I conduct three additional tests. First, to address the concern 
that my results are not specific to the measurement of discretion in mandatory market risk 
disclosures, I construct a second market risk disclosures index (DMRD2) which considers the 
extent of disclosures. The results presented in Table 5.5 show that the main inference is 
unaffected even after different specification of mandatory market risk disclosures in model 1, 
model 2 and model 3 for both over (under) investment. The under (over) investment 
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regression coefficients in model 1, model 2 and model 3 are 0.0912(0.0894), 0.0059(0.1663), 
and 0.945(0.0531) at (p<0.05 level) except for model 2 at (p<0.10 level). Second, I test 
whether the results on the interaction between discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures 
and voluntary disclosure is affected by the alternative measure of discretion in mandatory 
market risk disclosures. Table 5.6 confirms that in all models my results are robust to 
alternative specification of discretion in mandatory market risk disclosure.     
I also adopt an alternative measure of investment based of Richardson (2006).  I find 
that my results are unaffected by the alternative measurement of Investment. Un-tabulated 
results show that the coefficients for the association between DMRD1 and under-(over) 
investment in the three models are -0.0072***, -0.0030***, -0.0102*** (-0.0075*, -
0.0188**, -0.0096**).91 Moreover, the coefficient for the association between DMRD2 and 
under-investment (over-investment) in three models are -0.1086***, -0.0416***, -0.1551*** 
(-0.0838; -0.2479**, -0.1150**). Furthermore, to mitigate the concern for potential serial 
dependence in the data, I follow Hoi et al. (2013) and estimate the average of the variables 
over the five-year sampling period. Then I use these average variables to re-run the 
regressions in main analysis. I find that my results are consistent with the main regressions 
results. Moreover, I replace a factor variable (Factort_1) with the decomposition of extent of 
disclosure liability, ease of shareholders’ suit directors and managers, regulatory quality and 
control of corruption indexes and re-run the regressions. I find that the significance level and 
sign of the results remains unchanged.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
91 *** p<.01, ** p<.05, and p<.10 
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Table 5.5:  Sensitivity Analysis  
Association between Discretion in Mandatory Market Risk Disclosures (DMRD2) and 
Investment Efficiency 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
 Under- 
Investment 
Over- 
Investment 
Under- 
Investment 
Over- 
Investment 
Under- 
Investment 
Over- 
Investment 
DMRD2t-1 -0.0912** -0.0894** -0.0059* -0.1663* -0.0945** -0.0531** 
 (0.0398) (0.0398) (0.0034) (0.0868) (0.0402) (0.0268) 
ROEt-1 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0001** -0.0027 -0.0012 -0.0019* 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0017) (0.0007) (0.0011) 
Slackt-1 0.2224 0.2220 0.0120* 0.6372 0.2429 0.0494 
 (0.2091) (0.2080) (0.0067) (0.4424) (0.2126) (0.0677) 
Leveraget-1 -0.1000** -0.0993** 0.0042** -0.294*** -0.1030** -0.0710 
 (0.0421) (0.0418) (0.0018) (0.0875) (0.0431) (0.0526) 
Assetst-1 -0.0026 -0.0029 0.0002 0.0250 -0.0030 0.0038 
 (0.0090) (0.0092) (0.0005) (0.0193) (0.0093) (0.0057) 
Aget-1 0.004 0.0041 0.0020** -0.0178 0.0059 0.0122 
 (0.0274) (0.0273) (0.0009) (0.0485) (0.0275) (0.0082) 
Tabt-1 0.0021 0.0018 0.0024* -0.0079 0.0022 -0.0069 
 (0.0299) (0.0300) (0.0014) (0.1084) (0.0307) (0.0105) 
McapDevt-1 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0001* -0.0001 0.0003 0.0005** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) 0.0000 (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Firm CGt-1 0.0014 0.0015 0.0002 0.0020 0.0016 0.0020** 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0001) (0.0038) (0.0019) (0.0009) 
Factort-1 0.0110 0.0122 -0.0001 0.0222 0.0133 -0.0012 
 (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0006) (0.0273) (0.0156) (0.0065) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.1279** 0.0241 -0.0481*** 0.2610* 0.0827 -0.0341 
 (0.0613) (0.0387) (0.0053) (0.1554) (0.0596) (0.0459) 
N 211 339 452 95 209 338 
Adj. R2 5.79% 9.99% 16.7% 15.99% 6.12% 9.97% 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (Two-tail). 
Robust p-values in brackets 
The variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
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Table 5.6:  Sensitivity Analysis  
Association between Interaction of Voluntary Disclosure and Discretion of Mandatory Risk 
Disclosure (DMRD2) and Investment Efficiency 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
 Under- 
Investment 
Over- 
Investment 
Under- 
Investment 
Over- 
Investment 
Under- 
Investment 
Over- 
Investment 
VDt-1 * DMRD2t-1 -0.1431*** -0.0848* -0.1509*** -0.0823* -0.0098** -0.2453* 
 (0.0536) (0.0440) (0.0545) (0.0442) (0.0046) (0.1360) 
NON-VDt1*DMRD2t-1 0.0460 -0.0200 0.0451 -0.0215 -0.0019 0.044 
 (0.0437) (0.0267) (0.0441) (0.0273) (0.0042) (0.1476) 
VDt-1 0.1240** 0.0581 0.1289** 0.0551 0.0028 0.1742* 
 (0.0482) (0.0382) (0.0496) (0.0387) (0.0039) (0.1008) 
ROEt-1 -0.0012 -0.0021* -0.0012* -0.0021* -0.0001** -0.0031* 
 (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0016) 
Slackt-1 0.2037 0.0665 0.2264 0.0641 0.0122* 0.5885 
 (0.2033) (0.0704) (0.2071) (0.0711) (0.0066) (0.4282) 
Leveraget-1 -0.0940** -0.0868* -0.0980** -0.0842 0.0044** -0.3289*** 
 (0.0427) (0.0519) (0.0442) (0.0536) (0.0018) (0.0941) 
Assetst-1 -0.0038 0.0056 -0.0039 0.0054 0.0002 0.0195 
 (0.0088) (0.0061) (0.0089) (0.0062) (0.0005) (0.0204) 
Aget-1 0.0015 0.0133* 0.0032 0.0136* 0.0021** -0.0194 
 (0.0278) (0.0080) (0.0278) (0.0080) (0.0010) (0.0487) 
Tabt-1 0.0025 -0.0074 0.0029 -0.0080 0.0025* -0.0032 
 (0.0297) (0.0105) (0.0303) (0.0106) (0.0014) (0.1062) 
McapDevt-1 0.0003 0.0004* 0.0003 0.0004* -0.0001* 0.0002 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 0.0000 (0.0008) 
Firm CGt-1 0.0012 0.0018** 0.0013 0.0018** 0.0002 0.0017 
 (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0001) (0.0037) 
Factort-1 0.0126 -0.0014 0.0139 -0.0014 -0.0001 0.0191 
 (0.0149) (0.0064) (0.0152) (0.0064) (0.0006) (0.0265) 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0521 -0.0079 0.0047 -0.0631 -0.049*** 0.1665 
 (0.0514) (0.0437) (0.0450) (0.0486) (0.0060) (0.1502) 
N 211 339 209 338 452 95 
Adj. R2 7.2% 11.0% 07.68% 10.89% 16.88% 16.46% 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (Two-tail). 
Robust p-values in brackets 
The variable definitions are in Appendix A. 
 
4.3.4 Potential Endogeneity between Mandatory Market Risk Disclosures and 
Investment Efficiency  
It is possible that the proxy for market risk disclosures (DMRD1 and DMRD2) is 
endogenously determined along with investment efficiency. To address this concern, I 
conduct additional tests. Specifically, I select a set of variables that are assumed to be 
exogenous and use two-stages-least-squares (2SLS) to estimate coefficients in the all three 
regression models. The selection of instrumental variables is guided by Larcker and Rusticus 
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(2010) and Hail and Leuz (2006). I use the number of risk exposures, Big4 audit firm, firm 
growth, and inflation as my instrumental variables. The theoretical argument for the use of 
number of risk exposures as an instrumental variable is that the number of market risk 
exposures that firms’ disclose in annual reports is correlated with discretion in market risk 
disclosures. Big four accounting firms (Big4) has an impact on the disclosure quality and 
compliance of the firm (Al-Shammari et al. 2008). Moreover, the use of growth (book to 
market ratio) in disclosure studies (e.g, Khurana et al. 2006) as an instrumental variable for 
disclosure motivates us to use this as an instrumental variable as well. It is well established 
that economy-wide variables are suitable as an instrument (Larcker and Rusticus 2010). Beck 
et al. (2006) find significant negative correlation between accuracy and transparency of 
disclosure and inflation rate, which also motivates in using inflation as an instrument.  
I conduct weak instrument test, over-identification test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
to ascertain the validity and appropriateness of instrumental variables estimation for all three 
models of investment efficiency. To assess whether weak instruments are a problem, I report 
partial F-statistics and partial R2. For weak instrument test if the F-statistic is low, this 
implies that the selected instruments are weak (For detail discussion see (Murray 2006). The 
reported F-statistics for four instruments (in Table 5.7) is higher than the benchmark 
suggested by Stock et al. (2002).  I conduct an over-identification test (i.e., use of the number 
of instruments more than the number of endogenous regressor) to determine the 
appropriateness of the instruments. This test requires that at least one of the instruments be 
valid (Cameron and Pravin 2009). The reported results show that in all the models, the 
coefficients on at least two instruments are significant at the conventional level. Moreover, 
for the Hansen test the p-value for all the models is higher than 0.05 levels, which also 
justifies the appropriateness of the instruments. I also perform standard Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test to justify the use of 2SLS rather than OLS results. For underinvestment (and 
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overinvestment), the Hausman test statistics 0.039, 0.25, 0.054 (0.002, 0.004 and 0.001) 
strongly rejects the exogeneity of discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures. Based on 
these results, I conclude that 2SLS estimate is preferable to the OLS estimate for both 
measures of discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures. 
Table 5.7 shows that the coefficient terms in all three models of underinvestment and 
overinvestment capture the effect of discretion in mandatory risk disclosures which is 
significantly negatively associated with investment efficiency. This is consistent with my 
expectations as well as with the results from main analysis. Overall, 2SLS results are stronger 
than the results reported under OLS.  
4.3.4 Additional analysis: In prior regression models, I controlled for country-specific 
effects including two variables which are McapDevt-1 and Factort-1. As additional analysis I 
also alleviate these impacts, by replacing the country-specific factors and including country 
dummies for both desertion in market risk disclosure (DMRD1 and DMRD2) and investment 
efficiency’s regressions. Un-tabulated results provide consistent evidence that discretion in 
risk reporting reduces the investment inefficiency in all three models.92  
5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
I examine the impact of discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures on investment 
efficiency. I hypothesize that discretion in mandatory disclosure increases the flow of 
information, which alleviate adverse selection and moral hazard problem and thus improve 
the investment efficiency by reducing both over-investment and under-investment. I also 
expect that improvement in investment efficiency is more pronounced when firms 
incorporate private information production incentive (voluntary disclosure). Consistent with 
expectations, I find a negative and statistically significant association between discretion in 
                                                          
92 Results of the additional analysis are available to the author upon reader request 
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mandatory market risk disclosures and over- (and under) investment. Moreover, when the 
existence of both voluntary disclosure and discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures are 
taken into account, the coefficients on over- and under- investment are negative and 
significant for all the models. This study contributes to investment efficiency and disclosure 
literature in several ways. My study contributes to disclosure literature by showing that 
discretion in mandatory disclosure provides investors with more firm specific information 
which improves investment efficiency by alleviating adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. I also document that coexistence of discretion in mandatory risk disclosure and 
voluntary earning disclosures have an important implication for disclosure level and 
investment decision-making. Moreover, in this study, I focus on the relation between 
discretion in disclosure and investment efficiency in emerging markets which receive less 
attention in the prior studies. Finally, prior studies extensively investigate investment 
efficiency of non-financial firms; empirical evidence on investment efficiency of financial 
firms is scarce. I fill this gap in literature.   
This study relies on a limited sample size since I collect data from annual reports of 
financial firms in the GCC. I control for the endogeneity by using 2SLS through providing 
instrumental variables. My finding suggests that an opportunity to undertake future research 
on mandatory market risk disclosures studies. For example, future research can be conducted 
to investigate the value relevance of discretion in mandatory risk disclosure. Future research 
can also explore the association of discretion in mandatory market risk disclose with cost of 
equity, stock price informativeness and firm specific stock crash risk.  
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Table 5.7 Endogeneity Test – 
DMRD1  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Under- Investment Over- Investment Under- Investment Over- Investment Under- Investment Over- Investment 
 1th Stage 2th Stage 1th Stage 2th Stage 1th Stage 2th Stage 1th Stage 2th Stage 1th Stage 2th Stage 1th Stage 2th Stage 
DMRD1t-1  -0.0230**  -0.0138***  -0.0009**  -0.0319***  -0.0239**  -0.0140*** 
  (0.0107)  (0.0041)  (0.0005)  (0.0104)  (0.0110)  (0.0042) 
Variable Predetermined in main specification Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -3.1839* 0.1864** 0.0266 0.0455 -2.293** -0.0535*** 5.366*** 0.6016*** -4.0033* 0.0332 (0.0202) -0.0217 
 (-1.9055) (0.0872) (0.0388) (0.0464) (1.0241) (0.0051) (2.0090) (0.2277) (2.1345) (0.0639) (1.5416) (0.0589) 
N 193 193 283 283 389 389 85 85 192 192 282 282 
 First stage: IVs First stage: IVs First stage: IVs First stage: IVs First stage: IVs First stage: IVs 
Variables Coeff. St. Err Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err 
No_ Riskt-1 1.231*** (0.2647) 1.647*** (0.1690) 1.414*** (0.1524) 1.467*** (0.3791) 1.218*** (0.2633) 1.636*** (0.1695) 
Audit4t-1 2.134** (0.7891) -0.215 (0.3911) 0.868* (0.4787) 1.7026* (0.9191) 2.153*** (0.7809) -0.199 (0.3892) 
Growtht-1 -0.041 (0.1526) -0.110 (0.0697) 0.048 (0.1032) -0.125 (0.0801) 0.042 (0.1510) -0.112 (0.0696) 
Log(Inflation)t-1 -0.683* (0.4070) -0.516* (0.3059) -0.446* (0.2676) 1.747** (0.7173) -0.672* (0.4037) -0.519* (0.3039) 
1-Partial R2 (F stat.) R2:0.24| F: 9.32 R2: 0.314 | F:24 R2: 0.25 | F: 3.87 R2: 0.46 | F:14.91 R2: 0.21 | F:8.64 R2: 0.31| F: 24.64 
2-Over-identfication  1.22  (p = 0.7491) 2.15 (p= 0.541) 2.59  (p = 0.47) 6.75  (p = 0.08) 1.195  (p = 0.75) 2.09  (p = 0.55) 
3-Endogenous Test 3.63 (p= 0.039) 9.34 (p= 0.002) 1.32  (p = 0.25) 8.64  (p = 0.004) 3.75  (p = 0.054) 10.69  (p = 0.001) 
 
DMRD2 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Under- Investment Over- Investment Under- Investment Over- Investment Under- Investment Over- Investment 
 1th Stage 2th Stage 1th Stage 2th Stage 1th Stage 2th Stage 1th Stage 2th Stage 1th Stage 2th Stage 1th Stage 2th Stage 
DMRD2t-1  -0.2411**  -0.2383**  -0.0112**  -0.4115***  -0.2484**  -0.1764*** 
 
 (0.1015)  (0.0999)  (0.0056)  (0.1359)  (0.1033)  (0.0530) 
Variable Predetermined in main specification Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.233* 0.1862** -0.0147 0.0384 -0.164** -0.053*** 0.3947** 0.5851*** -0.298** 0.0419 -0.0309 -0.0307 
 0.1319 (0.0852) (0.0900) (0.0458) 0.0723 (0.0051) 0.1487 (0.2255) 0.1466 (0.0582) 0.1145 (0.0596) 
N 193 193 283 283 389 389 85 85 192 192 282 282 
 
First stage: IVs First stage: IVs First stage: IVs First stage: IVs First stage: IVs First stage: IVs 
Variables Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err Coeff St. Err 
No._Riskt-1 0.107*** (0.0165) 0.128*** (0.0124) 0.115*** (0.0108) 0.110** (0.0281) 0.106*** (0.0164) 0.127*** (0.1695) 
Audit4t-1 0.126* (0.0641) -0.021 (0.0295) 0.058* (0.0354) 0.1267* (0.0678) 0.126** (0.0634) -0.018 (0.3891) 
Growtht-1 0.001 (0.0114) -0.011** (0.0045) -0.002 (0.0086) -0.0103 (0.0062) 0.001 (0.0113) -0.011** (0.0696) 
Log(Inflation)t-1 -0.044 (0.0298) -0.047** (0.0221) -0.038** (0.0196) -0.131** (0.0531) -0.043 (0.0295) -0.047** (0.3038) 
Partial R2 (F stat.) R2 :0.28| F: 12.89 R2 0.34| F:  29.23 R2 0.21| F: 31.89 R2: 0.46 | F:15.52 R2: 0.27 | F:12.56 R2: 0.34| F: 28.65 
Over-identification  1.46  (p = 0.70) 2.41  (p = 0.41) 2.40  (p = 0.45) 6.85  (p = 0.07) 1.44  (p = 0.70) 2.16  (p = 0.53) 
Endogenous Test 3.83  (p = 0.051) 11.60  (p = 0.00) 0.959  (p = 0.33) 8.37  (p = 0.00) 3.92  (p = 0.04) 11.84  (p = 0.00) 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively (Two-tail); Robust p-values in brackets; No._Risk is number of risk exposures that firm disclosed; Audit is a proxy for big four auditors; Growth is ratio of 
book to market value; and Natural log inflation is the inflation rate of country i in year t from world bank.   
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CHAPTER 6 
DISAGGREGATION, AUDITOR CONSERVATISM and IMPLIED COST OF 
EQUITY CAPITAL 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent economic reforms by the GCC have attracted foreign investors to their stock 
markets (Balli et al. 2011). These reforms have increased the number of listed firms listed on 
GCC stock exchanges from 399 to 702 between 2000 and 2011, inspired the revival of the 
auditing profession (Al-Shammari et al. 2008). Like most emerging markets, the GCC’s 
financing markets are considered to be a banking-oriented system (Al-Yahyaee et al. 2011). 
However, an increasing interest by international investors in GCC equity markets, which 
provide tax haven opportunities and a strong return in capital markets (Bley and Saad 2012), 
signifies that corporate disclosure is important as a means of accessing equity financing and 
for creating greater transparency for private debt financing (Francis et al. 2005). For instance, 
Bley and Chen (2006) document in 2004 indicated that foreign portfolio investors alone 
obtained profit in the range of USD 150–170 billion from GCC stock markets. 
At issue of importance is to what extent, and at what level of quality, of 
disaggregation of market risk disclosure in the presence of a conservative auditor will 
facilitate the reduction in information asymmetry. In this study, I investigate the effect of 
discretionary disaggregation in mandatory risk disclosures (disaggregation thereafter), auditor 
conservatism and the implied cost of equity (ICOE thereafter) on GCC financial firms. First, I 
examine whether the disaggregation provides investors with more private risk information 
and, in doing so, whether this reduces the ICOE. Secondly, I investigate the role of auditor 
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conservatism on the association between discretionary disaggregation in mandatory risk 
disclosures and the ICOE.  
The survey of analysts, the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board and the 
International Accounting Standards Board (FASB/IASB (2009), highlights that 
disaggregation of accounting information into components results in the provision of 
comprehensive and useful information to stakeholders leading to enhanced transparency, 
particularly in regard to prediction of a firm’s future cash flows. However, the degree of 
disaggregation in mandatory disclosure is subject to discretion and will ultimately depend on 
the capacity, incentives and opportunities available to management (SEC 2011; IASB 2005). 
The International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS 7): Disclosure of Financial 
Instruments states that “an entity decides, in the light of its circumstances, how much detail it 
provides to satisfy the requirements of this IFRS, how much emphasis it places on different 
aspects of the requirements and how it aggregates information to display the overall picture 
without combining information with different characteristics.” (p. 20). Specifically, IFRS 7 
requires the firm to not disclose information on an aggregated basis if, in so doing, it obscures 
important differences between individual transactions or associated risks. For example, IFRS 
7 requires firms to not aggregate market risk exposures from an area of hyperinflation with 
market risk exposures from an area of very low inflation. Thus, Schipper (2007) suggests that 
disaggregation should be required by standard setters to the extent that it improves investors’ 
predictions of a firm’s performance. Several research studies suggest that disaggregated 
disclosures in financial statements may mitigate the effects on the mispricing of earnings, 
improve alternatives for investors’ disclosures and reduce uncertainties. For example, Lail et 
al. (2009) find that the persistence of accruals differs from the persistence of cash flow; 
therefore, they suggest that standard setters may focus on improving disaggregation about 
accruals. This leaves unanswered the question of why disaggregated risk disclosure would 
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assist investors in efficiently pricing a firm’s cost of capital. The argument is that more 
informative risk disclosure allows investors to understand the information in order to predict 
future cash flows as they are then able to understand the managerial assumptions used in 
exposing market risk (Dobler 2008; Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2003). Hence, it is argued 
that investors can estimate the future economic benefits and valuation implications of risk 
disclosure more accurately when risk disclosure is discretionary through the reduction of 
information asymmetry (Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2003). 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) theoretical model suggests that discretionary disclosures, 
earnings’ management activities and accounting measurement rules affect the firm’s cost of 
capital even when these features have no relation to the underlying fundamentals of firms 
(Lambert 2003). Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh (2003) argue that aggregated information in 
financial statements may affect investors’ ability to more accurately process information. For 
instance, they propose that, although earnings’ components may be publicly available via 
media and financial analysts, the probability that investors intend to pursue the growth rate of 
separate earnings’ components is higher under disaggregated disclosure than under 
aggregated disclosure. In terms of risk exposures, Rajgopal (1999) and Dobler (2008) argue 
that managers have limited incentive to disclose a firm’s private risk information.94 If risk 
information is widely disseminated among investors, this has implications for a firm 
(Solomon et al. 2000). For instance, the prior literature largely provides evidence of a 
positive association between the degree of information asymmetry and the ICOE (e.g. 
Diamond and Verrecchia 1991). Investors may thus engage in the acquisition of private 
information to reduce potential information asymmetry, although acquiring that information 
is likely to be costly (Barth et al. 2013). Hodder et al. (2001a) suggest that, if market risk 
                                                          
94 Dobler (2008) outlines three reasons why a manager has the incentive to not disclose risk information: (1) the 
endowment of risk reporting uncertainty; (2) verification and credibility; and (3) threat of economic 
disadvantage. I empirically extend Dobler (2008) study by investigating the nature and benefits of disaggregated 
market risk disclosures of financial firms in GCC countries. 
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disclosures are disclosed in aggregated form, this will obscure essential information about the 
risk elements, while disaggregation will allow investors to discount the market risk exposures 
for each component. Furthermore, aggregated risk disclosures cause individual investors to 
react differently to how they would if risk is disaggregated (Hodder et al. (2001a). In 
addition, prospect theory suggests that the nature of losses in the market risk disclosures’ 
requirements leads investors to react to losses more strictly than they do to gains. Therefore, 
disclosing risk disclosure in disaggregated form provides a rich information environment, 
with more accurate and relevant information to investors to assess a firm’s cost of capital 
(Einhorn 2005; Hodder et al. 2001a; Libby and Brown 2013; Lansford et al. 2013). Given 
that provision of private information relating to risk is likely to reduce the degree of 
information asymmetry (Dobler 2008; Linsley and Shrives 2006), it is not unreasonable to 
assert then that voluntary disaggregation in mandatory market risk disclosures will facilitate 
the provision of private risk information to stakeholders (Einhorn 2005) and thus reduce the 
ICOE (Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2003), specifically if audited by a conservative auditor 
(Libby and Brown 2012).95  
One could argue about the relevance of an analysis of GCC countries. However, 
recent cross-countries’ studies (e.g., Francis et al. 2005; Peasnell et al. 2000; Leuz et al. 2003; 
Hope 2003; Ball et al. 2008; DeFond et al. 2007; Hail and Leuz 2006) that have investigated 
disclosure, financial reporting and the cost of capital, have not incorporated any observations 
of firms from GCC countries.96 I believe that more detail within GCC studies can 
complement and provide different insight for investigations by previous international studies 
                                                          
95 Specifically, effective risk management leads insiders to have more risk information compared to outsiders 
regarding firms’ cash flow distribution; therefore, revealing more risk information can reduce information 
asymmetry (Dobler 2008). I predict that risk disclosure also has a negative relationship with information 
asymmetry. Like Barth et al. (2013), I conducted a correlation test between risk disclosure proxies and five 
different measures of information asymmetry suggested by the prior literature. I find negative correlations 
between risk disclosure proxies and the five measures of information asymmetry. See section 4.2.2. 
96 In addition, corporate governance in across-countries’ investigation (e.g., Doidge et al. 2007; Lang et al. 
2006) suffers from the same problem. For example, Lang et al. (2006) investigated 698 observations from 35 
countries, and (Doidge et al. 2007) used a sample of 495 firms from 25 countries: neither included any GCC 
observations (See also,  Dittmar et al. 2003; Klapper and Love 2004). 
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for several reasons. First, in the GCC countries, corporate transparency and disclosure 
requirements are not stringently imposed by the government and regulators on public firms 
owned by the ruling family and business élites (Union of Arab Banks 2007; Al-Yahyaee et al. 
2011; IFC/Hawkamah 2008; Mazaheri 2013); hence, public and foreign investors continue to 
face information symmetry (Al-Sehali and Spear 2004; Mazaheri 2013; Ramady 2005).97 
Furthermore, another unique feature for investigation in the GCC region setting is that, as 
a conservative procedure, the regulators in GCC countries encourage firms to have financial 
statements audited and signed by at least two auditors (Al-Shammari et al. 2008). Hence, the 
regulators mainly rely on the audit report (Al-Shammari et al. 2008). In fact, very little 
research has investigated the implications of auditor conservatism in disaggregation 
disclosure specifically in developing and frontier markets (Libby and Brown 2012; Al-
Shammari et al. 2008).98  
Despite the potential importance that disclosure may have in reducing problems 
arising from information asymmetry, there has been comparatively little research on 
information asymmetry, idiosyncratic risks and the ICOE in the context of developing and 
frontier economies such as those of the GCC. The GCC setting as a frontier market provides 
stock return and estimation risk that differ from what is typical of well-established and 
developed markets (Bley and Saad 2012). Consequently, very little is known concerning the 
pricing process of stocks and of different risk components’ estimations. Finally, the lack of 
analyst followers, lack of credible media coverage and lower investor protection in the GCC 
                                                          
97 For example, Reuters reported on 19 February 2014 that the U.A.E’s largest listed property company (by 
market value) linked to “Emaar” or the ruler of the Emirates, quietly replaced its Group Chief Executive late last 
year. But the company did not announce this to the stock exchange until late January, three days after Reuters 
reported the news. The “Emaar” refused to respond to the capital market authority’s calls seeking comment on 
the delay.  
(see <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/19/-mideast-equities-regulation-idUSL5N0LH2BQ20140219>) 
98 Most recently, in March 2013, the GCC Accounting & Auditing Organization (GCCAAO) signed a landmark 
audit quality monitoring agreement with the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
(ICAEW). Al-Shammari et al. (2008) find that auditor quality (the Big 4) improves the IFRS compliance in 
GCC countries. Chi and Chin (2011) also test the application of two auditors in association with auditor quality 
in Taiwan from the perspective of the auditors’ specialization.  
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make disaggregated accounting information a better mechanism for a firm’s overall set of 
information that is utilized by insiders and outsiders in their investment decision making (Al-
Yahyaee et al. 2011). In support of this argument, Abu-Nassar and Rutherford (1996) suggest 
that accounting information is the first priority source of information for users in emerging 
markets. I hypothesize that the decomposition of mandatory market risk disclosures into their 
components reduces the ICOE through the provision of more information regarding a firm’s 
risk exposures and its capacity to deal with those risks. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
It is well documented that an increase in the quality of disclosure enhances firm value (Beyer 
et al. 2010; Healy and Palepu 2001) through the reduction of both information asymmetry 
and agency problems (Myers and Majluf 1984; Jensen and Meckling 1976). The relation 
between ICOE and the extent and quality of disclosure is well examined in the accounting 
literature (e.g. Botosan 1997; Botosan and Plumlee 2005; Daske 2006; Hail and Leuz 2006; 
Leuz and Verrecchia 2004; Li 2010; He et al. 2013). The association between disclosure and 
the cost of equity capital is discussed from main two main theoretical bases (For discussion 
see Daske 2006; Beyer et al. 2010). First, the quality of information can reduce the cost of 
equity through the reduction of non-diversifiable estimation risk. Investors use the available 
information to estimate the parameters of stock return or payoff distribution when forming 
the optimal portfolio. In addition to systematic risk, investors will face estimation risk which 
can be reduced through an increase in the extent and quality of information (Beyer et al. 
2010; Artiach and Clarkson 2011). Second, information quality reduces the cost of equity 
capital through voluntary (private) disclosure on stock liquidity (see Verrecchia 2001). 
Hence, less-informed investors can liquidate their stock by selling it to better-informed 
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investors. Information asymmetry introduces adverse selection into stock transactions, 
thereby reducing market liquidity. To compensate the less-informed investor, firms must 
issue equity capital at a discount rate which will increase the cost of equity capital. Thus, 
firms provide private signals based on public information which, in turn, reduces information 
asymmetry amongst investors, increases liquidity and reduces the cost of equity capital 
(Amihud and Mendelson 1991; Diamond and Verrecchia 1991).99 In Easley and O'hara 
(2004), the equilibrium model shows that the proportion of public and private information has 
an impact on the cost of capital. In that model, private information increases the risk for less-
informed investors in holding stock, while the better-informed investors are able to shift their 
portfolio weight to incorporate new information. Empirically, Daske (2006) and Li (2010) 
provide evidence that the adoption of IFRS reduces investors’ requirements for private 
information resulting in a reduction in the cost of equity capital. Conversely, Hughes et al. 
(2007) suggest that in large economies, idiosyncratic risk and asymmetric information risk 
are fully diversifiable and should not impact on the cost of capital.  
Disaggregation of information into components is an effective way to disclose firms’ 
private information in publicly available media (Schipper 2007). Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) 
propose that a proportion of individual investors in the market are inattentive investors. In 
other words, inattentive investors miss important information in aggregation disclosure or 
misinterpret its implications; however, the lack of sophistication is not eliminated at the 
aggregate market level. Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter (2003) and Lambert (2003) argue that 
discretionary disclosures and risk disclosure impact on share price, even if the disaggregation 
information bears no relation to a firm’s underlying fundamentals. Hence, Hirshleifer and 
                                                          
99 Amihud and Mendelson (1991) argue that the cost of capital increases with wider bid-ask spreads, while 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) assert that greater disclosure reduces the amount of information that is revealed 
by large trades. When the impact of an adverse price is reduced in such trades, the investor is able to take a 
larger position in a firm’s securities and, hence, this will increase demand for its securities and reduce the cost of 
capital.  
  
 145 
 
Teoh (2003) suggest that this salient feature in financial statement disclosures may adversely 
impact on investors’ ability to accurately process the information.  
Einhorn (2005) also outlines the method by which firms make their private 
information available to the public through the disaggregation of disclosure components.100 
An increase in the disaggregation of mandatory disclosure occurs when components vary 
widely in their informational qualities (Einhorn 2005). Hence, Einhorn (2005) suggests that 
managers’ incentive for disaggregated disclosure increases when it is more relevant to 
investors in terms of dealing with the uncertainty of a firm’s value. Venter et al. (2013) find 
investors are able to price earnings’ components more consistently compared to aggregated 
earnings. Hirst et al. (2007) find that disaggregation of earnings into components increases 
the credibility of management earnings’ forecasts. Furthermore, Heitzman et al. (2010) find 
that firms disaggregate expenses into components when the information is more relevant to 
investors. From a segment disaggregation perspective, Herrmann and Thomas (2000) propose 
that the precision of forecasts is greater when a firm disaggregates its segment information. 
Botosan and Stanford (2005) suggest that firms reduce their disaggregation disclosures into 
operational segments (under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards [SFAS] No. 
131)101 to hide profitable segments that operate in less competitive industries. Berger and 
Hann (2007) find that managers reduce their reporting of disaggregated segments when faced 
with more proprietary costs, and reduce their disaggregation in segments with less profit 
when faced with abnormal low profit.  
The location of disaggregated disclosures in the annual report is important. For 
instance, Riedl and Srinivasan (2010) find disaggregation of special items in the income 
statement is less persistent than those disclosed in footnotes. Libby and Brown (2012) find 
                                                          
100 Einhorn (2005) claims, in proposition 10, that more discretion in mandatory disclosure reduces voluntary 
disclosure as it enlarges the managers’ set of disclosure alternatives, hence enabling them to design mandatory 
disclosure to minimize the need for voluntary disclosure. 
101 SFAS No. 131 Disclosure about Segments of an Enterprise and related Information.  
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that the auditor is more conservative when expenses are disaggregated in the income 
statement. Bloomfield et al. (2014) suggest that more disaggregation of disclosure items is 
useful to users regardless of whether that information is disclosed in the financial statements 
or the notes to the financial statements.  
Far less research has focused on the disaggregation of disclosures particularly risk 
disclosure. Borch (1968) defines risk as how far the actual values are distributed from a 
benchmark outcome. Risk disclosure is the related information on these distributed values. 
Risk disclosure is a cornerstone of a firm’s investment decision (ICAEW 1999). For example, 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) suggest that risk disclosure motivates fund providers to eliminate 
a part of the premium to compensate for uncertainty in the firm’s risk position. Jorgensen and 
Kirschenheiter (2003) find that the risk premium of firms is less if they disclose their risk 
exposures, compared to firms that do not. Hence, the role of risk -related information is 
highly important in decision making. If firms disclose more disaggregated risk information, 
as proxied by mandatory market risk disclosures, private risk signals become more 
informative. Therefore, firms that disaggregate more risk exposures are conveying more 
private information to the public relative to firms that disclose less disaggregated risk 
exposures. Investors who have less private information are able to combine this with more 
private information through disaggregated signals. I expect, if firms disclose more 
disaggregation in risk information relating to their market exposures, that this reduces the 
ICOE through the reduction of information asymmetry among investors. Based on this, I 
hypothesize that:  
H1: Ceteris paribus, discretionary disaggregation in mandatory market risk 
disclosures significantly reduces the implied cost of equity capital.  
Prior literature suggests that the disaggregated disclosure increases the credibility of 
financial statements by reducing investors’ uncertainty with regard to risk estimation (e.g 
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Hirst et al. 2007). Francis and Krishnan (1999) find that firms with higher accruals receive 
more modified reports from auditors for asset realization uncertainties and going concern 
problems than firms with lower accruals. As auditors are more likely to face litigation and 
therefore reputational risk when there is a high disaggregation of accruals, they act 
conservatively (Francis and Krishnan, 1999). DeAngelo (1981) asserts that firms disclose 
more comprehensive disclosure when audited by reputable auditors. On the other hand, 
choosing a reputable auditor is also a signal to the market that the firm’s disclosure is of a 
high quality (Craswell and Taylor 1992). From a voluntary disclosure perspective, Clarkson 
et al. (2003) find that a firm’s voluntary disclosure is at a higher level when audited by a 
conservative auditor especially after the remediation information problem in 2000 (Y2K, or 
the computerized two digits of the 21st century). Using an experiment methodology, Libby 
and Brown (2013) also find that the disaggregation of expense disclosures increases the 
reliability of income statements through decreasing the amount of management misstatements 
tolerated by auditors in comparison to those tolerated from aggregated firms. Based on these 
studies, I expect that the disaggregated mandatory market risk disclosures of firms will be 
informative and less misstated when firms are audited by a more conservative auditor, and 
that a conservative auditor, as an enforcement mechanism, will verify and make risk 
information more meaningful and credible (Dobler 2008). Therefore, risk information will be 
more likely to reduce much of the uncertainty and improve investors’ confidence, thereby 
reducing the cost of capital. I hypothesize that: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, the negative impact of discretionary disaggregated market risk 
disclosures on the implied cost of equity capital is greater when verified by 
conservative auditors. 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEASURMENT 
3.1 Dependent Variable  
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Simultaneous estimation of implied cost of capital using realized earnings 
I measure the ICOE based using two approaches. In the first approach, I adopt the portfolio-
specific measure of Easton and Sommers (2007) after controlling for firm-specific variables. 
Easton (2006) and Easton and Sommers (2007) illustrate two main weaknesses of firm-
specific measures for abnormal growth and residual models (e.g. Claus and Thomas 2001). 
First, potential biases in the measurement of investors’ growth expectations may impact on 
the cost of capital estimates (Easton 2006). Second, firm-specific models use an optimistic 
proxy for expected earnings by applying analysts’ earnings’ forecasts. Easton and Sommers 
(2007) suggest that analysts’ earnings’ forecasts produce biases that impact on the cost of 
capital as analysts’ forecasts vary in cross-section with firm size and analysts’ stock 
recommendations (see for more detial Easton and Sommers 2007). In turn, this will lead to a 
bias in ICOE estimation. For example, Bhushan (1989) finds studies introducing a sampling 
measurement design that only used firms followed by analysts, thus reducing the power of 
the results’ generalizability. Several researchers attempt to mitigate these weaknesses (Chen 
et al. 2010). For example, Easton (2004) develops a model for a firm-specific measure which 
simultaneously estimates the long-term growth rather than assuming that variable. However, 
these models (e.g. Easton 2004) still use analysts’ earnings’ forecasts as proxies for expected 
earnings (Chen et al. 2010). Nevertheless, Easton and Sommers (2007) develop a 
simultaneous portfolio estimation for the ICOE by mitigating the above drawback of the 
firm-specific measure which was adopted specifically from O'Hanlon and Steele (2000) 
residual income model. They replace the analysts’ earnings’ forecasts with the realized 
earnings to estimate the long-term growth and ICOE. Therefore, following Easton (2006), 
Daske (2006) and Chen et al. (2010), I establish Easton and Sommers (2007) firm-specific 
measure by using constant sample observations. The residual income valuation model is: 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡 + ∑
𝐸𝑡(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+𝜏 ∗  𝐵𝑡+𝜏−1)
(1+𝑟)𝜏
𝜏
𝜏=1
       Eq. (8) 
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where Pt = stock price of the firm at time t: I use Marcht+1 price for the closing date as the 
annual reports in GCC countries are published in the middle of Februaryt+1 for the current 
year closing. Bt is the book value of the equity per share at time t; Et is the expectation on 
time t; EPSt is earnings per share at time t, and r is the cost of capital of a firm.     
Using current realized earnings as expected earnings 
Easton and Sommers (2007) show that equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡 +
(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡− 𝑟𝐸𝑆
0  ∗ 𝐵𝜏−1)∗(1+𝑔𝐸𝑆) 
𝑟𝐸𝑆
0 −𝑔𝐸𝑆
       Eq. (9) 
They assume that the current year residual income is 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 −  𝑟𝐸𝑆
0  ∗  𝐵𝜏−1; 𝑟𝐸𝑆
0  is the ICOE 
from current earnings, which grows at 𝑔𝐸𝑆 rate per year in perpetuity. Hence, they rearrange 
equation (10) as shown below:  
 
𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡
𝐵𝑡−1
=  𝛿0 +  𝛿1
𝑃𝑡− 𝐵𝑡
𝐵𝑡−1
 +  𝜇𝑡        Eq. (10) 
where 𝛿0 =   𝑟𝐸𝑆
0  and 𝛿1 =
( 𝑟𝐸𝑆
0 − 𝑔𝐸𝑆)
(1+𝑔𝐸𝑆)
; 𝛿0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿1 can be obtained by estimating the firm 
portfolio at time t. This model is free from the weaknesses outlined previously. However, as 
the model is portfolio-based, this makes it difficult to control for other factors that affect the 
cost of capital because these factors are firm-specific variables. Dhaliwal et al. (2005) 
suggested a treatment to overcome this issue, as discussed and applied in Easton (2006), 
Daske (2006a), Chen et al. (2010) and Dhaliwal et al. (2005), by using the same observations 
in the regression models as are used in the regressions that obtain 𝛿0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿1 (see footnote 10 
(Easton 2006). 
I then estimate the ICOE based on current earnings 𝑅𝐸𝑆
0  by regressing equation (3) for 
the full sample, based on country (six countries) and year (five years); hence, I obtain 30 
ICOE for 30 portfolios. Following Gomes et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2010), I categorize 
firms into three classes; small, medium and large including the pool sample, based on market 
capitalization at the end of March in each country and year. Small firms are those whose 
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market capitalization is 50th or lower, medium firms are those whose market capitalization is 
between 50th and 75th, and the larger firms are those whose market capitalization is above 
75th. I obtain a final pool sample of 588 firm-year observations: 281 firm-year observations 
for small firms, 146 firm-year observations for medium firms, and 161 firm-year observations 
for large firms. 
In the second approach, I use three firm-specific measures of two-period growth 
based on analysts’ earnings’ forecasts, namely price–earnings–growth (PEG) (Easton (2004); 
Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), and the PEG model using random walk forecasts based 
on Bradshaw et al. (2012) model. 
3.2 Independent Variable  
Market Risk Disclosures: DMRD1  
I construct DMRD1 based on the risk coverage, in accordance with Miihkinen (2012), which 
is the sum of the score of: (1) qualitative market risk disclosures and (2) disaggregation in 
quantitative market risk disclosures scaled by the number of risk exposures reported in the 
annual report (e.g., interest rate risk, currency exchange risk and equity risk from both VaR 
and Sen formats):  
𝑫𝑴𝑹𝑫𝟏 = ∑ 𝑸𝒖𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆_𝑰𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔 𝑿𝒊𝒋
𝒏𝒋𝟏=𝟏𝟒  
𝐭=𝟏  + ∑
𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆_𝑰𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔  𝑿𝒊𝒋
𝑵𝒐.𝒐𝒇 𝒎𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 𝒓𝒊𝒔𝒌 𝒆𝒙𝒑𝒐𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆
𝒏𝒋𝟐=𝟏𝟒(𝟑)+𝟏𝟑(𝟑)  
𝐭=𝟏         
see Eq. (1)  
Xij = 1 if i
th item is disclosed for jth firm 
nj1 = total score (nj1 ≤ 14) from qualitative disclosures for jth firm 
nj2 = total score from quantitative disclosures for j
th firm. For VaR format, the score = 
number of quantitative risk disclosures x maximum number of risk exposures disclosed. The 
same process is applied for Sen format.102 Then, the total score from quantitative risk 
                                                          
102 The quantitative disclosure component is derived from the VaR and Sen formats. For both formats, the 
maximum number of risk exposures in the GCC financial firms can be three. For example, if firm j discloses 
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disclosures is calculated as the sum of the scores from VaR and Sen formats scaled by the 
number of market risk exposures. Thus, the total value for DMRD1 is the sum of the total 
qualitative and quantitative risk disclosures. Firms that disaggregate more risk exposures are 
expected to have a higher score in the index.    
Market Risk Disclosures: DMRD2  
Following Riedl and Srinivasan (2010), DMRD2 is calculated based on the total score 
obtained from both VaR and Sen formats scaled by the formats’ maximum expected score:  
𝑫𝑴𝑹𝑫𝟐 = ∑
𝑸𝒖𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆_𝑰𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔  𝑿𝒊𝒋
𝒏𝒆,𝒋
𝒏𝒊𝟏=𝟏𝟒  
𝐭=𝟏  + ∑
𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆_𝑰𝒕𝒆𝒎𝒔  𝑿𝒊𝒋
𝒏𝒆,𝒋
𝒏𝒊𝟐=𝟏𝟒(𝟑)+𝟏𝟑(𝟑)  
𝐭=𝟏             
see Eq. (2) 
Xij = 1 if i
th item is disclosed for jth firm 
nej = total maximum expected score for qualitative and quantitative disclosures for j
th 
firm 
nj1 = total score (nj1 ≤ 14) from qualitative disclosures for jth firm 
nj2 = total score from quantitative disclosures for j
th firm. In calculating the 
quantitative score, I follow the same methodology as in DMRD1 so that 0 ≤ DMDR2 ≤ 2.  
 
Thus, DMRD2 captures the extent of disaggregated disclosure by each firm in each 
year in the annual report. I expect firms with a high positive correlation between risk items 
(e.g., interest rate and foreign currency exchange) and a higher quality of signals are most 
likely to disclose disaggregated market risk exposures in annual reports. Hence both DMRD1 
and DMRD2 are different measures as the first measure considers the number of risk 
exposures. On the other hand, the second measure does not consider risk exposures; it only 
considers the risk format, mainly VaR and Sen. 
3.3 Control Variables  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
two risk exposures (e.g., interest rate and foreign currency risk) under the VaR format, the maximum 
quantitative VaR score will be 28 (14 items * 2 exposures). The same process is also followed for the Sen 
format. 
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I include both firm-specific and country-specific control variables to test the association 
between the ICOE and disaggregation in mandatory market risk disclosures motivated by the 
prior literature on the ICOE (e.g. Francis et al. (2004); Hail and Leuz (2006); Lopes and de 
Alencar (2010); Li (2010)) and risk disclosure (e.g. Abraham and Cox (2007). Beta is 
calculates the expected return of an asset based on its beta and expected market return of at 
least 12 months a year. Leverage is the sum of the total short- and long-term liabilities 
divided by total assets. The book value of firm over market value is BM. Then I control for 
Tab (tabular is the third market risk disclosure format) as a dummy variable to check whether 
the tabular format complements or is a substitute for the market risk measure (Rajgopal 
1999). Furthermore, Chen et al. (2009) show that a firm’s corporate governance level and 
country-level investor protection have an impact on the cost of capital in an emerging market. 
Hence, I use firm-level corporate governance consisting of a 12-item index (Firm CG) as a 
control variable (the final score is scaled by 12 items). 103 In addition, I add the country’s 
gross domestic product (GDP)(log) in year t as a country-specific measure to control for 
country-specific variables (Pástor et al. 2008).104 Furthermore, following Leuz et al. (2003) 
and Gul et al. (2013), I conduct factor analysis (Factor)105 for country-level governance 
(which covers regulatory quality106 and control for corruption level, as derived from 
Kaufmann et al. (2009)]).107 I also apply a country-level investor protection index (which 
covers the extent of director liability and ease of shareholders to suit directors and managers 
from (La Porta et al. 2000). Size is the natural log of firm market capitalization at the end of 
the year. I also use portfolio size based on (Fama and French 1996): HML is high (book to 
                                                          
103 See Appendix C for detailed information regarding the corporate governance index. 
104 To make my analysis robust, I re-test the main analysis by fixing the country effects: un-tabulated results 
provide consistent evidence. 
105 I check the factor value year by year and find that values vary for each country and year.   
106 Regulation quality consists of trade policy, competitive environment and labour market policies. 
107 Control of corruption consists of transparency and corruption. 
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market ratio) less low (book to market ratio) for year t in country j; SMB is small (market 
capitalization) less large (market capitalization) in year t for country j. 
3.4 Empirical Models 
Model 1  
𝒓𝐸𝑆
0
𝒕,𝒄 
= 𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏𝑫𝑴𝑹𝑫𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒂𝟐𝑩𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒂𝟑𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +  𝒂𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊,𝒕 +  𝒂𝟓𝑻𝒂𝒃𝒊,𝒕 +
 𝒂𝟔𝑭𝒊𝒓𝒎 𝑪𝑮𝒊,𝒕 +  𝒂𝟕𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝒊,𝒋,𝒕 +  𝒂𝟖𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒊,𝒋,𝒕  + ∑ 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 & 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕   
 Eq. (11.1)          
𝒓𝑬𝑺
𝟎
𝒕,𝒄 
= 𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏𝑫𝑴𝑹𝑫𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒂𝟐𝑩𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒂𝟑𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +  𝒂𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒂𝟓𝑻𝒂𝒃𝒊,𝒕 +
 𝒂𝟔𝑭𝒊𝒓𝒎 𝑪𝑮𝒊,𝒕 +  𝒂𝟕𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝒊,𝒋,𝒕 +  𝒂𝟖𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒊,𝒋,𝒕  + 𝒂𝟗𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + ∑ 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 & 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚  + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕  
 Eq. (11.2)        
𝒓𝑬𝑺
𝟎
𝒕,𝒄 
= 𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏𝑫𝑴𝑹𝑫𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒂𝟐𝑩𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒂𝟑𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +  𝒂𝟒𝑩𝑴𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒂𝟓𝑻𝒂𝒃𝒊,𝒕 +
 𝒂𝟔𝑭𝒊𝒓𝒎 𝑪𝑮𝒊,𝒕 +  𝒂𝟕𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝒊,𝒋,𝒕 +  𝒂𝟖𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒊,𝒋,𝒕  + 𝒂𝟗𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒊,𝒕 +  𝒂𝟏𝟎𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒊,𝒕 + ∑ 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 & 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚  + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕  
 Eq. (11.3)          
        
where 𝒓𝐸𝑆
0
𝒕,𝒄 
 is the ICOE for each country in year t that is obtained after regressing equation 
(10) for each country and year. Then, I run the regression based on the final sample of 588 
firm-year observations. At this point, I can add a firm’s control variables to the regressions. 
DMRDi,t is the disaggregation in mandatory market risk disclosure of firm i in year t. I then 
fix the year and clustering by firm. To test the ICOE, I regress equation (11.1) with the 
independent variables based on three classes: small firms, medium firms, large firms and the 
pool sample. Equation (11.2) is then used for the pooled regression by including two types of 
size, first, the firm size  as measured by the natural log of the firm’s market capitalization 
[LMVAL]) and, in equation (11.3), I include portfolio size HML and SMB based on (Fama 
and French 1996). 
Model 2  
𝒓𝐸𝑆
0
𝒕,𝒄 
= 𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏𝑫𝑴𝑹𝑫𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒂𝟐  𝑨𝒖𝒅𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒂𝟑𝑫𝑴𝑹𝑫𝒊,𝒕 ∗ 𝑨𝒖𝒅𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +
 𝒂𝟒𝑩𝒆𝒕𝒂𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒂𝟓𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕  +  𝒂𝟔𝑩𝑴𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒂𝟕𝑻𝒂𝒃𝒊,𝒕 +  𝒂𝟖𝑭𝒊𝒓𝒎 𝑪𝑮𝒊,𝒕 +  𝒂𝟗𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒍𝒐𝒈 𝒊,𝒋,𝒕 +  𝒂𝟏𝟎𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒊,𝒋,𝒕  +
+ ∑ 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 & 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚 +  𝜺𝒊,𝒕        Eq.(12)
      
Following that used in prior literature, I adopt two measures for auditor conservatism: (1) Big 
4 auditor firms (Big4) and (2) discretionary accruals’ quality. For the first measure, reputable 
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auditors act very conservatively to protect their reputation; hence, a firm that is audited by 
Big4 reports more conservative disclosures (Clarkson et al. 2003; Kim et al. 2003; Liao et al. 
2013). In some GCC countries, for example, in the KSA and in Kuwait (Al-Shammari et al. 
2008), firms are audited by at least two auditors. In this study, I use a very strict measure for 
a conservative auditor. A firm that is proxied as being conservative has to meet two 
conditions: first, it is audited by at least two auditors and, second, at least one of these two 
auditors is from Big4. I have 407/588 financial firm-year observations that meet these 
criteria. The second measure is earnings’ accruals’ quality as a proxy for auditor 
conservatism. Firms that have high quality earnings’ accruals are audited very conservatively 
(Francis and Krishnan 1999). A firm with high earnings’ quality is proxied as receiving more 
conservative treatment from the auditors. I use performance-adjusted discretionary accruals 
developed by (Kothari et al. 2005). I estimate the following model by country and for each 
year that has at least nine observations.  
T-accruals i, t = α0 + α1 1/Asset i, t-1 + α2 ∆Rev i, t + α3 PPE i, t+ α4 ROA i, + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕    Eq.(13) 
I also adopt Jones (1991) model, as suggested by Klein (2002), by estimating the 
model below by industry and year that has at least nine observations: 
T-accruals i, t = α0 + α1 [1/Asset i, t-1] + α2 ∆Rev i, t  + α3  PPE i, t + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕    Eq. (14) 
where T-accruals i, t  is calculated as the change in non-cash current assets less the change in 
current liabilities less depreciation and amortization expenses for firm i in year t scaled by 
lagged total assets (Asset i,t , t-1). ∆Rev i,t  is calculated as revenue growth of one year at year t 
for firm i scaled by lagged assets. PPE i,t  is the firm’s total property, plant and equipment 
scaled by lagged total assets, and ROA i,t  is the firm’s return on assets in year t for firm i. The 
residuals from the model are the discretionary accruals. Then, I obtain the absolute value 
multiplied by -1 (EQ t-i): the higher the EQ t,i value, the higher the auditor conservatism. I 
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obtain 569 firm-year observations calculated by the model, as some missing values and 
lagged values are excluded from the total sample of 588, which noise the consistent estimate 
of the portfolio cost of equity capital (𝑟𝐸𝑆
0 ). However, (Easton 2006) includes these although 
the sample remains inconsistent in calculating (𝑟𝐸𝑆
0 ) due to fewer missing observations. I 
include Kothari et al. (2005), re-running the regressions using Kothari et al. (2005) model for 
my sensitivity analysis (Sen) with firm-specific models. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Before examining the hypotheses using OLS, descriptive statistics and correlation analyses 
are reported. White’s (1980) and Newey and West’s (1987) standard errors 
heteroskedasticity-corrected, serially uncorrelated and autocorrelation have been used in all 
regression models. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the 
potential effect of outliers on hypothesized associations. Table 6.1 reports summary statistics 
for the variables included in the regression models. The means (medians) of the ICOE (𝒓𝐸𝑆
0 ) 
and the pool sample are 0.18 (0.14), respectively. These numbers are very similar to the 
results of the prior study by (Lopes and de Alencar 2010). Table 6.1 shows that the means 
(medians) of DMRD1, DMRD2 and No_Risk (number of disaggregated risk exposures for 
firm i in year t) for the sample are 7.86 (7.70); 5.75 (5.70); and 1.89 (2.00) with a standard 
deviation of 3.756, 2.84 and 1.13, respectively. The mean (median) corporate governance 
index of sample firms in the study is 0.27 (0.23), suggesting that GCC financial firms exhibit 
lower levels of corporate governance. This also supports the argument found in (TNI Survey 
2008) of GCC corporate governance. However, for some variables, I find over-dispersion 
between means and variances that might be due to endogeneity. As a robustness check, I have 
also re-checked this issue as part of the endogeneity analysis (see Table 5). Overall, Table 1 
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(Panels B and C) show that there is a large dispersion among the sample firms in terms of 
control variables, and this dispersion illustrates a considerable diversity in the sample. For the 
regression analysis, I use log transformations of each country’s GDP. The descriptive 
statistics of other control variables are also generally in line with the prior studies suggesting 
that the sample is representative. 
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean S.D. Mdn Max 
rES
0  588 0.18 0.26 .14 1.07 
DMRD1 588 7.86 3.76 7.70 17.00 
DMRD2 588 5.75 2.84 5.70 13.20 
No_Risk 588 1.89 1.13 2.00 5.00 
AudCons B4 588 0.69 0.46 1.00 1.00 
AudCons Kothri 588 1.94 5.82 0.24 49.09 
AudCons Jones 569 1.72 5.92 1.24 50.10 
Beta  588 0.55 0.33 0.48 1.60 
Leverage  588 0.65 0.29 0.70 2.07 
BM  588 1.78 2.27 1.24 19.36 
Tab  588 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Firm CG  588 0.27 0.23 0.17 0.92 
Log(GDP ) 588 25.42 1.37 25.51 27.08 
GovFactor  588 -0.05 0.99 -0.19 1.62 
Size 588 6.14 1.72 6.08 9.74 
4.2 Correlation Analysis 
4.2.1 Variables correlation   
Table 6.2 reports the Pearson correlations matrix of the variables included in the regression 
analysis. As predicted, DMRD1 and DMRD2 are negatively correlated with the ICOE. In 
addition, the disclosure proxies (DMRD1 and DMRD2) are positively and significantly 
correlated with each other. Consistent with previous cost of capital studies, the proxy for the 
ICOE is significantly positively correlated with Beta and negatively correlated with BM, 
Leverage, GDP(log) and GovFactor, respectively. Moreover, un-tabulated correlation results 
show that other proxies of cost of capital measures are found to be positively correlated with 
proxies of disaggregation of mandatory market risk disclosures. These other proxies are rt-oj 
(the implied cost of equity based on Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005); rt-peg (the implied 
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cost of equity based on Easton [2004]); and rt-peg-RW (the implied cost of equity capital using 
Easton (2004)] based on Bradshaw et al. (2012) random walk forecasts).  
4.2.2 To what Extent does Disaggregation in Mandatory Risk Disclosures have a 
Negative Effect on the ICOE?  
The proxies of risk disclosures also have a negative impact on the proxies of information 
asymmetry. Regardless of the inclusion of the firm’s fundamental risk factors in the 
estimation equation, I also apply the work of Barth et al. (2013) by conducting the Pearson 
correlations matrix test to estimate the correlation among the three proxies of disaggregation 
in mandatory market risk disclosures (DMRD1, DMRD2, No_Risk) and five different proxies 
of information asymmetry based on the discretionary accruals’ quality (Dechow and Dichev 
2002; Jones 1991; Kothari et al. 2005; McNichols and Stubben 2008; Teoh et al. 1998). The 
un-tabulated result shows that the first two proxies of disaggregation in mandatory risk 
disclosures have a negative and significant correlation with all proxies of information 
asymmetry at 0.01% level, and a negative and non- significant correlation between No_Risk 
and the proxies of information asymmetry.108 
4.0 Regression Analysis 
4.1 H1: Association between Disaggregated Mandatory Risk Disclosures and Implied 
Cost of Capital (ICOE) 
Table 6.3 reports the ordinary least square (OLS)109 estimates of the association between the 
disaggregated mandatory risk disclosures and the ICOE. I show whether the ICOE of the firm 
depends systematically on DMRD1 through the three different classes of firms’ size as well 
as for the pool sample. DMRD1 is a proxy for disaggregation in mandatory risk disclosures 
                                                          
108 The correlations result is available upon request. 
 
109 The OLS result is reported after conducting the Breusch–Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) to decide the 
appropriateness of OLS over the random effect model. However, there is no significant difference across units 
(e.g., panel effects [including year and countries]). The null hypothesis proposes that variance across units is 
zero. I reject the null hypothesis for all models. For example, for DMRD1, the p-value of the LM test is 0.1157, 
0.1110, 0.1120 and 0.1124, for small, medium, large and pool samples, respectively.    
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which reflects the quality of market risk disclosures. The provision of voluntary 
disaggregation in mandatory risk disclosures encourages firms to disclose more firm specific- 
information to the public which reduces information asymmetry. Managerial opportunistic 
behaviour is curbed by disclosure which also prevents managers from making value-
destroying investment decisions, thus ultimately improving the cost of the capital of the firm.  
The coefficient on DMRD1 is negative and statistically significant for all the model 
estimates: small (281 firm-year observations); medium (146 firm-year observations); large 
(161 firm-year observations); and pool firms (588 firm-year observations), -0.022***, -
0.012*,   -0.013*, -0.013*** and -0.012***, respectively).110 I find significant reductions of 
approximately 22 basis points in the ICOE for small firms at 0.01% level; 12 basis points for 
medium firms at 0.05% level; and approximately 13 basis points for large firms. For the pool 
sample, I find that disaggregation of risk exposures reduces by approximately 12–13 basis 
points in the ICOE which is significant at 0.01% level.  
My result is similar to that of Chen et al. (2010) who use Easton and Sommers (2007) 
model based on current realized earning as the expected return. They find firms post-adoption 
of the Fair Disclosures Regulation in the U.S. have a negative association with the ICOE; 
however, they find a significant coefficient only for medium firms. These findings are 
consistent with the expectation of (𝐻1). The results also reveal that BM, Firm CG, Size (HML 
and SMB), and country governance and investor protection decrease the cost of capital. 
                                                          
110 * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 6.2: Pearson Correlation Matrix  
              1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
rES
0  1.000                           
DMRD2 -0.029 1.000             
DMRD1 -0.003 0.973*** 1.000            
No_Risk 0.013 0.548*** 0.541*** 1.000           
AudConsB4 0.041 -0.069* -0.039 0.089** 1.000          
AudConsKotheri -0.007 0.289*** 0.296*** 0.081** 0.088** 1.000         
AudCons Jones 0.014 0.270*** 0.274*** 0.072* 0.052 0.941*** 1.000        
Beta  0.196*** 0.041 0.051 -0.006 0.270*** 0.082** 0.111*** 1.000       
Leverage  -0.006 0.344*** 0.330*** 0.125*** -0.023 0.186*** 0.173*** -0.021 1.000      
BM  -0.108*** -0.025 -0.037 -0.165*** 0.085** -0.004 -0.023 -0.005 0.153*** 1.000     
Tab  0.040 0.340*** 0.330*** 0.1475*** 0.097*** 0.113*** 0.065 0.019 0.250*** 0.031 1.000    
Firm CG  0.066 0.180*** 0.169*** -0.068* -0.403*** 0.0928** 0.112*** 0.045 0.1103*** 0.056 0.188*** 1.000   
Log(GDP ) -0.298*** -0.081** -0.063 -0.079** 0.733*** 0.062 0.041 0.2054*** 0.010 0.047 0.128*** -0.226*** 1.000  
GovFactor  -0.275*** -0.0372 -0.028 0.060* 0.763*** 0.069* 0.030 0.1765*** -0.020 0.182*** 0.060 -0.196*** 0.624*** 1.000 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
All variables definitions in Appendix C 
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Consistent with the prior literature (e.g., Botosan 1997), I find that Beta and Leverage has a 
positive association with the ICOE. However, in model 𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool1
0 , I find a positive 
association between DMRD1 and firm size based on firm-level size but this is not significant. 
I follow (Chen et al. 2010) by replacing firm-level size by portfolio-level size based on (Fama 
and French 1996) factors (HML and SMB) in model 𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool2
0 . Consistent with studies in the 
GCC (e.g., Bley and Saad 2012), I find a significant negative association between both 
measures (HML and SMB) and the ICOE. In the regressions, I planned to include year and 
industry fixed effects (FE). I then included only year FE since the sample covers one industry 
digit.111 Also, I provide robustness checks and cluster the firms over five years for all models 
to mitigate the potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation dependence.  
4.2 H2: Interaction between Disaggregation in Mandatory Market Risk Disclosures, 
Auditor Conservatism and Implied Cost of Capital (ICOE)   
Table 6.4 presents the impact of auditor conservatism and disaggregation in mandatory 
market risk disclosures with respect to DMRD1. Firms with more disaggregated mandatory 
market risk disclosures and a conservative auditor are expected to face lower number of 
misstatements as a conservative auditor is more likely to ask firm management to correct 
errors and follow-up on reporting issues before the financial statements are released. The 
interaction between auditor conservatism and disaggregation in mandatory market risk 
disclosures offers managers alternative means to infer with the market direction so they can 
transfer more precise private signals as part of public disclosure which reduces the cost of 
capital. Firms with disaggregation in mandatory market risk disclosures that are audited by 
less conservative auditors enjoy a relatively lower reduction in the cost of capital. The reason 
                                                          
111 The GCC countries share homogenous features, such as being similar geographically, demographically and 
industrially (with oil). They also share similar features such as their political regimes and the application of 
similar accounting standards (IAS/IFRS). Therefore, I expect the DMRD index score to be in-variant in some 
years and, motivated by the prior empirical studies (e.g. Lin et al. 2008; Khurana et al. 2006), I report the results 
based on year fixed effects. The un-tabulated results are consistent.  
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for this is that firms with only disaggregated mandatory market risk disclosures suffer from a 
lack of investor confidence and uncertainties which do not exist with firms that have 
conservative auditors (Libby and Brown 2013).  
Table 6.3: Disaggregated Market Risk Disclosures and Implied Cost of Equity Capital 
 𝒓𝐸𝑆−Samll
0  𝒓𝐸𝑆−Medium
0  𝒓𝐸𝑆−Large
0  𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool1
0  𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool2
0  
Intercept 2.103*** 2.218*** 1.140* 1.764*** 1.512*** 
 (-6.71) (-3.94) (-1.76) (-7.17) (6.29) 
DMRD1  -0.022*** -0.012* -0.013* -0.013*** -0.012*** 
 (-3.23) (-1.68) (-1.89) (-3.05)   (-3.07) 
Beta  0.216*** 0.342*** 0.217*** 0.227*** 0.214*** 
 (4.22) (3.44) (2.99) (5.46) (5.33) 
Leverage  -0.047 0.029 0.069 -0.02 0.000 
 (-0.68) (0.36) (1.38) (-0.45)    (0.01) 
BM  -0.003** 0.026** 0.004 -0.001 -0.012*** 
 (-2.13) (2.11) (0.47) (-0.73)    (-3.32) 
Tab  -0.015 0.029 0.093* 0.038 0.046*   
 (-0.59) (0.58) (1.97) (1.49) (1.84) 
Firm CG  -0.097 -0.071 -0.01 -0.049 0.014 
 (-0.90) (-0.78) (-0.09) (-0.81)    (0.24) 
Log(GDP ) -0.080*** -0.090*** -0.041* -0.067*** -0.057*** 
 (-6.11) (-4.03) (-1.70) (-6.86)    (-6.30) 
GovFactor  -0.042* 0.021 -0.068** -0.036**  -0.074*** 
 (-1.81) (0.48) (-2.31) (-2.10)    (-3.43) 
Size     0.019  
    (1.30)  
HML     -0.001*** 
     (-3.54) 
SMB     -0.000**  
     (-2.49) 
Year & Industry  FX Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Robust/Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq 35.1% 283% 36.7% 31.7% 31.4% 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Robust t-values in parentheses 
The variable definitions are in Appendix C. 
 
To determine whether auditor conservatism is impacted by firm size across GCC 
countries, I also divided the sample into three classes of firms: small, medium and large. I 
employ three measures of auditor conservatism that are used in the prior literature. The first 
two are measures of discretionary accruals based on models by Kothari et al. (2005) and 
Jones (1991). The third is based on the Big 4 (AuditBig4) (Francis and Krishnan, 1999). The 
coefficient on interactions between disaggregation in mandatory market risk disclosures 
(DMRD1) and auditor conservatism is negative for all models. The significance level varies 
based on the models used and firm’s size. For example, I find significant associations for 
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large firms and the pool sample in Model 1; significant association for the pool sample in 
Model 2, and significant association for small and medium firms in Model 3. This suggests 
that the proxies capture the various differences in interaction. The coefficient of the main 
independent variable (DMRD1) is found to be significant and negative in all models with the 
exception of small, medium and large firms in Model 3. This suggests that firms with a 
conservative auditor and high quality and more disaggregation in mandatory market risk 
disclosures enjoy a greater reduction in the ICOE, compared to their counterparts. For 
instance, in Model 1, as shown in Table 6.3, I find the coefficient of DMRD1 for large firms 
is -0.0013* which is significant at 0.10% level. Then, as shown in Table 6.4, large firms that 
employ a conservative auditor and have high disaggregation in mandatory market risk 
disclosures have greater impact on the ICOE, by an effect of -0.0023 (-0.0022** DMRD1 + -
0.0010* DMRD1 * AudCons Kothari) at 0.05% level. Furthermore, the control variables are in 
line with the base regressions. These results signify that the presence of auditor conservatism 
affects the level of disaggregated disclosures. These results are also consistent with the 
findings that the more conservative the auditor, the more credible are the disclosures.  
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
4.3.1 Alternative disaggregation in mandatory market risk disclosures 
I conduct several additional robustness checks. First, to address the potential concern that the 
measurement of disaggregation in mandatory market risk disclosures does not adequately 
capture the level of disaggregation, I construct a second disaggregation index (DMRD2) 
which measures the extent of market risk disclosures. The results in Table 6.5 show that the 
main inference is unchanged even after different specifications of disaggregation in 
mandatory market risk disclosures. My results are significant and negative at the 0.01% level 
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Table 6.4:  Disaggregated Market Risk Disclosures (DMRD1), Audit Conservatism and Implied Cost of Equity Capital: 
 Model 1: AudCons Kothri  Model 2: AudCons Jones  Model 3: AudCons B4 
 rES−Samll
0  rES−Medium
0  rES−Large
0  rES−pool
0   rES−Samll
0  rES−Medium
0  rES−Large
0  rES−pool
0   rES−Samll
0  rES−Medium
0  rES−Large
0  rES−pool
0  
Intercept 2.579*** 2.581*** 1.281* 1.560***  2.074*** 2.685*** 1.072 1.512***  2.853*** 3.612*** 2.792*** 2.698*** 
 (7.25) (4.02) (1.93) (6.72)  (6.05) (4.11) (1.67) (6.00)  (14.53) (8.81) (4.51) (11.82) 
DMRD1  -0.025*** -0.016* -0.017** -0.013***  -0.022*** -0.015* -0.019** -0.013***  -0.004 -0.002 -0.007 -0.006**  
 (-3.21) (-1.90) (-2.23) (-3.12)     (-2.94) (-1.89) (-2.26) (-3.03)     (-1.19) (-0.53) (-0.95) (-2.06)   
AudCons 0.009 0.032 0.011* 0.010**   0.017 0.038 0.013 0.011**   0.865*** 0.862*** 0.470*** 0.706*** 
 (0.95) (0.88) (1.92) (2.10)  (1.49) (1.41) (1.57) (2.20)  (11.2) (6.88) (4.60) (11.89) 
DMRD * AudCons -0.002 -0.003 -0.001* -0.001**   -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001**   -0.027*** -0.019* -0.004 -0.002 
 (-1.21) (-0.91) (-1.83) (-2.16)     (-1.54) (-1.43) (-1.49) (-2.24)     (-3.19) (-1.81) (-0.49) (-0.60)    
Beta  0.227*** 0.326*** 0.206*** 0.210***  0.234*** 0.351*** 0.234*** 0.220***  0.100** 0.194** 0.135** 0.108*** 
 (4.35) (3.08) (2.79) (5.21)  (4.31) (3.18) (2.86) (5.13)  (2.12) (2.6) (2.62) (3.67) 
Leverage  -0.035 0.028 0.101* 0.001  -0.051 0.033 0.141** 0.002  0.012 0.017 0.201*** 0.026 
 (-0.47) (0.36) (1.76) (0.03)  (-0.69) (0.41) (2.46) (0.04)  (0.35) (0.30) (4.20) (0.81) 
BM  -0.023* -0.053** -0.010** -0.012***  -0.022 -0.053** -0.011** -0.013***  -0.005 -0.030** -0.012** -0.009*** 
 (-1.76) (-2.48) (-2.35) (-3.36)     (-1.66) (-2.494) (-2.60) (-3.22)     (-0.43) (-2.18) (-2.40) (-3.14)    
Tab  -0.017 0.041 0.086* 0.046*    -0.011 0.035 0.071 0.042  0.000 0.057* 0.065 0.021 
 (-0.65) (0.82) (1.80) (1.80)  (-0.47) (0.66) (1.44) (1.64)  (0.01) (1.89) (1.63) (1.10) 
Firm CG  -0.15 -0.107 0.023 0.016  -0.129 -0.095 0.018 0.021  0.247*** 0.323*** 0.188** 0.201*** 
 (-1.25) (-1.20) (0.26) (0.27)  (-1.05) (-1.07) (0.19) (0.35)  (4.91) (5.31) (2.31) (4.66) 
Log(GDP)  -0.086*** -0.096*** -0.045* -0.057***  -0.080*** -0.095*** -0.045* -0.056***  -0.139*** -0.164*** -0.122*** -0.131*** 
 (-6.17) (-3.78) (-1.81) (-6.55)     (-5.73) (-3.72) (-1.78) (-5.90)     (-17.90) (10.02) (-5.12) (-14.95)    
GovFactor  -0.040* 0.025 -0.056* -0.076***  -0.042* -0.024 -0.063** -0.072***  -0.242*** -0.141*** -0.112*** -0.243*** 
 (-1.82) (-0.58) (-1.92) (-3.60)     (-1.92) (-0.54) (-2.17) (-3.12)     (-8.31) (-3.27) (-4.52) (-11.68)    
HML    -0.001***     -0.001***     -0.001*** 
    (-3.57)        (-3.47)        (-5.39) 
SMB    -0.000**      -0.000*       -0.000*** 
    (-2.49)        (-1.78)        (-6.06)    
Year & Industry  FX Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Robust/Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq 33.2% 29.5% 36.6% 31.3%  32.1% 30.8% 36.8% 30.8%  64.9% 57.6% 51.2% 56.8% 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Robust t-values in parentheses 
The variable definitions are in Appendix C. 
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for firms of all sizes with the exception of large firms where I find the coefficient to be 
significant at 0.10% level. Furthermore, the control variables are in line with the main 
regressions. Then, I also test whether the results on the interaction between disaggregation in 
mandatory market risk disclosures and auditor conservatism are affected by the alternative 
measure of disaggregation in mandatory market risk disclosures. Table 6.6 confirms that my 
results in all models are robust to the alternative definition of disaggregated mandatory 
market risk disclosures. Furthermore, the un-tabulated result of the pool sample shows that 
the DMRD2’s coefficient is negative and significant (-0.0034) at 5% level with t-statistics of -
2.21 with the ICOE, even after controlling for country dummies.112  
I also adopt a third alternative measure of disaggregation of market risk disclosures 
being the number of disaggregated risk exposures (No_Risk) in the sense that a firm that 
discloses more market risk exposure is disaggregating more risk exposures. Un-tabulated 
results show that the coefficient for the association between No_Risk and the disaggregation 
of market risk disclosures is negative and significant at 0.05% level for small firms, and is 
negative and not significant for other regressions. 
4.3.2 Potential serial dependence 
Following Hoi et al. (2013), I average the variables over the five-year sample period 
to mitigate concern about potential serial dependence in the data. Then, I re-run the 
regressions in the main analysis using the average variables from the pool sample for both 
measures of DMRD1 and DMRD2. The un-tabulated results show that my results are 
consistent with the main regression results. For instance, I find negative and significant 
coefficients at 0.01%, 0.05% and 0.01% levels for both DMRD1 and DMRD2 for all size 
levels of firms (small, large and pool samples, respectively), but not for firms of medium 
size, where I find a negative but non-significant association.   
                                                          
112 Prior literature in the GCC region does not control for country effects (e.g. see Bley and Saad 2011). 
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4.3.3 Factor analysis decomposition and Firm CG decomposition 
Moreover, I replace the factor variable (GovFactort) obtained from factor analysis with 
decomposed items, namely country governance level and investor protection level (consisting 
of the extent of disclosure liability, ease of shareholders to suit directors and managers, 
regulatory quality and control of corruption indexes) and re-run the regressions. I find that the 
results’ sign and the effects are almost unchanged for both DMRD1 and DMRD2, and that the 
coefficients are negative and significant at the 0.01% level for all of the small, large and pool 
samples, but not for medium firms where I find the coefficient to be negative and significant 
 
 
Table 6.5 Additional tests:  Disaggregated Market Risk Disclosures (DMRD2) and Implied Cost 
of Equity Capital 
  𝒓𝐸𝑆−Samll
0  𝒓𝐸𝑆−Medium
0  𝒓𝐸𝑆−Large
0  𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool1
0  𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool2
0  
Intercept 2.296*** 3.000*** 1.350** 1.917*** 1.576*** 
 (7.05) (4.65) (2.15) (7.96) (6.41)    
DMRD2  -0.034*** -0.024** -0.019** -0.024*** -0.020*** 
 (-3.83) (-2.31) (-2.21) (-4.40) (-3.78)    
Beta  0.224*** 0.317*** 0.212*** 0.219*** 0.213*** 
 (4.41) (3.21) (2.92) (5.42) (5.37)    
Leverage  -0.035 0.051 0.108** 0.011 0.006    
 (-0.51) (0.69) (2.03) (0.24) (0.13)    
BM  -0.021* -0.054** -0.010** -0.018*** -0.013*** 
 (-1.75) (-2.61) (-2.32) (-3.84) (-3.35)    
Tab  -0.010 0.047 0.087* 0.039 0.049**  
 (-0.41) (0.92) (1.84) (1.61) (1.98)    
Firm CG  -0.127 -0.106 0.019 -0.039 0.009    
 (-1.21) (-1.22) (0.20) (-0.66) (0.16)    
Log(GDP ) -0.086*** -0.104*** -0.048** -0.075*** -0.058*** 
 (-6.40) (-4.24) (-2.08) (-7.90) (-6.41)    
GovFactor  -0.031 0.027 -0.053* -0.028* -0.073*** 
 (-1.52) (0.66) (-1.89) (-1.75) (-3.42)    
Size     0.034**                 
    (2.36)                 
HML     -0.001*** 
     (-3.53)    
SMB     -0.000**  
     (-2.56)    
Year & Industry  FX Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Robust/Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq 35.2% 30.1% 34.8% 29.5% 32.4% 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Robust t-values in parentheses 
The variable definitions are in Appendix C. 
 
at the 0.10% level. I also decompose the Firm CG index into the 12 items and I then re-run 
the main regressions in Table 6.3 and Table 6.5 for both DMRD1 and DMRD2. My results 
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are unchanged in that I find them to be negative and significant for all firm sizes at 0.01%, 
0.10%, 0.05% and 0.01% levels for small, medium and large firm and pool samples, 
respectively. In addition, I find that having the board chairman on board committees, all 
characteristics of the audit committee and independence of the remuneration committee 
reduce the ICOE.  
4.3.5 Sample partition into sub-samples 
As suggested by Lu and Sapra (2009), to increase the statistical power of auditor 
conservatism tests with the proxy for disaggregation disclosures, I divided the sample into 
two sub-samples: first firms with conservative auditors and, second, firms that did not have 
conservative auditors, for DMRD1, DMRD2 and No_Risk. Table 6.7 shows that in the main 
test, the ICOE is negatively and significantly reduced for firms with conservative auditors at 
the 0.01% level. For DMRD1, I obtain 0.007*** and for DMRD2, the coefficient is -
0.011***, while for No_Risk, I find a coefficient of -0.018* significant at 0.10% level. On the 
other hand, I find a positive and non-significant association for the second sub-sample in all 
measures of disaggregated disclosures. This provides further evidence that the level of 
disaggregated mandatory market risk disclosures is improved when audited by conservative 
auditors, hence reducing the ICOE. 
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Table 6.6 Additional tests: Disaggregated Market Risk Disclosures (DMRD2), Audit Conservatism and Implied Cost of Equity Capital 
  AudCons Kothari  AudCons Jones  AudCons B4 
 𝒓𝐸𝑆−Samll
0  𝒓𝐸𝑆−Medium
0  𝒓𝐸𝑆−Large
0  𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool
0   𝒓𝐸𝑆−Samll
0  𝒓𝐸𝑆−Medium
0  𝒓𝐸𝑆−Large
0  𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool
0   𝒓𝐸𝑆−Samll
0  𝒓𝐸𝑆−Medium
0  𝒓𝐸𝑆−Large
0  𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool
0  
Intercept 2.217*** 2.912*** 1.279* 1.620***  2.161*** 2.818*** 1.074* 1.586***  2.880*** 3.689*** 2.795*** 2.709*** 
 (6.58) (4.31) (1.93) (6.63)     (6.24) (4.15) (1.68) (6.15)  (15.05) (8.43) (4.52) (11.9) 
DMRD2  -0.035*** -0.027** -0.022** -0.022***  -0.036*** -0.025** -0.026** -0.022***  -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.009**  
 (-3.81) (-2.35) (-2.27) (-3.81)     (-3.70) (-2.26) (-2.33) (-3.78)     (-0.99) (-0.67) (-0.94) (-2.25)    
AudCons 0.010 0.039 0.012* 0.011**   0.020* 0.031 0.014 0.013**   0.867*** 0.833*** 0.470*** 0.706*** 
 (1.15) (1.07) (1.98) (2.46)     (1.77) (1.13) (1.64) (2.52)     (11.72) (6.61) (4.59) (11.99)    
DMRD * AudCons  -0.003 -0.005 -0.001* -0.001**   -0.005* -0.004 -0.001 -0.001***  -0.425*** -0.226 0.049 -0.046    
 (-1.28) (-1.10) (-1.90) (-2.59)     (-1.75) (-1.14) (-1.57) (-2.62)     (-4.05) (-1.61) (0.50) (-0.85)    
Beta  0.224*** 0.319*** 0.207*** 0.209***  0.227*** 0.346*** 0.234*** 0.218***  0.099** 0.197** 0.135** 0.109*** 
 (4.43) (3.17) (2.81) (5.31)     (4.38) (3.20) (2.89) (5.14)     (2.12) (2.63) (2.62) (3.74)    
Leverage  -0.037 0.040 0.104* 0.004     -0.044 0.047 0.145** 0.009     0.013 0.021 0.202*** 0.028    
 (-0.55) (0.53) (1.80) (0.09)     (-0.61) (0.58) (2.51) (0.19)     (0.40) (0.36) (4.18) (0.89)    
BM  -0.022* -0.052** -0.010** -0.012***  -0.022* -0.053** -0.011** -0.013***  -0.005 -0.027** -0.012** -0.009*** 
 (-1.78) (-2.56) (-2.27) (-3.35)     (-1.71) (-2.51) (-2.59) (-3.29)     (-0.43) (-2.02) (-2.38) (-3.14)    
Tab  -0.009 0.051 0.085* 0.050**   -0.005 0.044 0.070 0.045*    0.007 0.066** 0.064 0.023 
 (-0.35) (1.00) (1.79) (2.05)     (-0.22) (0.82) (1.42) (1.79)     (0.37) (2.16) (1.61) (1.22)    
Firm CG  -0.136 -0.115 0.024 0.012     -0.132 -0.104 0.018 0.017  0.231*** 0.310*** 0.189** 0.196*** 
 (-1.28) (-1.31) (0.26) (0.21)     (-1.11) (-1.19) -0.19 -0.28  -4.89 -4.97 -2.32 -4.55 
Log(GDP ) -0.084*** -0.100*** -0.045* -0.059***  -0.082*** -0.100*** -0.045* -0.058***  -0.139*** -0.164*** -0.122*** -0.131*** 
 (-6.22) (-3.89) (-1.82) (-6.54)     (-5.88) (-3.81) (-1.80) (-6.02)     (-18.47) (-10.14) (-5.15) (-15.08)    
GovFactor  -0.035* 0.020 -0.057* -0.072***  -0.041* 0.022 -0.063** -0.071***  -0.233*** -0.138*** -0.112*** -0.241*** 
 (-1.68) (0.48) (-1.95) (-3.42)     (-1.97) (0.52) (-2.21) (-3.13)     (-8.14) (-3.20) (-4.52) (-11.57)    
HML    -0.001***     -0.001***     0.001*** 
    (-3.57)        (-3.48)        -5.39 
SMB    -0.000**      -0.000*       -0.000*** 
    (-2.42)        (-1.82)        (-6.07)    
Year & Industry FX Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Robust/Cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq 34.9% 32.1% 36.6% 32.5%  34.3% 32.0% 37.0% 32.0%  66.3% 57.5% 51.2% 57.2% 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Robust t-values in parentheses 
The variable definitions are in Appendix C. 
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4.3.6 Potential endogeneity between disaggregated mandatory market risk disclosures 
and implied cost of capital: using two-stage least square (2SLS) 
It is possible that my proxies for disaggregated market risk disclosures (DMRD1 and 
DMRD2) are endogenously determined along with the ICOE due to omitted variables and 
measurement error.113 If the proxies are endogenous and correlated with the error term, I 
expect that OLS will inconsistently estimate the parameters in the regressions. Motivated by 
Hossain et al. (2005) and Barton and Waymire (2004), my approach to deal with endogeneity 
is to resort to econometrics by using an instrumental variables estimator such as two-stage 
least squares (2SLS). The selection of instrumental variables is guided by Larcker and 
Rusticus (2010) to report the results and justify the use of selected instrumental variables and 
to present a number of diagnostic tests.  
The selection of instruments should also be stable the constant sample of 588 that is 
acquired to calculate 𝒓𝐸𝑆
0 ; and thus, I include instruments only that do not have any missing 
values. I use the number of risks scaled by 2 if the firm uses two formats of market risk 
disclosures (No_Risk); a qualitative index score scaled by 2 if firms use two formats of 
market risks (No_QulRisk); firms’ Age(log); Tang (total property, plant and equipment (PPE) 
scaled by total assets); female director on the board of directors (FemaleMem); and a dummy 
variable of 1 if firms disclose their hedging instruments on market risk; otherwise 0. The 
theoretical argument for the use of the number of risks and the qualitative index as an 
instrumental variable is that the number of market risk exposures that firms disclose in annual 
reports is correlated with the disaggregated market risk disclosures index but not with the cost 
of capital. In addition, older firms have well-established reporting systems; hence disclosures 
are less costly (Al-Shammari et al. 2008) and thus I include firms’ Age(log) (calculated by the 
year founded less the current year).  
                                                          
113 For example, I add Tab which is one of the market risk disclosure formats that may create endogeneity 
problems for both DMRD1 and DMRD2. 
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Table 6.7 Sensitivity tests: Disaggregated Market Risk Disclosures, Audit Conservatism and Implied Cost of Equity Capital using firm’s specific 
measures: 
  Model 1:DMRD1t 
 
Model 2:DMRD2t 
 
Model 3:No_Riskt 
 
𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool
0  
 
𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool
0  
 
𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool
0  
 AuditConsB4=1 AuditConsB4=0 
 
AuditConsB4 AuditConsB4=0 
 
AuditConsB4=1 AuditConsB4=0 
Intercept 6.138*** 1.447*** 
 
6.093*** 1.462*** 
 
6.480*** 1.454*** 
 
(10.609) (3.674) 
 
(10.575) (3.755) 
 
(10.925) (3.378)    
DMRD -0.007*** 0.001 
 
-0.011*** 0.001 
 
-0.018* 0.001    
 
(-2.672) (1.127) 
 
(-3.139) (0.755) 
 
(-1.978) (0.294)    
Beta  0.086*** 0.003 
 
0.088*** 0.002 
 
0.080** 0.002    
 
(2.757) (0.092) 
 
(2.877) (0.074) 
 
(2.510) (0.055)    
Leverage  0.046 -0.024 
 
0.048 -0.022 
 
0.043 -0.021    
 
(1.234) (-1.481) 
 
(1.288) (-1.467) 
 
(1.126) (-1.385)    
BM  -0.011*** -0.007* 
 
-0.011*** -0.008** 
 
-0.011*** -0.008**  
 
(-5.986) (-2.004) 
 
(-5.956) (-2.075) 
 
(-5.363) (-2.120)    
Tab  0.010 0.005 
 
0.012 0.005 
 
0.012 0.006    
 
(0.666) (0.415) 
 
(0.808) (0.475) 
 
(0.750) (0.553)    
Firm CG  0.185*** -0.000 
 
0.181*** -0.000 
 
0.177*** -0.002    
 
(4.200) (-0.019) 
 
(4.112) (-0.005) 
 
(3.744) (-0.057)    
Log(GDP ) -0.221*** -0.144*** 
 
-0.220*** -0.144*** 
 
-0.234*** -0.143*** 
 
(-9.700) (-9.023) 
 
(-9.654) (-9.134) 
 
(-10.100) (-8.275)    
GovFactor  -0.242*** -1.430*** 
 
-0.239*** -1.428*** 
 
-0.244*** -1.426*** 
 
(-7.748) (-38.281) 
 
(-7.632) (-39.455) 
 
(-7.768) (-39.572)    
HML -0.048*** 0.005*** 
 
-0.047*** 0.005*** 
 
-0.048*** 0.005*** 
 
(-12.325) (50.774) 
 
(-12.184) (52.072) 
 
(-12.342) (52.123)    
SMB -0.000 0.000*** 
 
-0.000 0.000*** 
 
-0.000 0.000*** 
 
(-1.563) (10.605) 
 
(-1.543) (10.767) 
 
(-1.535) (9.975)    
Year & Industry  FX Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Firm Robust/Cluster Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
N 407 181 
 
407 181 
 
407 181 
Adj. R-sq 62.7% 92.8% 
 
62.9% 92.8% 
 
62.5% 92.8% 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Robust t-values in parentheses 
The variable definitions are in Appendix C. 
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I am also motivated by (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000) and (Barton and Waymire 2004) to 
include Tang (PPE scaled by total assets) as an instrumental variable for disclosure. In 
addition, Terjesen et al. (2009) and Adams and Ferreira (2009) suggest that having a female 
director improves firms’ governance level and also the allocation of more monitoring effort 
as harder questions are asked within the board with the presence of at least one female 
director; therefore, I include female director (FemaleMem) as an instrument that correlates 
with disaggregation disclosures. Finally, for firms with more hedging activities that have 
more market risk exposures to disclose (Lin et al. 2008; DeMarzo and Duffie 1995), I add a 
dummy variable of 1 if the firm supplements their market risk exposures in the annual report 
with hedging disclosures (HD); otherwise 0.  
I also supplement the theoretical link with several econometric post-estimation checks 
by: (i) testing the productivity power of the instruments; (ii) the weak instrument test; (iii) the 
under-identification test; (iv) the over-identification test; and (v) the Durbin–Wu–Hausman 
test to determine the validity and appropriateness of instrumental variables in comparison to 
the OLS estimator for all pool main regressions. To assess whether a weak instrument is a 
problem, I report robust F-statistics and partial R2, Shea’s partial R2 and p-value114 (for 
detailed discussion, see (Murray 2006). The reported F-statistics in Table 6.8 for the four 
instruments is higher than the benchmark suggested by Stock et al. (2002).115 As the first-
stage partial F-statistics (R2) are above (below) the critical values, the instruments are 
considered not to be weak (strong), and there is no potential inference problem in the 
analysis. I report on Kleibergen–Paap LM statistics and the Wald F-statistic for under-
identification and weak-identification. The results show that the F-statistic is higher than the 
Stock et al. (2002) benchmark. For example, based on the 10% maximal instrumental 
                                                          
114 For the weak instrument test, if the F-statistic is lower than 10 (the rule of thumb) and the partial R2 is lower 
than 0.05%, this indicates the exclusion effects of the instruments as a percentage. 
115 Stock et al. (2002) weak instrument benchmarks test the F-statistic. If the number of instruments is 1, 2, 3, 5 
and 10, the suggested critical F-values are 8.96, 11.59, 12.83, 15.09 and 20.88, respectively. 
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variables (IV) size critical value “> 29.18”, rk Wald F-statistic for DMRD1 is 80.5982 and 
for DMRD2 is 71.595. Then, I conduct the Hansen J statistic over-identified models test (i.e., 
use of the number of instruments that is more than the number of endogenous regressor) to 
determine the appropriateness of the instruments.116. The reported results show that in all the 
models, I do not reject the null hypothesis which also justifies the appropriateness of the 
instruments. I also perform the standard Durbin–Wu–Hausman test to justify the use of 2SLS 
rather than OLS results. I reject the null hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressor 
can actually be treated as exogenous, hence 2SLS provides robust results when testing the 
association between disaggregation in mandatory market risk disclosures and the ICOE. In 
addition, the coefficients are statistically stronger and more powerful at 0.01% level. 
For clarity, I show the results for instrumental variables (IV) estimation in Table 6.8. 
In all models, the disaggregated mandatory risk disclosures are significantly negatively 
associated with the ICOE at the 0.01% level. This is consistent with the expectations as well 
as with the results from the main regression analysis. Furthermore, the un-tabulated results 
also show consistent evidence for all firm size classes for both DMRD1 and DMRD2. The 
coefficients for DMRD1 (small, medium and large) are -0.0706***; -0.0693 and -0.0469***, and for 
DMRD2 (small, medium and large) are -0.0967***; -0.0971 and -0.0639***.  
4.3.7. (a) Alternative implied cost of capital measures for firm-specific factors 
As a robustness check, I also check whether the results are specific to the ICOE or to auditor 
conservatism. Therefore, I adopt additional three firm-specific measures: first,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
116 This test requires that at least one of the instruments be valid (Cameron and Pravin 2009) 
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Table 6.8 Endogeneity tests:- 
  Model 1: DMRD1t  Model 2: DMRD2t 
 𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool
0   𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool
0  
 First Stage Second Stage  First Stage Second Stage 
Intercept 6.447* 2.092***  5.224* 2.111*** 
 (1.73) (8.38)  (1.79) (8.50) 
DMRD  -0.028***   -0.038*** 
  (-4.39)   (-4.49) 
All Variables in Main Specification  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year & Industry FX Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Robust/Cluster Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
N 588 588  588 588 
Instrumental Variables Coff. t-statistic  Coff. t-statistic 
HD 1.024** (2.30)  0.695** (2.11) 
Tang -2.984*** (-2.6)  -1.865** (-2.14) 
Age(log) 0.364 (1.60)  0.232 (1.31) 
FemaleMem 0.188 0.33  0.29 (0.66) 
No_Risk 0.444** (2.06)  0.371** (2.23) 
No_QulRisk 11.892*** 7.5  8.735*** (7.11) 
Intercept 6.447* (1.73)  5.224* (1.79) 
Post-estimations Tests for Instrumental Variables: 
1-Predictive power Partial R2 
Partial R2 & Shea 0.3921    0.3799   
Robus F-test 26.26   24.18  
P-vlaue 0.000   0.000  
2- Underindenificaiton test 160.9     
Kleibergen-Paap rk  LM statistic 0.000   151.886  
P-value    0.000  
3- Weak Indentification test 80.598     
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 29.18   71.595  
10% maximal IV size    29.18  
4- Overidentification test 6.91     
Hansen J statistic 0.2274   6.985  
Chi-sq(6) P-val 160.9   0.2218  
5-Endogeneity test      
Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests  5.615   3.156 
Chi-sq(1) P-val   0.0178    0.0757 
HD is firm has hedging in market risk disclosures, otherwise 0, Tang total PPE scaled by total asset, Age firm’s age 
calculated the difference between year t – year of foundation; FemaleMem firm’s board of directors with female directors 1, 
otherwise0, No_Risk is the number of market risk exposures in year t; No_QulRisk is the scaled number of qualitative items 
in Appendix B divided on No_Risk in year t. 
using the abnormal growth model based on Easton (2004) and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
(2005); and, second, I adopt the PEG model that uses random walk earnings’ forecasts based 
on (Bradshaw et al. 2012). In addition, I use a second proxy for auditor conservatism based 
on accrual quality based on (Kothari et al. 2005), thus using the following regression model:  
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𝒓𝒊,𝒕 = 𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏𝑫𝑴𝑹𝑫𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒂𝟐  𝑨𝒖𝒅𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝒂𝟑𝑫𝑴𝑹𝑫𝒊,𝒕 ∗ 𝑨𝒖𝒅𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +
 𝒂𝟒𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍 𝑽𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊,𝒕  + ∑ 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 & 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚   + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕        Eq.(15) 
      
I find that alternative measures for the ICOE and auditor conservatism provide 
consistent results. In all models, the coefficients of the main independent variables are 
significantly negative except for roj for DMRD2 for which the coefficient is negative but not 
significant. For Easton (2004) model, I find the coefficient of DMRD1 is -0.0212** at 5% 
level and that of DMRD2 is -0.0280* at 10% level). For Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) 
model, DMRD1 is -0.0229* at 10% level and DMRD2 is -0.023: for the PEG model’s random 
walk earnings’ forecasts using (Bradshaw et al. 2012), the coefficient of DMRD1 is -
0.0106** at 0.10% level and for DMRD2 is -0.0168*** at 0.01% level). Furthermore, the 
coefficients for the interaction between the proxy for disaggregation disclosures DMRD1 
(DMRD2) and earning quality (proxy for auditor conservatism) are all negative and only 
significant for rpeg, being -0.0002*, (-0.0026*); -0.0001 (-0.0011); and -0.0001 (-0.0014), 
respectively. 
4.3.7.(b) Using future realized earnings as expected earnings 
In addition, I repeat the calculation procedure, used in section 3.1, to obtain a second 
portfolio-specific ICOE using future realized earnings as the expected return to obtain 30 
portfolios based on country and year that are calculated from 588 observations based on 
(Easton and Sommers 2007):  
 
𝑬𝑷𝑺𝒕+𝟏
𝑩𝒕
=  𝜹𝟎 +  𝜹𝟏
𝑷𝒕
𝑩𝒕
+  𝝁𝒕       Eq. (16.1) 
Where 𝜹𝟎 + 𝜹𝟏 =   𝒓𝑬𝑺
𝟏 , the ICOE based on future realized earnings can be obtained by 
estimating the firm portfolio at time t in country j consistent with Chen et al. (2010) and Bley 
and Saad (2012). Therefore, I regress the 𝑟𝐸𝑆
1  with only portfolio measures, first with Fama 
and French (1996) factors and second with country GDP(log) t,j and country governance and 
investor protection level (Factor t,j) for country j at time t: 
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𝒓𝐸𝑆
0
𝒕,𝒋 
= 𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏   ∑ (𝑫𝑴𝑹𝑫) 𝒕,𝒋𝒕=𝟓 +  𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒕,𝑱 + 𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒕,𝑱 +  𝑮𝑫𝑷(𝒍𝒐𝒈)𝒕,𝑱 +  𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒕,𝑱 +  𝜺𝒕,𝑱 Eq. (16.2) 
𝒓𝐸𝑆
1
𝒕,𝒋 
= 𝒂𝟎 + 𝒂𝟏   ∑ (𝑫𝑴𝑹𝑫) 𝒕,𝒋𝒕=𝟓 +  𝑯𝑴𝑳𝒕,𝑱 + 𝑺𝑴𝑩𝒕,𝑱 +  𝑮𝑫𝑷(𝒍𝒐𝒈)𝒕,𝑱 +  𝑭𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒕,𝑱 +  𝜺𝒕,𝑱 Eq. (16.3) 
 
where mean (DMRD)t,j is the average firm’s DMRD over five years for country j in year t; 
HML is high (book to market ratio) less low (book to market ratio) for year t in country j; 
SMB is small (market capitalization) less big (market capitalization) in year t for country j. 
Table 6.9 shows that even when I run regressions with portfolio-specific factors (excluding 
firm-level factors), I find a negative and significant association between disaggregation in 
mandatory market risk disclosures and the ICOE for current realized earnings 𝒓𝐸𝑆
0
𝒕,𝒋 
and it is 
also negative for future realized earnings 𝒓𝐸𝑆
1
𝒕,𝒋 
. This suggests that my results are consistent 
even after excluding firm-specific factors. 
Table 6.9 Sensitivity tests: Disaggregated Market Risk Disclosures and Implied Cost of Equity 
Capital on portfolio based using (Fama and French 1996) Factors: 
 𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool
0
  𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool
0
 
Intercept 1.152*** 1.216***  47.775*** 47.591*** 
 (5.173) (5.3)  (5.02) (5.04) 
DMRD1 -0.010**   -0.025  
 (-2.43)   (-0.16)  
DMRD2  -0.018***   -0.018 
  (-3.08)   (-0.09) 
HML -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.009 -0.009 
 (-4.57) (-4.56)  (-1.45) (-1.44) 
SMB -0.000** -0.000**  -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-2.39) (-2.41)  (-4.02) (-4.04) 
Log(GDP ) -0.040*** -0.041***  -1.577*** -1.574*** 
 (-4.79) (-4.88)  (-4.65) (-4.64) 
GovFactor -0.089*** -0.088***  -0.137 -0.142 
 (-4.06) (-4.02)  (-0.22) (-0.23) 
Year & Industry  FX Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Robust/Cluster Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq 24.3% 25.2%  23.9% 23.9% 
𝑟𝐸𝑆
1 is the implied cost of equity for portfolio based on Easton and Sommers (2007) based on 588 year 
observations based on future realized earnings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.8 Additional analysis: Royal family members 
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Chen et al. (2011c) find that the presence of a quality auditor in stated-owned firms reduces 
the cost of equity capital. Given the high representation of royal family members on the board 
of GCC-listed firms, I follow Chen et al. (2011c) by interaction with disaggregation, first, 
with firms with non-royal family board members and, second, with firms without royal 
family member board members but with auditor conservatism. The prior studies (e.g., 
Boubakri et al. 2012) provide evidence that political connections reduce the cost of capital 
due to increased information asymmetry (Chaney et al. 2011). In this test, I assume that the 
presence of a conservative auditor in firms not connected to royal family members will 
reduce information asymmetry by making more accurate disaggregation. I find that the 
interaction between disaggregation in firms in the presence of a royal family board member 
has a positive impact β4 on the ICOE. In addition, I find that the interaction between 
disaggregation firms in the presence of a conservative auditor but without royal family board 
members has a negative impact on the ICOE, all of which are significant at p < 0.01 level. I 
then re-test, as shown on Table 6.10, using discretionary accrual (Kothari et al. 2005) and 
find similar evidence.  
5. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
I examine the impact of disaggregation in mandatory market risk disclosures on the implied 
cost of equity capital (ICOE) of GCC firms. I find that disaggregation in mandatory market 
risk disclosures has a significant and negative impact on the ICOE. In addition, I find that the 
existence of a conservative auditor magnifies the negative association between the 
disaggregation of market risk disclosures and the ICOE. My results are robust using 
alternative measures for the ICOE for firm-specific models, several measures of 
disaggregation proxies, different sampling models and the endogeneity test. Unlike prior 
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studies, this study adopts a portfolio-specific model based on firms’ realized earnings after 
controlling for firm-level factors, following the approach by used by (Easton 2006).  
 
Table 6.10: Association between Disaggregation, Audit Conservatism, Non-Royal family, and 
ICOE 
Dependent Variable 𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool
0
 𝒓𝐸𝑆−pool
0
 
Independent Variable  Model: DMRD1 Model2: DMRD2 
Intercept -0.353*** -0.337*** 
 (-4.54) (-4.33) 
DMRD  -0.017** -0.026*** 
 (-2.41) (-2.83) 
AudCons 0.564*** 0.544*** 
 (10.023) (9.89) 
DMRD * AudCons  -0.006* -0.026*** 
 (-1.707) (-2.83) 
Non-Royal -0.150** -0.166*** 
 (-2.44) (-2.71) 
DMRD * Non-Royal  0.023*** 0.033*** 
 (3.07) (3.43) 
Non-Royal * AudCons -0.201*** -0.188*** 
 (-5.00) (-4.55) 
All Variables in Main Specification Yes Yes 
Year  FX Yes Yes 
Firm Robust/Cluster Yes Yes 
N-Obs. 588 588 
Adj. R-sq 46.50% 47.1% 
Non-Royal is firm’s is not politically connected by royal family member. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Robust t-values in parentheses 
This study is important for several reasons. First, it furnishes unique evidence of the 
significant role that auditor conservatism plays in reducing uncertainty and increasing 
confidence relating to disclosed market risk information. In fact, when market risk 
information is devolved into its components, the existence of a conservative auditor enhances 
the informativeness of those market risk disclosures to the extent that it magnifies the 
negative relation between disaggregated disclosures and the ICOE. As far as I am aware, this 
is the first study that has examined the association between disaggregated market risk 
disclosures, cost of capital and auditor conservatism. Second, this study extends other recent 
studies that have examined the benefits of disaggregated disclosures relating to earnings (see 
e.g., Venter et al. 2013). Third, this study provides a testable methodology for researchers 
intending to investigate the implied cost of capital (ICC) in the GCC region, where firms are 
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less frequently followed and covered by financial analysts, by adopting the ICOE for 
portfolio-specific measures using firm-specific measures based on realized earnings.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this thesis, empirical examination of the determinants and consequences on market risk 
disclosures are undertaken. I test three objectives: The first objective of this thesis is to 
test the association between the existence of a board risk sub-committee and the extent of 
market risk disclosures (Chapter 4). The second objective of this thesis is to examine the 
impact of discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures on firm investment efficiency 
(Chapter 5). The third objective is to investigate the impact of firm’s disaggregation in 
mandatory market risk disclosures and audit conservatism on the implied cost of capital 
(Chapter 6). The analyses in this study are based on a unique hand collected dataset of 
financial firms belonging to six GCC countries, spanning a five year time period. Section 
2 discusses the summary of the findings from empirical analyses while Section 3 provides 
the contribution of this research. Finally, Section 4 provides possible future areas of study 
and provides an account of the implications of this study. 
2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
The three aspects examined in this study are presented in Chapters Four, Five and Six. 
The first objective (Chapter 4) investigates that whether or not a separate RC can improve 
the extent and quality of risk disclosures. Prior studies in developed markets suggest that 
the typical audit committee (AC) is inadequate for managing financial and non-financial 
risks relating to complex and high-risk environments specifically those typical of the 
GCC countries. Since an RC concentrates on and specializes in risk oversight and risk 
management, I hypothesize that the RC may strengthen a firm’s risk management system 
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which ultimately leads to an improvement in firm’s risk reporting. A stand-alone RC is 
found to be a significant factor that improves both the extent and quality of market risk 
disclosures. This result is unchanged even after estimating the analysis using a panel 
regression model (fixed and random effects). I also undertake the Heckman (1978) model 
to control for any possible endogeneity. The results remain unaffected in that the 
existence of a RC increases both extent and quality of market risk disclosures. The 
characteristics of the RC are then analysed to ascertain which key determinants of market 
risk disclosures are. Both size and qualification of RC members are important 
determinants in enhancing the extent and quality of market risk disclosures. As an 
additional test, I also test the impact of RC on market risk disclosures depending on firm 
life cycle. I find that the existence of a RC is a significant determinant of market risk 
disclosures in the mature-stage of a firm’s life cycle as compared to the introduction 
stage. This result is robust using various measures of life cycle and after fixing the effects 
of country, year, industry and market risk methods. 
As part of objective 3 (Chapter 5), I investigate the impact of discretion in mandatory 
market risk disclosures of financial firms on that firm’s investment efficiency. I argue that 
discretion in market risk disclosures provides more precise market risk information 
relating to firms’ exposures, which in turn improves investment efficiency by reducing 
the extent of information asymmetry and moral hazard issues. I find that firms with more 
discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures have more efficient investments. In 
particularly, discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures reduces over and under 
investment of the firm. These results are robust even after conducting two-stage OLS 
regression which provides consistent results with the base regression model. I also test the 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure interaction models of (Einhorn 2005; Gigler 1994; 
Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter 2003). More discretion in mandatory disclosures reduces 
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firms’ level of voluntary disclosures. Firms decide to voluntarily disclose in order to 
increase the precision of their mandatory disclosures. Consistently, I find that the 
interaction between discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures and voluntary 
disclosures reduces over and under investment. These results are consistent using 
different investment models after controlling for country and firm-specific factors.    
In objective 3 (Chapter 6), I examine the association between the disaggregation of 
mandatory market risk disclosures and the implied cost of capital. Disaggregated 
information is considered to provide investors more information regarding private 
activities. Hence, it is expected that disaggregation in risk disclosures reduces the 
information asymmetry among investors, and thus reduces the implied cost of equity 
capital. Consistent with theory, I find that disaggregation in market risk disclosures 
reduces the implied cost of capital. This chapter tests the interaction between auditor 
conservatism and disaggregation of disclosures on the implied cost of capital.  I also find 
that firms audited by a conservative auditor provide disaggregated disclosures, and hence 
provide a greater reduction in the implied cost of capital. This result is robust using 
different measures of the cost of capital, disaggregation of market risk disclosures, and 
auditor conservatism. In all regression models, I control for firm and country level 
factors, and industry and year dummy variables.  
3. CONTRIBUTION 
 
This study makes several contributions to the literature on market risk disclosures, 
and corporate governance. First, the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that 
investigates board risk management committees and the quality and extent of firm risk 
disclosures. Prior studies provide evidence that audit committee characteristics improve 
the extent of disclosures. The question of whether the voluntary formation of risk 
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committee can improve market risk disclosures has not been examined. In this thesis, I 
explicitly examine this association and thus, I shed light on an aspect of reporting which 
is growing in importance. Second, I extend the findings of prior studies in that firm size is 
found to one of the more important determinants of risk disclosure, consistent with the 
findings of prior studies. The results show that a stand-alone risk committee plays a more 
significant role in enhancing market risk disclosures of mature-stage firms than that of 
young-stage firms.  
Third, this study examines the impact of discretion in mandatory risk disclosure 
on investment efficiency. Prior literature investigates the association between financial 
reporting quality and investment efficiency, and to the best of my knowledge, there has 
been negligible research investigating the association between discretion in mandatory 
risk disclosures and investment efficiency. I show that discretion in mandatory risk 
disclosures provides investors with credible information which reduces uncertainty and 
improves managerial decision-making.   
Fourth, prior research examined disaggregation in mandatory earnings, special 
items, expenses and segment reporting, while this study extends the prior literature by 
providing evidence on the consequences of the disaggregation of mandatory market risk 
disclosures on the implied cost of capital. Fifth, whilst in most emerging markets, most 
stocks rarely receive any analyst coverage and few analyst recommendations in the GCC 
which reduces firm-specific earnings’ forecasts, I provide an approach for determining 
the implied cost of capital using a firm-specific realized earnings model by adopting the 
simultaneous portfolio measure of (Easton and Sommers 2007).   
Sixth, while prior research provides empirical evidence of investment efficiency, 
implied cost of equity capital, and market risk disclosures in developed markets (e.g. 
U.S.) and in emerging Asian markets (e.g. China), there is far less research that focuses 
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on emerging markets from the GCC. In this thesis, I investigate the determinants and 
consequence of market risk disclosures in six GCC countries characterized by low level 
of disclosure, weak enforcement regimes and lower investor protection. Finally, although 
investment efficiency and implied cost of capital of non-financial firms has been tested in 
prior studies, there is a lack of empirical evidence of both investment efficiency and 
implied cost of capital of financial firms. This thesis uses a sample of financial firms 
consisting of banks, financial, insurance and investment firms.  
4. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
 
First, this thesis will be of interest to academics and researchers as the development of the 
theories, hypotheses and analysis in this thesis related to market risk disclosures also will 
be applicable for future research. Researcher may test management’s incentive to disclose 
discretionary information under mandatory disclosure regime. Future research could 
investigate the relation between political connection and discretion in mandatory risk 
disclosures, specifically in emerging countries such as the GCC where the politicians 
intervene in most business transactions. Furthermore, disaggregation of mandatory risk 
disclosures is one of the effective ways that firms utilise to reveal the private information 
to investors; hence less informed investors can offset the better informed investor, which 
may has implication to capital providers. Future research may test the association 
between disaggregation in mandatory disclosure and firms’ stock crash. In addition, this 
study suggests that the risk management at the board level plays a significant role in 
enhancing the level and quality of market risk disclosures. The findings also indicate the 
recent corporate governance structures, practices and codes do not appear to be sufficient 
in improving firm’s risk reporting, specifically in younger firms. Regulatory authorities 
may well be interested in reviewing the rules governing the risk reporting in the GCC 
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countries. The voluntary formation of board risk management committee suggests that the 
larger firms are able to form a stand-alone risk committee, hence smaller firms disclose 
less. Mandating internal governance practices such as requiring the formation of a risk 
management committee is a matter currently under consideration by GCC regulatory 
bodies.    
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Appendix A: List of Items Examined in Constructing Mandatory & Discretionary 
Market Risk Disclosures Index 
Value at Risk (VaR) Index: Qualitative Items Sources Sensitivity Analysis (Sen): 
Qualitative Items 
Sources 
a. Effect of VaR on cash flow/ fair value/earning  
(M ) 
IFRS 7: Paragraph 18- 
40a, FRR. 
48:305(a): 1F 
a. Effect of Sen on cash flow/ fair 
value/earning  (M ) 
IFRS 7: Paragraph 18- 
40a, FRR. 48:305(a): 1F 
b. Two or more VaR  effects on cash flow/fair 
value/earning  (V) 
IFRS 7: Paragraph 18- 
40a, FRR. 
48:305(a): 1F 
b. Two or more Sen effects on 
cash flow/fair value/earning  (V) 
IFRS 7: Paragraph 18- 
40a, FRR. 48:305(a): 1F 
c. Objective of risk management ( M) IFRS 7: Paragraph 18-
40a 
c. Objective of risk management ( 
M) 
IFRS 7: Paragraph 18-40a 
d. Policies of risk management ( M) IFRS 7: Paragraph 
33,  FRR .48 305 
(a)(1)  
d. Policies of risk management ( 
M) 
IFRS 7: Paragraph 
33,  FRR .48 305 (a)(1)  
e. Limitations of risk management  (M) IFRS 7: 41 C e. Limitations of risk management  
(M) 
IFRS 7: 41 C  
f. Other risk exposure except for interest rate, 
currency and price risk (V) 
  f. Other risk exposure except for 
interest rate, currency and price risk 
(V) 
 
g. Disclosure of gain from VaR (V) IFRS 7: Paragraph 25: 
B20 
g. Disclosure of gain from Sen (V) IFRS 7: Paragraph 25: 
B20 
h. Non-trading market risk  (V) IFRS 7: Paragraph 20 h. Non-trading market risk  (V) IFRS 7: Paragraph 20 
i. Immaterial market risk exposure (V) IFRS 7: Paragraph 17-
40a 
i. Immaterial market risk exposure 
(V) 
IFRS 7: Paragraph 17-40a 
j. Risk target of the firm (V) IFRS 7: Paragraph 40 j. Risk target of the firm (V) IFRS 7: Paragraph 40 
k. Other stress testing (V) Basel II k. Other stress testing (V) Basel II 
l. Qualitative description of stress test (V) IFRS 7: Paragraph 19- 
20 & 19-a, FRR. 48: 
305(a): 1 A-D  & 
Basel II 
l. Qualitative description of stress 
test (V) 
IFRS 7: Paragraph 19- 20 
& 19-a, FRR. 48: 
305(a): 1 A-D  & Basel II 
m. Stress test result (V) IFRS B19 B m. Stress test result (V) IFRS B19 B 
n.  Near term risk exposure (M) FRR. 48 305(a) 4.a 
and IFRS B19 B 
n.  Near term risk exposure (M) FRR. 48 305(a) 4.a and 
IFRS B19 B 
Qualitative Score: 14 points   Qualitative Score: 14 points   
Quantitative Index for each Interest Rate, Foreign Exchange, Equity Price and 
other commodity price 
Quantitative Index for each Interest Rate, Foreign 
Exchange, Equity Price and other commodity price  
1-VaR Characteristics   1-Sen Characteristics   
a. Holding period under VaR (M) IFRS: B20, Basel & 
FRR. 48 305(a)(1)(iii): 
C  
a. Potential loss => 10%  (M) IFRS 7: B19a, B18b & 
FRR. 48 305(a)(1)(ii) 
b. Confidence level (e.g., 99%, 95%) (M) IFRS: B20, Basel & 
FRR. 48 305(a)(1)(iii): 
C 
b. Potential loss <10% (V) 
c. Type of VaR model (M) IFRS: B20 c. Economic Justification for 
<10% (V) 
d. Data time frame (M) IFRS: B20, Basel & 
FRR. 48305 A (i),(i) a 
d. Multi Scenarios ( 10% and 
20%) or (100, 200 points) (V) 
2-VaR Statistics: Summary      2-Sen Statistics : Summary  
a. Annual average VaR (V) FRR. 48 305 a 1(iii) 
(A) 
a. Annual Ave. Sen over the year 
(V) 
  
b. Minimum VaR over the year (V) FRR. 48 305 a 1(iii) 
(A) 
b. Minimum Sen over the year (V) IFRS 7 B19a+ B19b 
c. Maximum VaR over the year (V) FRR. 48 305 a 1(iii) 
(A) 
c. Maximum Sen over the year (V) 
d. Year-end VaR (M) IFRS: B20, FRR. 48 
305 a 1(iii) (A) 
d. Period indication for Ave., Max 
and Min Sen (M) 
e. Diversification effect (V) FRR. 48: 305(a): 1 E e. Individual exposure in the risk 
type (e.g., all currencies) (V) 
3-VaR Inter-temporal Comparison   3-Sen Inter-temporal 
Comparison 
  
a. Summary information about the previous Years' 
VaR (M) 
IFRS: B20, FRR. 48: 
305 a 3 a (1) i 
a. Summary information about 
previous Year’ Sen (M) 
  
4-VaR Back-testing    b & c. change in Sen from % to 
Point or Point to %** (V) 
IFRS 7 C9: 36A & 
Holder 2002 
a. Number of exceptions (V) Basel II d. Justification for the change from 
% to point or vice versa (V) 
b. Explanation of Exceptions (V) Basel II   
5-Graphical presentation of daily VaR       
a &b. Histogram of daily VaRs and/or plot of daily 
VaRs* (V) 
Basel II     
Quantitative Score: 14 points for each market risk exposure. Quantitative Score: 13 points for each market risk 
exposure 
Total VaR Score: 28 Points Total Sen Score: 27 points   
M and V denote mandatory (based on IFRS 7)  and voluntary disclosure respectively 
* Score of 1 if Histogram of Daily VaR is disclosed or score of 2 if both histogram and plot are disclosed 
** Score of 1 if firm changes Sen figures from % to point or vice versa or score of 2 if both % and point changes are disclosed.  
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Notes: 
1. In addition to basic VaR characteristics (holding period and confidence interval) my disclosure index considers 
disclosures of the VaR models and time frame used to calculate the models.  Sen Characteristics considers the hypothetical 
change (e.g., greater or less than 10%), or economic justification for less than 10% change and multi scenario sensitivity 
analysis.  
  
2. Year-end figure is the most updated number; however, this number may be subject to manipulation. Hence I consider the 
average, maximum and minimum VaR over the year. I also consider diversification effects. Perignon and Smith (2010b) 
suggest that firms usually report high level of VaR due to less consideration for diversification. I repeat this procedure for 
Sen. I include disaggregation of individual exposure in the risk type (e.g., disaggregation of foreign currency exposures). 
Disaggregation of risk exposures will allow users to discount the market risk exposures (Holdder 2000).  
 
3. Inter-temporal Comparison is included in index aiming to signal whether VaR estimates of current year changes from that 
of previous year. This help the investors to understand firm’s market risk trends and risk management position over the 
years. For Sen disclosure,I incorporate detailed inter-temporal comparison over the years.   
 
4. Back-testing compares the actual losses that exceed the reported VaR exceptions in specified confidence level (Jorion 
2007), which aid in estimating the accuracy of the forecasted VaR figures.   
 
5. Graphical presentation of VaR shows the daily trend of VaR figures. Daily VaR  histogram allow users to assess its level 
and time-series properties Perignon and Smith (2010b). VaR plots help the user to detect any exceptions.  
 
In overall, indices go beyond SEC Financial Reporting Release No. 48 (FRR 48) and Basel II requirement on market risk 
disclosures. The adoption of IFRS 7 allows for discretion in several market risk disclosures. For example, for Sen, the 
hypothetical change (%) is specified at 10% under SEC FRR. 48, however, IFRS 7 does not require any specific hypothetical 
change, unless the firm assumes the change is reasonable. 
 
 
Appendix A- Supplementary 1: Qualitative Scores  
Item a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Sum 
2007 109 71 84 114 12 24 0 37 31 24 24 13 6 4 553 
2008 120 73 95 121 14 29 0 41 35 39 29 17 6 3 622 
2009 121 86 95 127 13 30 3 40 32 46 33 20 6 6 658 
2010 126 85 95 128 14 28 4 39 31 46 34 22 7 6 665 
2011 123 84 95 125 13 29 4 39 33 45 33 21 7 6 657 
                
Appendix A- Supplementary 2: Quantitative Value-at-Risk (VaR) Scores 
Item a1 b1 c1 d1 a2 b2 c2 d2 a3 b&c3 d3    Sum 
2007 72 133 34 18 3 2 5 96 164 5 0    532 
2008 93 151 42 28 4 4 7 122 211 5 0    667 
2009 100 155 40 29 4 4 6 129 225 6 0    698 
2010 104 159 41 28 4 5 7 130 230 9 0    717 
2011 101 153 39 26 4 5 6 128 224 8 0       694 
                
Appendix A- Supplementary 3: Quantitative Sensitivity Analysis (Sen) Scores 
Item a1 b1 c1 d1 a b c d e a3 a4 b4 a&b5 Sum 
2007 32 30 27 32 16 10 10 21 6 22 4 3 1  214 
2008 34 32 29 34 18 13 13 25 6 22 5 3 1  235 
2009 28 26 20 27 13 11 11 20 5 15 8 3 2  189 
2010 31 28 20 27 15 13 13 20 5 16 8 3 0  199 
2011 31 28 20 27 15 13 13 20 5 16 10 3 0   201 
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Appendix A- Supplementary 4: Graphical presentation for Mandatory & Discretionary Market 
Risk Disclosures Index Scoring Process 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Un-weighted index of corporate governance 
Board Composition 
1-Independence: Majority of Independent Directors  
2-Extern-Directorship: Firm cross-directorship board member  
3-Inter-Directorship : Duality of chairperson with more than one Committee 
4-Duality of CEO/Chairman: CEO and Chairperson  
Risk Committee 
5- Risk committee chaired by Independent Director 
6-At least one of the Risk Committee member director has  Finance background  
7-Size of the Risk Committee (1 if firms size greater than median size) 
8 Majority of Independent member of Risk Committee 
Remuneration & Compensation Committee 
9-Remuneration Committee chaired by Independent Director  
10-Size of Remuneration Committee (1 if firms size greater than median size) 
11-Majority of Independent member of Remuneration Committee  
Audit Committee 
12- At least one of the Audit Committee member has Finance background (AuditComQul) 
13- Audit committee chaired by Independent Director (AudiInd) 
14- Size of the Audit Committee  
15- Majority of Independent member of Audit Committee  
Total CGs : 15 Items 
 
 
 
Quantitative Index (13*4)/4
Characteristics=5 
point
 Summary 
Statistics=5 points
Comparison =3 
points
Individual 
Index
13 Points 
Interest Rate 13P
Exchange Currency 
13P
Equity Price 13P 
Commodity Price 
13P
Qualitative Index 
Limitation
Policy
Risk Management
Voluntarily 
Disclosure 
Stress Testing 
Overall 
Index 
15 Points 
Expected  SenIndex for Firm i = 28 
Pints  
Sensitivity Analysis Model
Quantitative Index (13*4)/4
Characteristics=4 
point
 Summary 
Statistics=5 points
Comparison =1 
points
Individual 
Index
13 Points 
Interest Rate=13P
Exchange Currency 
13 P
Equity Price 13P 
Commodity Price 
13P 
Qualitative Index 
Limitation
Policy
Risk Management
Voluntarily 
Disclosure 
Stress Testing 
Overall 
Index 
15 Points 
Expected  VarIndex for Firm i = 28 
Pints  
Value at risk (VaR) Model
Back-testing= 2 
Points
Daily Figures= 
1Points  
Qualitative and Quantitate Market Risk Disclosure Index 
(QQMRDis) Index. 28 Point for firm i
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Appendix C: Variable Definition and Measurement 
Variables = Definition and Measurement 
The implied cost of capital Variable 
rES
0   
 
 The implied cost of equity for portfolio based on Easton and Sommers 
(2007).  
Disclosure Proxies (Appendix A) 
EMRD  The extent of market risk disclosures. “Objective 1” 
   
DMRD1  Discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures based on risk coverage 
which measure the quality of disclosure. “Objective 2” 
 
The disaggregated mandatory market risk disclosures based on risk 
coverage which measures the quality of disclosure. “Objective 3” 
 
QMRD  The quality of market risk disclosures. “Objective 1” 
   
DMRD2  Discretion in mandatory market risk disclosures scaled by maximum 
expected score, which reflects the extent of disclosures. “Objective 2” 
 
The disaggregated mandatory market risk disclosures scaled by maximum 
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expected score as measure on the extent for disclosures. “Objective 3” 
 
Audit Conservatism Proxies 
AudConsKothri   conservative auditor based on firm’s Financial Reporting Quality (FRQ) 
using (Kothari et al. 2005) 
AudConsJones  conservative auditor based on FRQ using (Jones 1991) 
 
AudCons B4  Firm is audited by two auditors and at least of them from Big 4. 
   
Investment Efficiency Variables 
Investment (U & 
O)  
 
 (Property, Plant and Equipment – Depreciation – Sale of Asset) / Lagged 
Asset. Average of cash and leverage to rank firms on their likelihood of 
over- and under-investment, Under invest if investment under the average of 
cash and leverage and Over invest if investment over the average of cash 
and leverage. 
 
Residual (U& O)  Estimated from equation 2: Negative residuals are considered under 
investment and positive residuals are considered over investment. 
   
Risk Committee (RC) and Characteristics Variables 
RC_D  Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the firm has dedicated risk 
committee, 0 otherwise. 
   
Factor_RC  Eigenvalue obtained from three RC characteristics (RC_Independence, 
RC_Qualification & RC_Size). 
   
RC_Independence  Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if majority of RC director are 
independent, 0 otherwise. 
RC_Qualification  Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if at least one director in RC 
has academic and professional degree in accounting/finance, 0 otherwise. 
RC_Size  The number of directors in RC. 
   
   
Control Variables 
Beta t  Firm’s beta for at least of twelve months. 
 
Leverage t     Total short & long term liabilities divided on total asset. 
 
BM t  Growth measures calculated based on total book value divided on total 
market value of firm’s outstanding shares value at the end of last month 
(March) after the release of the firm’s annual reports. 
 
Tab t    The disclosed tabulation format for firm I equal 1 if firm disclose otherwise 
0. 
 
Firm_CG1  Firm level corporate governance index of three dichotomous items 
that covers independent of BOD, duality of CEO/Chairman, and 
firm’s director with outside directorship seat.  
 
Firm CG2 t  Sum score of firm level corporate governance consists of 12 attributes 
scaled by Total expected items (Appendix B) 
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GDP t(log)    The total Gross Domestic Products for country I in t year 
 
GovFactor  Factor analysis of country investor protection index (which covers extent of 
director liability and ease of shareholders’ suit directors and managers) and 
country level governance (which covers regulatory quality and control of 
corruption). 
 
McapDev  Market development, measured as total stock market capitalization of each 
country divided by total Gross Domestic Products (GDP) in year t.  
 
Size (asset)  Natural logarithm of total assets.  
 
HML  High minus Low portfolios size based on (Fama and French 1996). 
 
SMB  Small minus Big portfolios size based on (Fama and French 1996). 
 
ROE  Firm’s Return on Equity. 
 
Slack  Slack of the firm, measured as total cash scaled by lagged total asset.  
    
Age  Natural Log of age of the firm, measured as the log of the difference 
between current year and year of establishment of the firm.  
 
Tab  Dummy variable for Tabular formats, which takes a value of 1 if firm 
disclose tabular format, 0 otherwise.   
    
VD  Proxy for voluntary disclosure, VD takes a value of 1 if Firms’ EPS in 
current year is higher than that of previous year 1, 0 otherwise. 
   
Big4  Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if firm is audited by one of the 
big four auditors, 0 otherwise. 
 
AC_Factor   Eigenvalue obtained from four Audit Committee (AC) characteristics 
(AC_Independence, AC_Qualification, AC_Size & AC_Chair 
Independence. 
 
 
Family_Dir    Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if at least one director in  
the board represents family ownership,0 otherwise. 
 
Gov_Dir    Dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if at least one director in 
the board represents government (or one of its agencies) ownership, 0 
otherwise. 
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